openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 137 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/key.c b/fs/cachefiles/key.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aae86af48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/cachefiles/key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Key to pathname encoder
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static const char cachefiles_charmap[64] __nonstring =
+	"0123456789"			/* 0 - 9 */
+	"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"	/* 10 - 35 */
+	"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"	/* 36 - 61 */
+	"_-"				/* 62 - 63 */
+	;
+
+static const char cachefiles_filecharmap[256] = {
+	/* we skip space and tab and control chars */
+	[33 ... 46] = 1,		/* '!' -> '.' */
+	/* we skip '/' as it's significant to pathwalk */
+	[48 ... 127] = 1,		/* '0' -> '~' */
+};
+
+static inline unsigned int how_many_hex_digits(unsigned int x)
+{
+	return x ? round_up(ilog2(x) + 1, 4) / 4 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * turn the raw key into something cooked
+ * - the key may be up to NAME_MAX in length (including the length word)
+ *   - "base64" encode the strange keys, mapping 3 bytes of raw to four of
+ *     cooked
+ *   - need to cut the cooked key into 252 char lengths (189 raw bytes)
+ */
+bool cachefiles_cook_key(struct cachefiles_object *object)
+{
+	const u8 *key = fscache_get_key(object->cookie), *kend;
+	unsigned char ch;
+	unsigned int acc, i, n, nle, nbe, keylen = object->cookie->key_len;
+	unsigned int b64len, len, print, pad;
+	char *name, sep;
+
+	_enter(",%u,%*phN", keylen, keylen, key);
+
+	BUG_ON(keylen > NAME_MAX - 3);
+
+	print = 1;
+	for (i = 0; i < keylen; i++) {
+		ch = key[i];
+		print &= cachefiles_filecharmap[ch];
+	}
+
+	/* If the path is usable ASCII, then we render it directly */
+	if (print) {
+		len = 1 + keylen;
+		name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!name)
+			return false;
+
+		name[0] = 'D'; /* Data object type, string encoding */
+		memcpy(name + 1, key, keylen);
+		goto success;
+	}
+
+	/* See if it makes sense to encode it as "hex,hex,hex" for each 32-bit
+	 * chunk.  We rely on the key having been padded out to a whole number
+	 * of 32-bit words.
+	 */
+	n = round_up(keylen, 4);
+	nbe = nle = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i += 4) {
+		u32 be = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)(key + i));
+		u32 le = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)(key + i));
+
+		nbe += 1 + how_many_hex_digits(be);
+		nle += 1 + how_many_hex_digits(le);
+	}
+
+	b64len = DIV_ROUND_UP(keylen, 3);
+	pad = b64len * 3 - keylen;
+	b64len = 2 + b64len * 4; /* Length if we base64-encode it */
+	_debug("len=%u nbe=%u nle=%u b64=%u", keylen, nbe, nle, b64len);
+	if (nbe < b64len || nle < b64len) {
+		unsigned int nlen = min(nbe, nle) + 1;
+		name = kmalloc(nlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!name)
+			return false;
+		sep = (nbe <= nle) ? 'S' : 'T'; /* Encoding indicator */
+		len = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < n; i += 4) {
+			u32 x;
+			if (nbe <= nle)
+				x = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)(key + i));
+			else
+				x = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)(key + i));
+			name[len++] = sep;
+			if (x != 0)
+				len += snprintf(name + len, nlen - len, "%x", x);
+			sep = ',';
+		}
+		goto success;
+	}
+
+	/* We need to base64-encode it */
+	name = kmalloc(b64len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!name)
+		return false;
+
+	name[0] = 'E';
+	name[1] = '0' + pad;
+	len = 2;
+	kend = key + keylen;
+	do {
+		acc  = *key++;
+		if (key < kend) {
+			acc |= *key++ << 8;
+			if (key < kend)
+				acc |= *key++ << 16;
+		}
+
+		name[len++] = cachefiles_charmap[acc & 63];
+		acc >>= 6;
+		name[len++] = cachefiles_charmap[acc & 63];
+		acc >>= 6;
+		name[len++] = cachefiles_charmap[acc & 63];
+		acc >>= 6;
+		name[len++] = cachefiles_charmap[acc & 63];
+	} while (key < kend);
+
+success:
+	name[len] = 0;
+	object->d_name = name;
+	_leave(" = %s", object->d_name);
+	return true;
+}