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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/ext2/acl.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ext2/acl.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/ext2/acl.h | 73 |
1 files changed, 73 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ext2/acl.h b/fs/ext2/acl.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4a8443a2b --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/ext2/acl.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + File: fs/ext2/acl.h + + (C) 2001 Andreas Gruenbacher, <a.gruenbacher@computer.org> +*/ + +#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> + +#define EXT2_ACL_VERSION 0x0001 + +typedef struct { + __le16 e_tag; + __le16 e_perm; + __le32 e_id; +} ext2_acl_entry; + +typedef struct { + __le16 e_tag; + __le16 e_perm; +} ext2_acl_entry_short; + +typedef struct { + __le32 a_version; +} ext2_acl_header; + +static inline size_t ext2_acl_size(int count) +{ + if (count <= 4) { + return sizeof(ext2_acl_header) + + count * sizeof(ext2_acl_entry_short); + } else { + return sizeof(ext2_acl_header) + + 4 * sizeof(ext2_acl_entry_short) + + (count - 4) * sizeof(ext2_acl_entry); + } +} + +static inline int ext2_acl_count(size_t size) +{ + ssize_t s; + size -= sizeof(ext2_acl_header); + s = size - 4 * sizeof(ext2_acl_entry_short); + if (s < 0) { + if (size % sizeof(ext2_acl_entry_short)) + return -1; + return size / sizeof(ext2_acl_entry_short); + } else { + if (s % sizeof(ext2_acl_entry)) + return -1; + return s / sizeof(ext2_acl_entry) + 4; + } +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_POSIX_ACL + +/* acl.c */ +extern struct posix_acl *ext2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu); +extern int ext2_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct posix_acl *acl, int type); +extern int ext2_init_acl (struct inode *, struct inode *); + +#else +#include <linux/sched.h> +#define ext2_get_acl NULL +#define ext2_set_acl NULL + +static inline int ext2_init_acl (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + |
