staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/afs/Makefile b/fs/afs/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d8f1982d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/afs/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for Red Hat Linux AFS client.
+#
+
+kafs-y := \
+	addr_list.o \
+	addr_prefs.o \
+	callback.o \
+	cell.o \
+	cm_security.o \
+	cmservice.o \
+	dir.o \
+	dir_edit.o \
+	dir_search.o \
+	dir_silly.o \
+	dynroot.o \
+	file.o \
+	flock.o \
+	fsclient.o \
+	fs_operation.o \
+	fs_probe.o \
+	inode.o \
+	main.o \
+	misc.o \
+	mntpt.o \
+	rotate.o \
+	rxrpc.o \
+	security.o \
+	server.o \
+	server_list.o \
+	super.o \
+	symlink.o \
+	validation.o \
+	vlclient.o \
+	vl_alias.o \
+	vl_list.o \
+	vl_probe.o \
+	vl_rotate.o \
+	volume.o \
+	write.o \
+	xattr.o \
+	yfsclient.o
+
+kafs-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AFS_FS)  := kafs.o