openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 120 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/acl.c b/fs/btrfs/acl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e55b686fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/btrfs/acl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Red Hat.  All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "ctree.h"
+#include "xattr.h"
+#include "acl.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+struct posix_acl *btrfs_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu)
+{
+	int size;
+	const char *name;
+	char AUTO_KFREE(value);
+	struct posix_acl *acl;
+
+	if (rcu)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
+		name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
+		break;
+	case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+		name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	size = btrfs_getxattr(inode, name, NULL, 0);
+	if (size > 0) {
+		value = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!value)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		size = btrfs_getxattr(inode, name, value, size);
+	}
+	if (size > 0)
+		acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size);
+	else if (size == -ENODATA || size == 0)
+		acl = NULL;
+	else
+		acl = ERR_PTR(size);
+
+	return acl;
+}
+
+int __btrfs_set_acl(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct inode *inode,
+		    struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+	int ret;
+	size_t size = 0;
+	const char *name;
+	char AUTO_KFREE(value);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
+		name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
+		break;
+	case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+			return acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
+		name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (acl) {
+		unsigned int nofs_flag;
+
+		/*
+		 * We're holding a transaction handle, so use a NOFS memory
+		 * allocation context to avoid deadlock if reclaim happens.
+		 */
+		nofs_flag = memalloc_nofs_save();
+		value = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, &size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		memalloc_nofs_restore(nofs_flag);
+		if (!value)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (trans)
+		ret = btrfs_setxattr(trans, inode, name, value, size, 0);
+	else
+		ret = btrfs_setxattr_trans(inode, name, value, size, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int btrfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+		  struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	umode_t old_mode = inode->i_mode;
+
+	if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && acl) {
+		ret = posix_acl_update_mode(idmap, inode,
+					    &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+	ret = __btrfs_set_acl(NULL, inode, acl, type);
+	if (ret)
+		inode->i_mode = old_mode;
+	return ret;
+}