x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>:  mov    %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>:  cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>:  mov    %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>:  xchg   %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>:  mov    %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000

1 files changed, 124 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/acl.c b/fs/btrfs/acl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..662cdd1cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/btrfs/acl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Red Hat.  All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "ctree.h"
+#include "xattr.h"
+#include "acl.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "btrfs_inode.h"
+
+struct posix_acl *btrfs_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu)
+{
+	int size;
+	const char *name;
+	char AUTO_KFREE(value);
+	struct posix_acl *acl;
+
+	if (rcu)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
+		name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
+		break;
+	case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+		name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	size = btrfs_getxattr(inode, name, NULL, 0);
+	if (size > 0) {
+		value = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!value)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		size = btrfs_getxattr(inode, name, value, size);
+	}
+	if (size > 0)
+		acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size);
+	else if (size == -ENODATA || size == 0)
+		acl = NULL;
+	else
+		acl = ERR_PTR(size);
+
+	return acl;
+}
+
+int __btrfs_set_acl(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct inode *inode,
+		    struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+	int ret;
+	size_t size = 0;
+	const char *name;
+	char AUTO_KFREE(value);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
+		name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
+		break;
+	case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+			return acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
+		name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (acl) {
+		unsigned int nofs_flag;
+
+		/*
+		 * We're holding a transaction handle, so use a NOFS memory
+		 * allocation context to avoid deadlock if reclaim happens.
+		 */
+		nofs_flag = memalloc_nofs_save();
+		value = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, &size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		memalloc_nofs_restore(nofs_flag);
+		if (!value)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (trans)
+		ret = btrfs_setxattr(trans, inode, name, value, size, 0);
+	else
+		ret = btrfs_setxattr_trans(inode, name, value, size, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int btrfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+		  struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	umode_t old_mode = inode->i_mode;
+
+	if (btrfs_root_readonly(BTRFS_I(inode)->root))
+		return -EROFS;
+
+	if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && acl) {
+		ret = posix_acl_update_mode(idmap, inode,
+					    &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+	ret = __btrfs_set_acl(NULL, inode, acl, type);
+	if (ret)
+		inode->i_mode = old_mode;
+	return ret;
+}