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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/ext2/xattr_user.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ext2/xattr_user.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/ext2/xattr_user.c | 50 |
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ext2/xattr_user.c b/fs/ext2/xattr_user.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dd1507231 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/ext2/xattr_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * linux/fs/ext2/xattr_user.c + * Handler for extended user attributes. + * + * Copyright (C) 2001 by Andreas Gruenbacher, <a.gruenbacher@computer.org> + */ + +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include "ext2.h" +#include "xattr.h" + +static bool +ext2_xattr_user_list(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return test_opt(dentry->d_sb, XATTR_USER); +} + +static int +ext2_xattr_user_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, + struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, + const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size) +{ + if (!test_opt(inode->i_sb, XATTR_USER)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return ext2_xattr_get(inode, EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_USER, + name, buffer, size); +} + +static int +ext2_xattr_user_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, + struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, + const char *name, const void *value, + size_t size, int flags) +{ + if (!test_opt(inode->i_sb, XATTR_USER)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + return ext2_xattr_set(inode, EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_USER, + name, value, size, flags); +} + +const struct xattr_handler ext2_xattr_user_handler = { + .prefix = XATTR_USER_PREFIX, + .list = ext2_xattr_user_list, + .get = ext2_xattr_user_get, + .set = ext2_xattr_user_set, +}; |
