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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /fs/coda/cache.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/coda/cache.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/coda/cache.c | 121 |
1 files changed, 121 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/coda/cache.c b/fs/coda/cache.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..245131296 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/coda/cache.c @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Cache operations for Coda. + * For Linux 2.1: (C) 1997 Carnegie Mellon University + * For Linux 2.3: (C) 2000 Carnegie Mellon University + * + * Carnegie Mellon encourages users of this code to contribute improvements + * to the Coda project http://www.coda.cs.cmu.edu/ <coda@cs.cmu.edu>. + */ + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/time.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/stat.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> + +#include <linux/coda.h> +#include "coda_psdev.h" +#include "coda_linux.h" +#include "coda_cache.h" + +static atomic_t permission_epoch = ATOMIC_INIT(0); + +/* replace or extend an acl cache hit */ +void coda_cache_enter(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + struct coda_inode_info *cii = ITOC(inode); + + spin_lock(&cii->c_lock); + cii->c_cached_epoch = atomic_read(&permission_epoch); + if (!uid_eq(cii->c_uid, current_fsuid())) { + cii->c_uid = current_fsuid(); + cii->c_cached_perm = mask; + } else + cii->c_cached_perm |= mask; + spin_unlock(&cii->c_lock); +} + +/* remove cached acl from an inode */ +void coda_cache_clear_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct coda_inode_info *cii = ITOC(inode); + spin_lock(&cii->c_lock); + cii->c_cached_epoch = atomic_read(&permission_epoch) - 1; + spin_unlock(&cii->c_lock); +} + +/* remove all acl caches */ +void coda_cache_clear_all(struct super_block *sb) +{ + atomic_inc(&permission_epoch); +} + + +/* check if the mask has been matched against the acl already */ +int coda_cache_check(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + struct coda_inode_info *cii = ITOC(inode); + int hit; + + spin_lock(&cii->c_lock); + hit = (mask & cii->c_cached_perm) == mask && + uid_eq(cii->c_uid, current_fsuid()) && + cii->c_cached_epoch == atomic_read(&permission_epoch); + spin_unlock(&cii->c_lock); + + return hit; +} + + +/* Purging dentries and children */ +/* The following routines drop dentries which are not + in use and flag dentries which are in use to be + zapped later. + + The flags are detected by: + - coda_dentry_revalidate (for lookups) if the flag is C_PURGE + - coda_dentry_delete: to remove dentry from the cache when d_count + falls to zero + - an inode method coda_revalidate (for attributes) if the + flag is C_VATTR +*/ + +/* this won't do any harm: just flag all children */ +static void coda_flag_children(struct dentry *parent, int flag) +{ + struct dentry *de; + + spin_lock(&parent->d_lock); + rcu_read_lock(); + hlist_for_each_entry(de, &parent->d_children, d_sib) { + struct inode *inode = d_inode_rcu(de); + /* don't know what to do with negative dentries */ + if (inode) + coda_flag_inode(inode, flag); + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + spin_unlock(&parent->d_lock); +} + +void coda_flag_inode_children(struct inode *inode, int flag) +{ + struct dentry *alias_de; + + if ( !inode || !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) + return; + + alias_de = d_find_alias(inode); + if (!alias_de) + return; + coda_flag_children(alias_de, flag); + shrink_dcache_parent(alias_de); + dput(alias_de); +} + |
