openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 99 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/ext4/bitmap.c b/fs/ext4/bitmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..87760fabd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/ext4/bitmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ *  linux/fs/ext4/bitmap.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995
+ * Remy Card (card@masi.ibp.fr)
+ * Laboratoire MASI - Institut Blaise Pascal
+ * Universite Pierre et Marie Curie (Paris VI)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/buffer_head.h>
+#include "ext4.h"
+
+unsigned int ext4_count_free(char *bitmap, unsigned int numchars)
+{
+	return numchars * BITS_PER_BYTE - memweight(bitmap, numchars);
+}
+
+int ext4_inode_bitmap_csum_verify(struct super_block *sb,
+				  struct ext4_group_desc *gdp,
+				  struct buffer_head *bh)
+{
+	__u32 hi;
+	__u32 provided, calculated;
+	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+	int sz;
+
+	if (!ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb))
+		return 1;
+
+	sz = EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) >> 3;
+	provided = le16_to_cpu(gdp->bg_inode_bitmap_csum_lo);
+	calculated = ext4_chksum(sbi->s_csum_seed, (__u8 *)bh->b_data, sz);
+	if (sbi->s_desc_size >= EXT4_BG_INODE_BITMAP_CSUM_HI_END) {
+		hi = le16_to_cpu(gdp->bg_inode_bitmap_csum_hi);
+		provided |= (hi << 16);
+	} else
+		calculated &= 0xFFFF;
+
+	return provided == calculated;
+}
+
+void ext4_inode_bitmap_csum_set(struct super_block *sb,
+				struct ext4_group_desc *gdp,
+				struct buffer_head *bh)
+{
+	__u32 csum;
+	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+	int sz;
+
+	if (!ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb))
+		return;
+
+	sz = EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) >> 3;
+	csum = ext4_chksum(sbi->s_csum_seed, (__u8 *)bh->b_data, sz);
+	gdp->bg_inode_bitmap_csum_lo = cpu_to_le16(csum & 0xFFFF);
+	if (sbi->s_desc_size >= EXT4_BG_INODE_BITMAP_CSUM_HI_END)
+		gdp->bg_inode_bitmap_csum_hi = cpu_to_le16(csum >> 16);
+}
+
+int ext4_block_bitmap_csum_verify(struct super_block *sb,
+				  struct ext4_group_desc *gdp,
+				  struct buffer_head *bh)
+{
+	__u32 hi;
+	__u32 provided, calculated;
+	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+	int sz = EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(sb) / 8;
+
+	if (!ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb))
+		return 1;
+
+	provided = le16_to_cpu(gdp->bg_block_bitmap_csum_lo);
+	calculated = ext4_chksum(sbi->s_csum_seed, (__u8 *)bh->b_data, sz);
+	if (sbi->s_desc_size >= EXT4_BG_BLOCK_BITMAP_CSUM_HI_END) {
+		hi = le16_to_cpu(gdp->bg_block_bitmap_csum_hi);
+		provided |= (hi << 16);
+	} else
+		calculated &= 0xFFFF;
+
+	return provided == calculated;
+}
+
+void ext4_block_bitmap_csum_set(struct super_block *sb,
+				struct ext4_group_desc *gdp,
+				struct buffer_head *bh)
+{
+	int sz = EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(sb) / 8;
+	__u32 csum;
+	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+
+	if (!ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb))
+		return;
+
+	csum = ext4_chksum(sbi->s_csum_seed, (__u8 *)bh->b_data, sz);
+	gdp->bg_block_bitmap_csum_lo = cpu_to_le16(csum & 0xFFFF);
+	if (sbi->s_desc_size >= EXT4_BG_BLOCK_BITMAP_CSUM_HI_END)
+		gdp->bg_block_bitmap_csum_hi = cpu_to_le16(csum >> 16);
+}