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authorKees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>2026-09-02 15:31:14 -0700
committerKees Cook <kees@kernel.org>2026-09-04 21:37:00 -0700
commit3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d (patch)
treec65086f9bdcd48c6360fb7cb4598bca084da1f32 /fs/fuse/acl.c
downloadlinux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.tar.gz
linux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.zip
treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversionsgrafted
This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc() family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's "--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control flow indicator I could find. Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc, riscv, and s390 with no new warnings. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1] Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/fuse/acl.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/fuse/acl.c161
1 files changed, 161 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/fuse/acl.c b/fs/fuse/acl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..31fb50e16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/fuse/acl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * FUSE: Filesystem in Userspace
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Canonical Ltd. <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
+ */
+
+#include "fuse_i.h"
+
+#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
+
+static struct posix_acl *__fuse_get_acl(struct fuse_conn *fc,
+ struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu)
+{
+ int size;
+ const char *name;
+ void *value = NULL;
+ struct posix_acl *acl;
+
+ if (rcu)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+ if (fuse_is_bad(inode))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
+
+ if (fc->no_getxattr)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
+ name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
+ else if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)
+ name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
+ else
+ return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+
+ value = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!value)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ size = fuse_getxattr(inode, name, value, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (size > 0)
+ acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(fc->user_ns, value, size);
+ else if ((size == 0) || (size == -ENODATA) ||
+ (size == -EOPNOTSUPP && fc->no_getxattr))
+ acl = NULL;
+ else if (size == -ERANGE)
+ acl = ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+ else
+ acl = ERR_PTR(size);
+
+ kfree(value);
+ return acl;
+}
+
+static inline bool fuse_no_acl(const struct fuse_conn *fc,
+ const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ /*
+ * Refuse interacting with POSIX ACLs for daemons that
+ * don't support FUSE_POSIX_ACL and are not mounted on
+ * the host to retain backwards compatibility.
+ */
+ return !fc->posix_acl && (i_user_ns(inode) != &init_user_ns);
+}
+
+struct posix_acl *fuse_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, int type)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
+
+ if (fuse_no_acl(fc, inode))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+
+ return __fuse_get_acl(fc, inode, type, false);
+}
+
+struct posix_acl *fuse_get_inode_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu)
+{
+ struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
+
+ /*
+ * FUSE daemons before FUSE_POSIX_ACL was introduced could get and set
+ * POSIX ACLs without them being used for permission checking by the
+ * vfs. Retain that behavior for backwards compatibility as there are
+ * filesystems that do all permission checking for acls in the daemon
+ * and not in the kernel.
+ */
+ if (!fc->posix_acl)
+ return NULL;
+ return __fuse_get_acl(fc, inode, type, rcu);
+}
+
+int fuse_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
+ const char *name;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (fuse_is_bad(inode))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (fc->no_setxattr || fuse_no_acl(fc, inode))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
+ name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
+ else if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)
+ name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (acl) {
+ unsigned int extra_flags = 0;
+ /*
+ * Fuse userspace is responsible for updating access
+ * permissions in the inode, if needed. fuse_setxattr
+ * invalidates the inode attributes, which will force
+ * them to be refreshed the next time they are used,
+ * and it also updates i_ctime.
+ */
+ size_t size;
+ void *value;
+
+ value = posix_acl_to_xattr(fc->user_ns, acl, &size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!value)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (size > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ kfree(value);
+ return -E2BIG;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Fuse daemons without FUSE_POSIX_ACL never changed the passed
+ * through POSIX ACLs. Such daemons don't expect setgid bits to
+ * be stripped.
+ */
+ if (fc->posix_acl &&
+ !in_group_or_capable(idmap, inode,
+ i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode)))
+ extra_flags |= FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID;
+
+ ret = fuse_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0, extra_flags);
+ kfree(value);
+ } else {
+ ret = fuse_removexattr(inode, name);
+ }
+
+ if (fc->posix_acl) {
+ /*
+ * Fuse daemons without FUSE_POSIX_ACL never cached POSIX ACLs
+ * and didn't invalidate attributes. Retain that behavior.
+ */
+ forget_all_cached_acls(inode);
+ fuse_invalidate_attr(inode);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}