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| author | Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com> | 2026-07-28 03:16:42 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> | 2026-08-05 16:15:51 +0100 |
| commit | 1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66 (patch) | |
| tree | e8ee4ac80f87e2ad1b6b0c877eccbb62b0915c02 /fs/cachefiles/key.c | |
| download | linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.tar.gz linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.zip | |
ARM: 9485/1: mm: acquire mmap write lock around show_pte() for user faultsgrafted
When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y, and cmdline "user_debug=31" is set,
a user fault may trigger show_pte() without any lock.
If another thread in the same process concurrently calls munmap(),
the page table pages may be freed while show_pte() is still traversing
them, causing a use-after-free in show_pte().
If CONFIG_ARM_LPAE=y, this may cause a kernel panic if the pages table
of PMD are freed when show_pte() is running.
Acquire mmap_write_lock() around show_pte() for user faults to fix the
contention.
For user faults, additionally restrict that show_pte() is called only
when the addr is a user-space address (addr < TASK_SIZE). This is because
the lock of tsk->mm only protects the virtual memory of user address space,
furthermore, dumping the page tables of a kernel-space address for user
faults is unnecessary and may have security implications.
Keep everything unchanged for kernel faults, because the kernel is
already in the "oops" state, acquiring a lock may risk a deadlock.
Co-developed-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6d021b724481 ("ARM: dump pgd, pmd and pte states on unhandled data abort faults")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260716014022.2823-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/cachefiles/key.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/cachefiles/key.c | 137 |
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/key.c b/fs/cachefiles/key.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aae86af48 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/cachefiles/key.c @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* Key to pathname encoder + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include "internal.h" + +static const char cachefiles_charmap[64] __nonstring = + "0123456789" /* 0 - 9 */ + "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" /* 10 - 35 */ + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" /* 36 - 61 */ + "_-" /* 62 - 63 */ + ; + +static const char cachefiles_filecharmap[256] = { + /* we skip space and tab and control chars */ + [33 ... 46] = 1, /* '!' -> '.' */ + /* we skip '/' as it's significant to pathwalk */ + [48 ... 127] = 1, /* '0' -> '~' */ +}; + +static inline unsigned int how_many_hex_digits(unsigned int x) +{ + return x ? round_up(ilog2(x) + 1, 4) / 4 : 0; +} + +/* + * turn the raw key into something cooked + * - the key may be up to NAME_MAX in length (including the length word) + * - "base64" encode the strange keys, mapping 3 bytes of raw to four of + * cooked + * - need to cut the cooked key into 252 char lengths (189 raw bytes) + */ +bool cachefiles_cook_key(struct cachefiles_object *object) +{ + const u8 *key = fscache_get_key(object->cookie), *kend; + unsigned char ch; + unsigned int acc, i, n, nle, nbe, keylen = object->cookie->key_len; + unsigned int b64len, len, print, pad; + char *name, sep; + + _enter(",%u,%*phN", keylen, keylen, key); + + BUG_ON(keylen > NAME_MAX - 3); + + print = 1; + for (i = 0; i < keylen; i++) { + ch = key[i]; + print &= cachefiles_filecharmap[ch]; + } + + /* If the path is usable ASCII, then we render it directly */ + if (print) { + len = 1 + keylen; + name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name) + return false; + + name[0] = 'D'; /* Data object type, string encoding */ + memcpy(name + 1, key, keylen); + goto success; + } + + /* See if it makes sense to encode it as "hex,hex,hex" for each 32-bit + * chunk. We rely on the key having been padded out to a whole number + * of 32-bit words. + */ + n = round_up(keylen, 4); + nbe = nle = 0; + for (i = 0; i < n; i += 4) { + u32 be = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)(key + i)); + u32 le = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)(key + i)); + + nbe += 1 + how_many_hex_digits(be); + nle += 1 + how_many_hex_digits(le); + } + + b64len = DIV_ROUND_UP(keylen, 3); + pad = b64len * 3 - keylen; + b64len = 2 + b64len * 4; /* Length if we base64-encode it */ + _debug("len=%u nbe=%u nle=%u b64=%u", keylen, nbe, nle, b64len); + if (nbe < b64len || nle < b64len) { + unsigned int nlen = min(nbe, nle) + 1; + name = kmalloc(nlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name) + return false; + sep = (nbe <= nle) ? 'S' : 'T'; /* Encoding indicator */ + len = 0; + for (i = 0; i < n; i += 4) { + u32 x; + if (nbe <= nle) + x = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)(key + i)); + else + x = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)(key + i)); + name[len++] = sep; + if (x != 0) + len += snprintf(name + len, nlen - len, "%x", x); + sep = ','; + } + goto success; + } + + /* We need to base64-encode it */ + name = kmalloc(b64len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name) + return false; + + name[0] = 'E'; + name[1] = '0' + pad; + len = 2; + kend = key + keylen; + do { + acc = *key++; + if (key < kend) { + acc |= *key++ << 8; + if (key < kend) + acc |= *key++ << 16; + } + + name[len++] = cachefiles_charmap[acc & 63]; + acc >>= 6; + name[len++] = cachefiles_charmap[acc & 63]; + acc >>= 6; + name[len++] = cachefiles_charmap[acc & 63]; + acc >>= 6; + name[len++] = cachefiles_charmap[acc & 63]; + } while (key < kend); + +success: + name[len] = 0; + object->d_name = name; + _leave(" = %s", object->d_name); + return true; +} |
