x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>:  mov    %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>:  cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>:  mov    %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>:  xchg   %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>:  mov    %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000

1 files changed, 304 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/ext4/acl.c b/fs/ext4/acl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3bffe862f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/ext4/acl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * linux/fs/ext4/acl.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2003 Andreas Gruenbacher, <agruen@suse.de>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/quotaops.h>
+#include "ext4_jbd2.h"
+#include "ext4.h"
+#include "xattr.h"
+#include "acl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Convert from filesystem to in-memory representation.
+ */
+static struct posix_acl *
+ext4_acl_from_disk(const void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	const char *end = (char *)value + size;
+	int n, count;
+	struct posix_acl *acl;
+
+	if (!value)
+		return NULL;
+	if (size < sizeof(ext4_acl_header))
+		 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	if (((ext4_acl_header *)value)->a_version !=
+	    cpu_to_le32(EXT4_ACL_VERSION))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	value = (char *)value + sizeof(ext4_acl_header);
+	count = ext4_acl_count(size);
+	if (count < 0)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	if (count == 0)
+		return NULL;
+	acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!acl)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	for (n = 0; n < count; n++) {
+		ext4_acl_entry *entry =
+			(ext4_acl_entry *)value;
+		if ((char *)value + sizeof(ext4_acl_entry_short) > end)
+			goto fail;
+		acl->a_entries[n].e_tag  = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
+		acl->a_entries[n].e_perm = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_perm);
+
+		switch (acl->a_entries[n].e_tag) {
+		case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+		case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+		case ACL_MASK:
+		case ACL_OTHER:
+			value = (char *)value +
+				sizeof(ext4_acl_entry_short);
+			break;
+
+		case ACL_USER:
+			value = (char *)value + sizeof(ext4_acl_entry);
+			if ((char *)value > end)
+				goto fail;
+			acl->a_entries[n].e_uid =
+				make_kuid(&init_user_ns,
+					  le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
+			break;
+		case ACL_GROUP:
+			value = (char *)value + sizeof(ext4_acl_entry);
+			if ((char *)value > end)
+				goto fail;
+			acl->a_entries[n].e_gid =
+				make_kgid(&init_user_ns,
+					  le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	if (value != end)
+		goto fail;
+	return acl;
+
+fail:
+	posix_acl_release(acl);
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert from in-memory to filesystem representation.
+ */
+static void *
+ext4_acl_to_disk(const struct posix_acl *acl, size_t *size)
+{
+	ext4_acl_header *ext_acl;
+	char *e;
+	size_t n;
+
+	*size = ext4_acl_size(acl->a_count);
+	ext_acl = kmalloc(sizeof(ext4_acl_header) + acl->a_count *
+			sizeof(ext4_acl_entry), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!ext_acl)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	ext_acl->a_version = cpu_to_le32(EXT4_ACL_VERSION);
+	e = (char *)ext_acl + sizeof(ext4_acl_header);
+	for (n = 0; n < acl->a_count; n++) {
+		const struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e = &acl->a_entries[n];
+		ext4_acl_entry *entry = (ext4_acl_entry *)e;
+		entry->e_tag  = cpu_to_le16(acl_e->e_tag);
+		entry->e_perm = cpu_to_le16(acl_e->e_perm);
+		switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
+		case ACL_USER:
+			entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(
+				from_kuid(&init_user_ns, acl_e->e_uid));
+			e += sizeof(ext4_acl_entry);
+			break;
+		case ACL_GROUP:
+			entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(
+				from_kgid(&init_user_ns, acl_e->e_gid));
+			e += sizeof(ext4_acl_entry);
+			break;
+
+		case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+		case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+		case ACL_MASK:
+		case ACL_OTHER:
+			e += sizeof(ext4_acl_entry_short);
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	return (char *)ext_acl;
+
+fail:
+	kfree(ext_acl);
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inode operation get_posix_acl().
+ *
+ * inode->i_rwsem: don't care
+ */
+struct posix_acl *
+ext4_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu)
+{
+	int name_index;
+	char *value = NULL;
+	struct posix_acl *acl;
+	int retval;
+
+	if (rcu)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
+		name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
+		break;
+	case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+		name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+	retval = ext4_xattr_get(inode, name_index, "", NULL, 0);
+	if (retval > 0) {
+		value = kmalloc(retval, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!value)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		retval = ext4_xattr_get(inode, name_index, "", value, retval);
+	}
+	if (retval > 0)
+		acl = ext4_acl_from_disk(value, retval);
+	else if (retval == -ENODATA || retval == -ENOSYS)
+		acl = NULL;
+	else
+		acl = ERR_PTR(retval);
+	kfree(value);
+
+	return acl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the access or default ACL of an inode.
+ *
+ * inode->i_rwsem: down unless called from ext4_new_inode
+ */
+static int
+__ext4_set_acl(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int type,
+	     struct posix_acl *acl, int xattr_flags)
+{
+	int name_index;
+	void *value = NULL;
+	size_t size = 0;
+	int error;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
+		name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
+		break;
+
+	case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+		name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
+		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+			return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (acl) {
+		value = ext4_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
+		if (IS_ERR(value))
+			return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
+	}
+
+	error = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, name_index, "",
+				      value, size, xattr_flags);
+
+	kfree(value);
+	if (!error)
+		set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int
+ext4_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+	     struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+	handle_t *handle;
+	int error, credits, retries = 0;
+	size_t acl_size = acl ? ext4_acl_size(acl->a_count) : 0;
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
+	int update_mode = 0;
+
+	error = dquot_initialize(inode);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+retry:
+	error = ext4_xattr_set_credits(inode, acl_size, false /* is_create */,
+				       &credits);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_XATTR, credits);
+	if (IS_ERR(handle))
+		return PTR_ERR(handle);
+
+	if ((type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) && acl) {
+		error = posix_acl_update_mode(idmap, inode, &mode, &acl);
+		if (error)
+			goto out_stop;
+		if (mode != inode->i_mode)
+			update_mode = 1;
+	}
+
+	error = __ext4_set_acl(handle, inode, type, acl, 0 /* xattr_flags */);
+	if (!error && update_mode) {
+		inode->i_mode = mode;
+		inode_set_ctime_current(inode);
+		error = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
+	}
+out_stop:
+	ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+	if (error == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
+		goto retry;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the ACLs of a new inode. Called from ext4_new_inode.
+ *
+ * dir->i_rwsem: down
+ * inode->i_rwsem: up (access to inode is still exclusive)
+ */
+int
+ext4_init_acl(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+{
+	struct posix_acl *default_acl, *acl;
+	int error;
+
+	error = posix_acl_create(dir, &inode->i_mode, &default_acl, &acl);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	if (default_acl) {
+		error = __ext4_set_acl(handle, inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT,
+				       default_acl, XATTR_CREATE);
+		posix_acl_release(default_acl);
+	} else {
+		inode->i_default_acl = NULL;
+	}
+	if (acl) {
+		if (!error)
+			error = __ext4_set_acl(handle, inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS,
+					       acl, XATTR_CREATE);
+		posix_acl_release(acl);
+	} else {
+		inode->i_acl = NULL;
+	}
+	return error;
+}