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| author | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 09:55:01 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 11:08:21 -0400 |
| commit | 4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 (patch) | |
| tree | 350aa83b47da0b574a814795392b20b0bed83cbc /fs/fuse/acl.c | |
| download | linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.tar.gz linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.zip | |
ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_opsgrafted
There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since
it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls
ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that
if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to
have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other
call.
Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the
ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that
states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex
has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut
having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after
the mute is taken in case of races.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/fuse/acl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/fuse/acl.c | 161 |
1 files changed, 161 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/fuse/acl.c b/fs/fuse/acl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..31fb50e16 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/fuse/acl.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * FUSE: Filesystem in Userspace + * Copyright (C) 2016 Canonical Ltd. <seth.forshee@canonical.com> + */ + +#include "fuse_i.h" + +#include <linux/posix_acl.h> +#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> + +static struct posix_acl *__fuse_get_acl(struct fuse_conn *fc, + struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu) +{ + int size; + const char *name; + void *value = NULL; + struct posix_acl *acl; + + if (rcu) + return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); + + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + + if (fc->no_getxattr) + return NULL; + + if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) + name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS; + else if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) + name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT; + else + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); + + value = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!value) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + size = fuse_getxattr(inode, name, value, PAGE_SIZE); + if (size > 0) + acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(fc->user_ns, value, size); + else if ((size == 0) || (size == -ENODATA) || + (size == -EOPNOTSUPP && fc->no_getxattr)) + acl = NULL; + else if (size == -ERANGE) + acl = ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); + else + acl = ERR_PTR(size); + + kfree(value); + return acl; +} + +static inline bool fuse_no_acl(const struct fuse_conn *fc, + const struct inode *inode) +{ + /* + * Refuse interacting with POSIX ACLs for daemons that + * don't support FUSE_POSIX_ACL and are not mounted on + * the host to retain backwards compatibility. + */ + return !fc->posix_acl && (i_user_ns(inode) != &init_user_ns); +} + +struct posix_acl *fuse_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, int type) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); + + if (fuse_no_acl(fc, inode)) + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); + + return __fuse_get_acl(fc, inode, type, false); +} + +struct posix_acl *fuse_get_inode_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu) +{ + struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); + + /* + * FUSE daemons before FUSE_POSIX_ACL was introduced could get and set + * POSIX ACLs without them being used for permission checking by the + * vfs. Retain that behavior for backwards compatibility as there are + * filesystems that do all permission checking for acls in the daemon + * and not in the kernel. + */ + if (!fc->posix_acl) + return NULL; + return __fuse_get_acl(fc, inode, type, rcu); +} + +int fuse_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct posix_acl *acl, int type) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); + const char *name; + int ret; + + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + + if (fc->no_setxattr || fuse_no_acl(fc, inode)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) + name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS; + else if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) + name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if (acl) { + unsigned int extra_flags = 0; + /* + * Fuse userspace is responsible for updating access + * permissions in the inode, if needed. fuse_setxattr + * invalidates the inode attributes, which will force + * them to be refreshed the next time they are used, + * and it also updates i_ctime. + */ + size_t size; + void *value; + + value = posix_acl_to_xattr(fc->user_ns, acl, &size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!value) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (size > PAGE_SIZE) { + kfree(value); + return -E2BIG; + } + + /* + * Fuse daemons without FUSE_POSIX_ACL never changed the passed + * through POSIX ACLs. Such daemons don't expect setgid bits to + * be stripped. + */ + if (fc->posix_acl && + !in_group_or_capable(idmap, inode, + i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode))) + extra_flags |= FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID; + + ret = fuse_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0, extra_flags); + kfree(value); + } else { + ret = fuse_removexattr(inode, name); + } + + if (fc->posix_acl) { + /* + * Fuse daemons without FUSE_POSIX_ACL never cached POSIX ACLs + * and didn't invalidate attributes. Retain that behavior. + */ + forget_all_cached_acls(inode); + fuse_invalidate_attr(inode); + } + + return ret; +} |
