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| author | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 09:55:01 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 11:08:21 -0400 |
| commit | 4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 (patch) | |
| tree | 350aa83b47da0b574a814795392b20b0bed83cbc /drivers/xen/time.c | |
| download | linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.tar.gz linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.zip | |
ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_opsgrafted
There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since
it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls
ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that
if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to
have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other
call.
Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the
ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that
states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex
has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut
having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after
the mute is taken in case of races.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/xen/time.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/xen/time.c | 175 |
1 files changed, 175 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/xen/time.c b/drivers/xen/time.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a2be0a4d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/xen/time.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Xen stolen ticks accounting. + */ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/kernel_stat.h> +#include <linux/math64.h> +#include <linux/gfp.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/static_call.h> +#include <linux/sched/cputime.h> + +#include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h> +#include <asm/xen/hypercall.h> + +#include <xen/events.h> +#include <xen/features.h> +#include <xen/interface/xen.h> +#include <xen/interface/vcpu.h> +#include <xen/xen-ops.h> + +/* runstate info updated by Xen */ +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu_runstate_info, xen_runstate); + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64[4], old_runstate_time); + +/* return an consistent snapshot of 64-bit time/counter value */ +static u64 get64(const u64 *p) +{ + u64 ret; + + if (BITS_PER_LONG < 64) { + u32 *p32 = (u32 *)p; + u32 h, l, h2; + + /* + * Read high then low, and then make sure high is + * still the same; this will only loop if low wraps + * and carries into high. + * XXX some clean way to make this endian-proof? + */ + do { + h = READ_ONCE(p32[1]); + l = READ_ONCE(p32[0]); + h2 = READ_ONCE(p32[1]); + } while(h2 != h); + + ret = (((u64)h) << 32) | l; + } else + ret = READ_ONCE(*p); + + return ret; +} + +static void xen_get_runstate_snapshot_cpu_delta( + struct vcpu_runstate_info *res, unsigned int cpu) +{ + u64 state_time; + struct vcpu_runstate_info *state; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + + state = per_cpu_ptr(&xen_runstate, cpu); + + do { + state_time = get64(&state->state_entry_time); + rmb(); /* Hypervisor might update data. */ + *res = __READ_ONCE(*state); + rmb(); /* Hypervisor might update data. */ + } while (get64(&state->state_entry_time) != state_time || + (state_time & XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE)); +} + +static void xen_get_runstate_snapshot_cpu(struct vcpu_runstate_info *res, + unsigned int cpu) +{ + int i; + + xen_get_runstate_snapshot_cpu_delta(res, cpu); + + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + res->time[i] += per_cpu(old_runstate_time, cpu)[i]; +} + +void xen_manage_runstate_time(int action) +{ + static struct vcpu_runstate_info *runstate_delta; + struct vcpu_runstate_info state; + int cpu, i; + + switch (action) { + case -1: /* backup runstate time before suspend */ + if (unlikely(runstate_delta)) + pr_warn_once("%s: memory leak as runstate_delta is not NULL\n", + __func__); + + runstate_delta = kmalloc_objs(*runstate_delta, + num_possible_cpus(), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (unlikely(!runstate_delta)) { + pr_warn("%s: failed to allocate runstate_delta\n", + __func__); + return; + } + + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + xen_get_runstate_snapshot_cpu_delta(&state, cpu); + memcpy(runstate_delta[cpu].time, state.time, + sizeof(runstate_delta[cpu].time)); + } + + break; + + case 0: /* backup runstate time after resume */ + if (unlikely(!runstate_delta)) { + pr_warn("%s: cannot accumulate runstate time as runstate_delta is NULL\n", + __func__); + return; + } + + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + per_cpu(old_runstate_time, cpu)[i] += + runstate_delta[cpu].time[i]; + } + + break; + + default: /* do not accumulate runstate time for checkpointing */ + break; + } + + if (action != -1 && runstate_delta) { + kfree(runstate_delta); + runstate_delta = NULL; + } +} + +/* return true when a vcpu could run but has no real cpu to run on */ +bool xen_vcpu_stolen(int vcpu) +{ + return per_cpu(xen_runstate, vcpu).state == RUNSTATE_runnable; +} + +u64 xen_steal_clock(int cpu) +{ + struct vcpu_runstate_info state; + + xen_get_runstate_snapshot_cpu(&state, cpu); + return state.time[RUNSTATE_runnable] + state.time[RUNSTATE_offline]; +} + +void xen_setup_runstate_info(int cpu) +{ + struct vcpu_register_runstate_memory_area area; + + area.addr.v = &per_cpu(xen_runstate, cpu); + + if (HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_register_runstate_memory_area, + xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), &area)) + BUG(); +} + +void __init xen_time_setup_guest(void) +{ + bool xen_runstate_remote; + + xen_runstate_remote = !HYPERVISOR_vm_assist(VMASST_CMD_enable, + VMASST_TYPE_runstate_update_flag); + + static_call_update(pv_steal_clock, xen_steal_clock); + + static_key_slow_inc(¶virt_steal_enabled); + if (xen_runstate_remote) + static_key_slow_inc(¶virt_steal_rq_enabled); +} |
