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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /fs/ext4/truncate.h
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ext4/truncate.h')
-rw-r--r--fs/ext4/truncate.h52
1 files changed, 52 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ext4/truncate.h b/fs/ext4/truncate.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ce84aa278
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/ext4/truncate.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * linux/fs/ext4/truncate.h
+ *
+ * Common inline functions needed for truncate support
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Truncate blocks that were not used by write. We have to truncate the
+ * pagecache as well so that corresponding buffers get properly unmapped.
+ */
+static inline void ext4_truncate_failed_write(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't need to call ext4_break_layouts() because the blocks we
+ * are truncating were never visible to userspace.
+ */
+ filemap_invalidate_lock(mapping);
+ truncate_inode_pages(mapping, inode->i_size);
+ ext4_truncate(inode);
+ filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Work out how many blocks we need to proceed with the next chunk of a
+ * truncate transaction.
+ */
+static inline unsigned long ext4_blocks_for_truncate(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ ext4_lblk_t needed;
+
+ needed = inode->i_blocks >> (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
+
+ /* Give ourselves just enough room to cope with inodes in which
+ * i_blocks is corrupt: we've seen disk corruptions in the past
+ * which resulted in random data in an inode which looked enough
+ * like a regular file for ext4 to try to delete it. Things
+ * will go a bit crazy if that happens, but at least we should
+ * try not to panic the whole kernel. */
+ if (needed < 2)
+ needed = 2;
+
+ /* But we need to bound the transaction so we don't overflow the
+ * journal. */
+ if (needed > EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA)
+ needed = EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA;
+
+ return EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb) + needed;
+}
+