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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /fs/ext4/truncate.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ext4/truncate.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/ext4/truncate.h | 52 |
1 files changed, 52 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ext4/truncate.h b/fs/ext4/truncate.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ce84aa278 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/ext4/truncate.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * linux/fs/ext4/truncate.h + * + * Common inline functions needed for truncate support + */ + +/* + * Truncate blocks that were not used by write. We have to truncate the + * pagecache as well so that corresponding buffers get properly unmapped. + */ +static inline void ext4_truncate_failed_write(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping; + + /* + * We don't need to call ext4_break_layouts() because the blocks we + * are truncating were never visible to userspace. + */ + filemap_invalidate_lock(mapping); + truncate_inode_pages(mapping, inode->i_size); + ext4_truncate(inode); + filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping); +} + +/* + * Work out how many blocks we need to proceed with the next chunk of a + * truncate transaction. + */ +static inline unsigned long ext4_blocks_for_truncate(struct inode *inode) +{ + ext4_lblk_t needed; + + needed = inode->i_blocks >> (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9); + + /* Give ourselves just enough room to cope with inodes in which + * i_blocks is corrupt: we've seen disk corruptions in the past + * which resulted in random data in an inode which looked enough + * like a regular file for ext4 to try to delete it. Things + * will go a bit crazy if that happens, but at least we should + * try not to panic the whole kernel. */ + if (needed < 2) + needed = 2; + + /* But we need to bound the transaction so we don't overflow the + * journal. */ + if (needed > EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA) + needed = EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA; + + return EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb) + needed; +} + |
