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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /fs/efivarfs/inode.c
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
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x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/efivarfs/inode.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/efivarfs/inode.c192
1 files changed, 192 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/inode.c b/fs/efivarfs/inode.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f0d009555
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/efivarfs/inode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uuid.h>
+#include <linux/fileattr.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static const struct inode_operations efivarfs_file_inode_operations;
+
+struct inode *efivarfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb,
+ const struct inode *dir, int mode,
+ dev_t dev, bool is_removable)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = new_inode(sb);
+ struct efivarfs_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct efivarfs_mount_opts *opts = &fsi->mount_opts;
+
+ if (inode) {
+ inode->i_uid = opts->uid;
+ inode->i_gid = opts->gid;
+ inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
+ inode->i_mode = mode;
+ simple_inode_init_ts(inode);
+ inode->i_flags = is_removable ? 0 : S_IMMUTABLE;
+ switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case S_IFREG:
+ inode->i_op = &efivarfs_file_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &efivarfs_file_operations;
+ break;
+ case S_IFDIR:
+ inode->i_op = &efivarfs_dir_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+ inc_nlink(inode);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return inode;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if 'str' is a valid efivarfs filename of the form,
+ *
+ * VariableName-12345678-1234-1234-1234-1234567891bc
+ */
+static bool efivarfs_valid_name(const char *str, int len)
+{
+ const char *s = str + len - EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN;
+
+ /*
+ * We need a GUID, plus at least one letter for the variable name,
+ * plus the '-' separator
+ */
+ if (len < EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN + 2)
+ return false;
+
+ /* GUID must be preceded by a '-' */
+ if (*(s - 1) != '-')
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Validate that 's' is of the correct format, e.g.
+ *
+ * 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc
+ */
+ return uuid_is_valid(s);
+}
+
+static int efivarfs_create(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+ struct efivar_entry *var;
+ int namelen, i = 0, err = 0;
+ bool is_removable = false;
+ efi_guid_t vendor;
+
+ if (!efivarfs_valid_name(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* length of the variable name itself: remove GUID and separator */
+ namelen = dentry->d_name.len - EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN - 1;
+
+ err = guid_parse(dentry->d_name.name + namelen + 1, &vendor);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (guid_equal(&vendor, &LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (efivar_variable_is_removable(vendor,
+ dentry->d_name.name, namelen))
+ is_removable = true;
+
+ inode = efivarfs_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, 0, is_removable);
+ if (!inode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ var = efivar_entry(inode);
+
+ var->var.VendorGuid = vendor;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++)
+ var->var.VariableName[i] = dentry->d_name.name[i];
+
+ var->var.VariableName[i] = '\0';
+
+ inode->i_private = var;
+
+ d_make_persistent(dentry, inode);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int efivarfs_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct efivar_entry *var = d_inode(dentry)->i_private;
+
+ if (efivar_entry_delete(var))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return simple_unlink(dir, dentry);
+};
+
+const struct inode_operations efivarfs_dir_inode_operations = {
+ .lookup = simple_lookup,
+ .unlink = efivarfs_unlink,
+ .create = efivarfs_create,
+};
+
+static int
+efivarfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa)
+{
+ unsigned int i_flags;
+ unsigned int flags = 0;
+
+ i_flags = d_inode(dentry)->i_flags;
+ if (i_flags & S_IMMUTABLE)
+ flags |= FS_IMMUTABLE_FL;
+
+ fileattr_fill_flags(fa, flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+efivarfs_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa)
+{
+ unsigned int i_flags = 0;
+
+ if (fileattr_has_fsx(fa))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (fa->flags & ~FS_IMMUTABLE_FL)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (fa->flags & FS_IMMUTABLE_FL)
+ i_flags |= S_IMMUTABLE;
+
+ inode_set_flags(d_inode(dentry), i_flags, S_IMMUTABLE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* copy of simple_setattr except that it doesn't do i_size updates */
+static int efivarfs_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ int error;
+
+ error = setattr_prepare(idmap, dentry, iattr);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ setattr_copy(idmap, inode, iattr);
+ mark_inode_dirty(inode);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations efivarfs_file_inode_operations = {
+ .fileattr_get = efivarfs_fileattr_get,
+ .fileattr_set = efivarfs_fileattr_set,
+ .setattr = efivarfs_setattr,
+};