diff options
| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /fs/fs_pin.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/fs_pin.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/fs_pin.c | 97 |
1 files changed, 97 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/fs_pin.c b/fs/fs_pin.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..47ef3c71c --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/fs_pin.c @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include "internal.h" +#include "mount.h" + +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pin_lock); + +void pin_remove(struct fs_pin *pin) +{ + spin_lock(&pin_lock); + hlist_del_init(&pin->m_list); + hlist_del_init(&pin->s_list); + spin_unlock(&pin_lock); + spin_lock_irq(&pin->wait.lock); + pin->done = 1; + wake_up_locked(&pin->wait); + spin_unlock_irq(&pin->wait.lock); +} + +void pin_insert(struct fs_pin *pin, struct vfsmount *m) +{ + spin_lock(&pin_lock); + hlist_add_head(&pin->s_list, &m->mnt_sb->s_pins); + hlist_add_head(&pin->m_list, &real_mount(m)->mnt_pins); + spin_unlock(&pin_lock); +} + +void pin_kill(struct fs_pin *p) +{ + wait_queue_entry_t wait; + + if (!p) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; + } + init_wait(&wait); + spin_lock_irq(&p->wait.lock); + if (likely(!p->done)) { + p->done = -1; + spin_unlock_irq(&p->wait.lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + p->kill(p); + return; + } + if (p->done > 0) { + spin_unlock_irq(&p->wait.lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; + } + __add_wait_queue(&p->wait, &wait); + while (1) { + set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); + spin_unlock_irq(&p->wait.lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + schedule(); + rcu_read_lock(); + if (likely(list_empty(&wait.entry))) + break; + /* OK, we know p couldn't have been freed yet */ + spin_lock_irq(&p->wait.lock); + if (p->done > 0) { + spin_unlock_irq(&p->wait.lock); + break; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +void mnt_pin_kill(struct mount *m) +{ + while (1) { + struct hlist_node *p; + rcu_read_lock(); + p = READ_ONCE(m->mnt_pins.first); + if (!p) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + break; + } + pin_kill(hlist_entry(p, struct fs_pin, m_list)); + } +} + +void group_pin_kill(struct hlist_head *p) +{ + while (1) { + struct hlist_node *q; + rcu_read_lock(); + q = READ_ONCE(p->first); + if (!q) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + break; + } + pin_kill(hlist_entry(q, struct fs_pin, s_list)); + } +} |
