x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>:  mov    %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>:  cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>:  mov    %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>:  xchg   %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>:  mov    %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000

1 files changed, 347 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/ext4/hash.c b/fs/ext4/hash.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..978bd92da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/ext4/hash.c
@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ *  linux/fs/ext4/hash.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002 by Theodore Ts'o
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/unicode.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+#include "ext4.h"
+
+#define DELTA 0x9E3779B9
+
+static void TEA_transform(__u32 buf[4], __u32 const in[])
+{
+	__u32	sum = 0;
+	__u32	b0 = buf[0], b1 = buf[1];
+	__u32	a = in[0], b = in[1], c = in[2], d = in[3];
+	int	n = 16;
+
+	do {
+		sum += DELTA;
+		b0 += ((b1 << 4)+a) ^ (b1+sum) ^ ((b1 >> 5)+b);
+		b1 += ((b0 << 4)+c) ^ (b0+sum) ^ ((b0 >> 5)+d);
+	} while (--n);
+
+	buf[0] += b0;
+	buf[1] += b1;
+}
+
+/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
+#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
+#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
+#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+
+/*
+ * The generic round function.  The application is so specific that
+ * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
+ * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
+ * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
+ */
+#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s)	\
+	(a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = rol32(a, s))
+#define K1 0
+#define K2 013240474631UL
+#define K3 015666365641UL
+
+/*
+ * Basic cut-down MD4 transform.  Returns only 32 bits of result.
+ */
+static __u32 half_md4_transform(__u32 buf[4], __u32 const in[8])
+{
+	__u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
+
+	/* Round 1 */
+	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[0] + K1,  3);
+	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[1] + K1,  7);
+	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[2] + K1, 11);
+	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[3] + K1, 19);
+	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[4] + K1,  3);
+	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[5] + K1,  7);
+	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[6] + K1, 11);
+	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[7] + K1, 19);
+
+	/* Round 2 */
+	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[1] + K2,  3);
+	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[3] + K2,  5);
+	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[5] + K2,  9);
+	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[7] + K2, 13);
+	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[0] + K2,  3);
+	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[2] + K2,  5);
+	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[4] + K2,  9);
+	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[6] + K2, 13);
+
+	/* Round 3 */
+	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[3] + K3,  3);
+	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[7] + K3,  9);
+	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[2] + K3, 11);
+	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[6] + K3, 15);
+	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[1] + K3,  3);
+	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[5] + K3,  9);
+	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[0] + K3, 11);
+	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[4] + K3, 15);
+
+	buf[0] += a;
+	buf[1] += b;
+	buf[2] += c;
+	buf[3] += d;
+
+	return buf[1]; /* "most hashed" word */
+}
+#undef ROUND
+#undef K1
+#undef K2
+#undef K3
+#undef F
+#undef G
+#undef H
+
+/* The old legacy hash */
+static __u32 dx_hack_hash_unsigned(const char *name, int len)
+{
+	__u32 hash, hash0 = 0x12a3fe2d, hash1 = 0x37abe8f9;
+	const unsigned char *ucp = (const unsigned char *) name;
+
+	while (len--) {
+		hash = hash1 + (hash0 ^ (((int) *ucp++) * 7152373));
+
+		if (hash & 0x80000000)
+			hash -= 0x7fffffff;
+		hash1 = hash0;
+		hash0 = hash;
+	}
+	return hash0 << 1;
+}
+
+static __u32 dx_hack_hash_signed(const char *name, int len)
+{
+	__u32 hash, hash0 = 0x12a3fe2d, hash1 = 0x37abe8f9;
+	const signed char *scp = (const signed char *) name;
+
+	while (len--) {
+		hash = hash1 + (hash0 ^ (((int) *scp++) * 7152373));
+
+		if (hash & 0x80000000)
+			hash -= 0x7fffffff;
+		hash1 = hash0;
+		hash0 = hash;
+	}
+	return hash0 << 1;
+}
+
+static void str2hashbuf_signed(const char *msg, int len, __u32 *buf, int num)
+{
+	__u32	pad, val;
+	int	i;
+	const signed char *scp = (const signed char *) msg;
+
+	pad = (__u32)len | ((__u32)len << 8);
+	pad |= pad << 16;
+
+	if (len > num*4)
+		len = num * 4;
+
+	while (len >= 4) {
+		val = ((__u32)scp[0] << 24) + ((__u32)scp[1] << 16) + ((__u32)scp[2] << 8) + scp[3];
+		*buf++ = val;
+		scp += 4;
+		len -= 4;
+		num--;
+	}
+
+	val = pad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		val = scp[i] + (val << 8);
+
+	if (--num >= 0)
+		*buf++ = val;
+
+	while (--num >= 0)
+		*buf++ = pad;
+
+}
+
+static void str2hashbuf_unsigned(const char *msg, int len, __u32 *buf, int num)
+{
+	__u32	pad, val;
+	int	i;
+	const unsigned char *ucp = (const unsigned char *) msg;
+
+	pad = (__u32)len | ((__u32)len << 8);
+	pad |= pad << 16;
+
+	if (len > num*4)
+		len = num * 4;
+
+	while (len >= 4) {
+		val = get_unaligned_be32(ucp);
+		*buf++ = val;
+		ucp += 4;
+		len -= 4;
+		num--;
+	}
+
+	val = pad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		val = ucp[i] + (val << 8);
+
+	if (--num >= 0)
+		*buf++ = val;
+
+	while (--num >= 0)
+		*buf++ = pad;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the hash of a filename.  If len is 0 and name is NULL, then
+ * this function can be used to test whether or not a hash version is
+ * supported.
+ *
+ * The seed is an 4 longword (32 bits) "secret" which can be used to
+ * uniquify a hash.  If the seed is all zero's, then some default seed
+ * may be used.
+ *
+ * A particular hash version specifies whether or not the seed is
+ * represented, and whether or not the returned hash is 32 bits or 64
+ * bits.  32 bit hashes will return 0 for the minor hash.
+ */
+static int __ext4fs_dirhash(const struct inode *dir, const char *name, int len,
+			    struct dx_hash_info *hinfo)
+{
+	__u32	hash;
+	__u32	minor_hash = 0;
+	const char	*p;
+	int		i;
+	__u32		in[8], buf[4];
+	bool use_unsigned = false;
+
+	/* Initialize the default seed for the hash checksum functions */
+	buf[0] = 0x67452301;
+	buf[1] = 0xefcdab89;
+	buf[2] = 0x98badcfe;
+	buf[3] = 0x10325476;
+
+	/* Check to see if the seed is all zero's */
+	if (hinfo->seed) {
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+			if (hinfo->seed[i]) {
+				memcpy(buf, hinfo->seed, sizeof(buf));
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch (hinfo->hash_version) {
+	case DX_HASH_LEGACY_UNSIGNED:
+		hash = dx_hack_hash_unsigned(name, len);
+		break;
+	case DX_HASH_LEGACY:
+		hash = dx_hack_hash_signed(name, len);
+		break;
+	case DX_HASH_HALF_MD4_UNSIGNED:
+		use_unsigned = true;
+		fallthrough;
+	case DX_HASH_HALF_MD4:
+		p = name;
+		while (len > 0) {
+			if (use_unsigned)
+				str2hashbuf_unsigned(p, len, in, 8);
+			else
+				str2hashbuf_signed(p, len, in, 8);
+			half_md4_transform(buf, in);
+			len -= 32;
+			p += 32;
+		}
+		minor_hash = buf[2];
+		hash = buf[1];
+		break;
+	case DX_HASH_TEA_UNSIGNED:
+		use_unsigned = true;
+		fallthrough;
+	case DX_HASH_TEA:
+		p = name;
+		while (len > 0) {
+			if (use_unsigned)
+				str2hashbuf_unsigned(p, len, in, 4);
+			else
+				str2hashbuf_signed(p, len, in, 4);
+			TEA_transform(buf, in);
+			len -= 16;
+			p += 16;
+		}
+		hash = buf[0];
+		minor_hash = buf[1];
+		break;
+	case DX_HASH_SIPHASH:
+	{
+		struct qstr qname = QSTR_INIT(name, len);
+		__u64	combined_hash;
+
+		if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) {
+			combined_hash = fscrypt_fname_siphash(dir, &qname);
+		} else {
+			ext4_warning_inode(dir, "Siphash requires key");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		hash = (__u32)(combined_hash >> 32);
+		minor_hash = (__u32)combined_hash;
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		hinfo->hash = 0;
+		hinfo->minor_hash = 0;
+		ext4_warning(dir->i_sb,
+			     "invalid/unsupported hash tree version %u",
+			     hinfo->hash_version);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	hash = hash & ~1;
+	if (hash == (EXT4_HTREE_EOF_32BIT << 1))
+		hash = (EXT4_HTREE_EOF_32BIT - 1) << 1;
+	hinfo->hash = hash;
+	hinfo->minor_hash = minor_hash;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ext4fs_dirhash(const struct inode *dir, const char *name, int len,
+		   struct dx_hash_info *hinfo)
+{
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE)
+	const struct unicode_map *um = dir->i_sb->s_encoding;
+	int r, dlen;
+	unsigned char *buff;
+	struct qstr qstr = {.name = name, .len = len };
+
+	if (len && IS_CASEFOLDED(dir) &&
+	   (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir))) {
+		buff = kzalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!buff)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		dlen = utf8_casefold(um, &qstr, buff, PATH_MAX);
+		if (dlen < 0) {
+			kfree(buff);
+			goto opaque_seq;
+		}
+
+		r = __ext4fs_dirhash(dir, buff, dlen, hinfo);
+
+		kfree(buff);
+		return r;
+	}
+opaque_seq:
+#endif
+	return __ext4fs_dirhash(dir, name, len, hinfo);
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXT4_KUNIT_TESTS)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_EXT4_TEST(ext4fs_dirhash);
+#endif