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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /fs/ext2/ioctl.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ext2/ioctl.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/ext2/ioctl.c159
1 files changed, 159 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ext2/ioctl.c b/fs/ext2/ioctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c3fea55b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/ext2/ioctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * linux/fs/ext2/ioctl.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1993, 1994, 1995
+ * Remy Card (card@masi.ibp.fr)
+ * Laboratoire MASI - Institut Blaise Pascal
+ * Universite Pierre et Marie Curie (Paris VI)
+ */
+
+#include "ext2.h"
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/fileattr.h>
+
+int ext2_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa)
+{
+ struct ext2_inode_info *ei = EXT2_I(d_inode(dentry));
+
+ fileattr_fill_flags(fa, ei->i_flags & EXT2_FL_USER_VISIBLE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ext2_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct ext2_inode_info *ei = EXT2_I(inode);
+
+ if (fileattr_has_fsx(fa))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ /* Is it quota file? Do not allow user to mess with it */
+ if (IS_NOQUOTA(inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ ei->i_flags = (ei->i_flags & ~EXT2_FL_USER_MODIFIABLE) |
+ (fa->flags & EXT2_FL_USER_MODIFIABLE);
+
+ ext2_set_inode_flags(inode);
+ inode_set_ctime_current(inode);
+ mark_inode_dirty(inode);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+long ext2_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
+ struct ext2_inode_info *ei = EXT2_I(inode);
+ unsigned short rsv_window_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ ext2_debug ("cmd = %u, arg = %lu\n", cmd, arg);
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
+ return put_user(inode->i_generation, (int __user *) arg);
+ case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION: {
+ __u32 generation;
+
+ if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+ ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ if (get_user(generation, (int __user *) arg)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto setversion_out;
+ }
+
+ inode_lock(inode);
+ inode_set_ctime_current(inode);
+ inode->i_generation = generation;
+ inode_unlock(inode);
+
+ mark_inode_dirty(inode);
+setversion_out:
+ mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ case EXT2_IOC_GETRSVSZ:
+ if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, RESERVATION)
+ && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
+ && ei->i_block_alloc_info) {
+ rsv_window_size = ei->i_block_alloc_info->rsv_window_node.rsv_goal_size;
+ return put_user(rsv_window_size, (int __user *)arg);
+ }
+ return -ENOTTY;
+ case EXT2_IOC_SETRSVSZ: {
+
+ if (!test_opt(inode->i_sb, RESERVATION) ||!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ if (get_user(rsv_window_size, (int __user *)arg))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (rsv_window_size > EXT2_MAX_RESERVE_BLOCKS)
+ rsv_window_size = EXT2_MAX_RESERVE_BLOCKS;
+
+ /*
+ * need to allocate reservation structure for this inode
+ * before set the window size
+ */
+ /*
+ * XXX What lock should protect the rsv_goal_size?
+ * Accessed in ext2_get_block only. ext3 uses i_truncate.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&ei->truncate_mutex);
+ if (!ei->i_block_alloc_info)
+ ext2_init_block_alloc_info(inode);
+
+ if (ei->i_block_alloc_info){
+ struct ext2_reserve_window_node *rsv = &ei->i_block_alloc_info->rsv_window_node;
+ rsv->rsv_goal_size = rsv_window_size;
+ } else {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&ei->truncate_mutex);
+ mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ default:
+ return -ENOTTY;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+long ext2_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ /* These are just misnamed, they actually get/put from/to user an int */
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case EXT2_IOC32_GETVERSION:
+ cmd = EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION;
+ break;
+ case EXT2_IOC32_SETVERSION:
+ cmd = EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+ }
+ return ext2_ioctl(file, cmd, (unsigned long) compat_ptr(arg));
+}
+#endif