staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/Makefile b/fs/f2fs/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8a7322d22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/f2fs/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+obj-$(CONFIG_F2FS_FS) += f2fs.o
+
+f2fs-y		:= dir.o file.o inode.o namei.o hash.o super.o inline.o
+f2fs-y		+= checkpoint.o gc.o data.o node.o segment.o recovery.o
+f2fs-y		+= shrinker.o extent_cache.o sysfs.o
+f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS) += debug.o
+f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR) += xattr.o
+f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL) += acl.o
+f2fs-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += verity.o
+f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_FS_COMPRESSION) += compress.o
+f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_IOSTAT) += iostat.o