virtio_blk: set the zone write granularitygrafted

virtblk_read_zoned_limits() reads the write granularity that the device
reports in virtio_blk_zoned_characteristics and assigns it to the
physical block size and to io_min, but never to the limit that is named
after it. queue_limits.zone_write_granularity is left at zero, so
blk_validate_zoned_limits() raises it to the logical block size:

	if (lim->zone_write_granularity < lim->logical_block_size)
		lim->zone_write_granularity = lim->logical_block_size;

A device that reports a granularity coarser than its logical block size,
which is what the field exists to express, therefore has it silently
reduced. A 512e host managed disk passed through to a guest reports a
logical block size of 512 and a write granularity of 4096, and the guest
ends up with a zone write granularity of 512.

bio_split_alignment() returns lim->zone_write_granularity if it is non-zero
and bio_split_io_at() may split a bio with as per bio_split_alignment().
This can real to the write getting rejected by the host drive, as the write
is not aligned to the physical block size.

zonefs also takes its block size from bdev_zone_write_granularity(), so it
would incorrectly use 512 on a disk that requires 4096.

sd_zbc_read_zones() sets the limit from the physical block size for the
same reason. NVMe ZNS and null_blk leave it unset, but the fallback
gives the right answer for them, as their write granularity is the
logical block size. virtio carries a separate value that may exceed it.

Set the zone write granularity from the value that the device reports.

Fixes: 95bfec41bd3d ("virtio-blk: add support for zoned block devices")
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260918140641.2031075-2-cassel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

1 files changed, 112 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/security.c b/fs/cachefiles/security.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc6611886
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/cachefiles/security.c
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* CacheFiles security management
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007, 2021 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * determine the security context within which we access the cache from within
+ * the kernel
+ */
+int cachefiles_get_security_ID(struct cachefiles_cache *cache)
+{
+	struct cred *new;
+	int ret;
+
+	_enter("{%u}", cache->have_secid ? cache->secid : 0);
+
+	new = prepare_kernel_cred(current);
+	if (!new) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (cache->have_secid) {
+		ret = set_security_override(new, cache->secid);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			put_cred(new);
+			pr_err("Security denies permission to nominate security context: error %d\n",
+			       ret);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	cache->cache_cred = new;
+	ret = 0;
+error:
+	_leave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * see if mkdir and create can be performed in the root directory
+ */
+static int cachefiles_check_cache_dir(struct cachefiles_cache *cache,
+				      struct dentry *root)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = security_inode_mkdir(d_backing_inode(root), root, 0);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_err("Security denies permission to make dirs: error %d",
+		       ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = security_inode_create(d_backing_inode(root), root, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_err("Security denies permission to create files: error %d",
+		       ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check the security details of the on-disk cache
+ * - must be called with security override in force
+ * - must return with a security override in force - even in the case of an
+ *   error
+ */
+int cachefiles_determine_cache_security(struct cachefiles_cache *cache,
+					struct dentry *root,
+					const struct cred **_saved_cred)
+{
+	struct cred *new;
+	int ret;
+
+	_enter("");
+
+	/* duplicate the cache creds for COW (the override is currently in
+	 * force, so we can use prepare_creds() to do this) */
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cachefiles_end_secure(cache, *_saved_cred);
+
+	/* use the cache root dir's security context as the basis with
+	 * which create files */
+	ret = set_create_files_as(new, d_backing_inode(root));
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		abort_creds(new);
+		cachefiles_begin_secure(cache, _saved_cred);
+		_leave(" = %d [cfa]", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	put_cred(cache->cache_cred);
+	cache->cache_cred = new;
+
+	cachefiles_begin_secure(cache, _saved_cred);
+	ret = cachefiles_check_cache_dir(cache, root);
+
+	if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		ret = 0;
+	_leave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}