Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted

Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Don't destroy user event fields when removal fails

   User event fields are destroyed before the event is removed from
   visibility. But that can fail leaving the still visible event with no
   fields. Move the destroying of the fields to after the event is
   successfully removed from visibility.

 - Initialize function graph state is fork before calling
   copy_exec_state()

   For non-CLONE_VM forks, copy_exec_state() allocates a new
   task_exec_state. If that allocation fails, ftrace_graph_exit_task()
   will free the tasks ret_stack pointer. Since that pointer is still
   using the parent's ret_stack, it mistakenly frees the parent's
   pointer too.

   Call ftrace_graph_init() on the task first which will NULL out the
   new tasks's ret_stack and if the copy fails, it will not free
   anything.

 - Remove FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX

   The macro FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX was added but never used. Remove it.

 - Save ent_size in function graph printing of nested functions

   The function graph tracer needs to look at the next event to see if
   the next event is the return of the current function entry. If it is,
   it prints a single line:

	ktime_get();

   Otherwise it prints it like a nested function:

	tick_nohz_irq_exit() {
	    ktime_get();
	    kcpustat_irq_exit();
	}

   In order to look at the next event, it must save the current event so
   that it has the information to print from it. It saves the event in
   the iterator descriptor called "ent". What it doesn't save is the
   ent_size of the event which is now used to know if the function graph
   arguments are to be printed. The peek doesn't save the size so the
   size used happens to be that of the size of the last event that was
   seen.

   Save the entry event size in the iterator descriptor so that the
   correct size is used.

 - Fix several errors with freeing data in the histogram code

   The histogram code had a lot of leaked or or incorrect accounting
   when failures happen. Correct them.

 - Fix histogram regression of .percent and .graph modifiers

   Up until 6.3 histogram values could have "percent" or "graph"
   modifiers that changed how they were printed. But a change that added
   restricting histograms values from being strings, stack traces and
   other modifiers inadvertently prevented them from using the percent
   and graph modifiers, which were legal use cases for values.

   Put back the percent and graph modifiers.

 - Fix various typos in the comments

 - Set the trace_clock before initializing a histogram with clock
   argument

   The histogram API allows the user to specific which trace clock to
   use via a "clock=" string. The histogram is set up first before the
   clock is checked. If the passed in clock is not valid, it exits
   without fully fixing up the histogram leaving it on the list and a
   use-after-free can trigger.

   Update the clock argument first and if it fails then exit gracefully
   before the histogram trigger is placed on any lists.

 - Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event

   The function ftrace_set_clr_event() modifies the parse string and
   needs to put it back to what was passed in. It searches for ":mod:"
   via a strsep() but fails to put back the first ':' in the string.

   Add back the ':' in the passed in string.

 - Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file

   The options files are dynamically created and some tracers add their
   own options. When a tracer adds their own list of options, the
   trace_array holding them has an array to hold the list of options for
   each tracer. This array increases in size via a krealloc(), and the
   new entry gets a newly allocated array to hold the options of the new
   tracer being added.

   The element in each entry of the tracer's option array holds a
   pointer back to the trace_array, a pointer to the tracer it is
   associated to, a pointer to the flags of the option.

   The issue is that these arrays are freed when the trace_array is
   freed when its instance it represents is removed from the instances
   directory. There's a race that an open of one of these options files
   can happen when the instance is being removed.

   Add a new helper function to be called by the open function of the
   options file to iterate all existing trace_arrays under a lock and
   find the one that has the given option element in one of it's tracer
   arrays. If found, then update the associated trace_array's reference
   counter to keep it from being freed. If not found, have the open call
   return -ENODEV.

 - Disable interrupts when acquiring the lock in rb_wake_up_waiters()

   The function rb_wake_up_waiters() assumes it will be called in
   interrupt context and does not disable irqs when taking
   cpu_buffer->reader_lock, which can be called in hard interrupt
   context. The issue is in PREEMPT_RT, this function is called in
   thread context leaving this lock open to a deadlock.

   Take the lock with interrupts disabled.

 - Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash

   The tmp_ops used in update_ftrace_direct_mod() assigns its
   filter_hash field directly, but that field is annotated as __rcu and
   sparse complains. Assign it with rcu_assign_pointer()

 - Fix use-after-free in enable_trigger_private_data_free()

   The trace_event_call is accessed through the event_trigger_data's
   trace_event_file pointer to put the trace_event_call on freeing. The
   issue is that the trace_event_file data may have been freed already
   causing a use-after-free. Add a field to the event_trigger_data that
   points directly to the trace_event_call so that it can decrement its
   reference directly without needing to go through the
   trace_event_file.

 - Fix accounting of buffer data remote headers

   trace_buffer_desc_size() and trace_remote_alloc_buffer() undercount
   the number of pages is needed for the asked for size as it doesn't
   take into account the meta data on each page. Add a helper function
   to do the calculation properly and use that in these functions.

 - Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing

   The number of pages per remote ring buffer is capped by
   ring_buffer_desc::nr_page_va (32 bits). A buffer_size large enough to
   overflow that field would silently allocate a descriptor smaller than
   what was asked for.

 - Do not resize the subbuf order if any per_cpu buffer is disabled

   The mmapping of ring buffers disables resizing the subbuffers, but it
   is done per-cpu whereas the subbuf size change is done for all the
   per_cpu buffers under the buffer->mutex. It could change the size of
   some while the mapping is happening on others. Have the resize of the
   subbuf order check all the per_cpu buffers under the lock to see if
   any of them is disabled before starting and causing an inconsistency
   between buffers that are being mapped.

* tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: (25 commits)
  ring-buffer: Check resize_disabled before publishing the new subbuf order
  tracing/remotes: Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing
  tracing/remotes: Account for ring buffer page header in size calculation
  tracing: Don't dereference trace_event_file in deferred trigger free
  ftrace: Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash
  ring-buffer: Acquire the lock with irqsave in rb_wake_up_waiters()
  tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
  tracing: Fix ring_buffer_read_page_size() kernel-doc
  tracing: Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event()
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
  tracing: Undo the registration when enabling the histogram trigger fails
  tracing: Take the reference before publishing the named histogram trigger
  tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
  tracing: Fix typo "preceeded" in comment
  tracing: Fix typo "availabe" in comment
  tracing: Let histogram values keep the percent and graph modifiers
  tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
  tracing: Free histogram the field rejected for a bad modifier
  tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
  ...

25 files changed, 3117 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f7691f64f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Confidential computing related collateral
+#
+
+if VIRT_DRIVERS
+source "drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig"
+
+source "drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Kconfig"
+
+source "drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig"
+
+source "drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Kconfig"
+
+source "drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig"
+
+source "drivers/virt/coco/guest/Kconfig"
+endif
+
+source "drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Kconfig"
+
+config TSM
+	bool
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b323b0ae4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Confidential computing related collateral
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET)	+= efi_secret/
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_PKVM_GUEST)	+= pkvm-guest/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST)		+= sev-guest/
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST)	+= tdx-guest/
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST)	+= tdx-host/
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST)	+= arm-cca-guest/
+obj-$(CONFIG_TSM) 		+= tsm-core.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TSM_GUEST)		+= guest/
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3f0f013f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+config ARM_CCA_GUEST
+	tristate "Arm CCA Guest driver"
+	depends on ARM64
+	select TSM_REPORTS
+	help
+	  The driver provides userspace interface to request and
+	  attestation report from the Realm Management Monitor(RMM).
+
+	  If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called
+	  arm-cca-guest.
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..69eeba08e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST) += arm-cca-guest.o
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0eeddd1ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 ARM Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/device-id/platform.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/tsm.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include <asm/rsi.h>
+
+/**
+ * struct arm_cca_token_info - a descriptor for the token buffer.
+ * @granule:		PA of the granule to which the token will be written
+ * @offset:		Offset within granule to start of buffer in bytes
+ */
+struct arm_cca_token_info {
+	phys_addr_t     granule;
+	unsigned long   offset;
+};
+
+/**
+ * arm_cca_attestation_continue - Retrieve the attestation token data.
+ *
+ * @info: pointer to the arm_cca_token_info
+ *
+ * Attestation token generation is a long running operation and therefore
+ * the token data may not be retrieved in a single call. Moreover, the
+ * token retrieval operation must be requested on the same CPU on which the
+ * attestation token generation was initialised.
+ * This helper function must therefore be executed on the same CPU multiple
+ * times until the entire token data is retrieved.
+ */
+static unsigned long
+arm_cca_attestation_continue(struct arm_cca_token_info *info)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	unsigned long len;
+	unsigned long size;
+
+	size = RSI_GRANULE_SIZE - info->offset;
+	ret = rsi_attestation_token_continue(info->granule, info->offset, size,
+					     &len);
+	info->offset += len;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * arm_cca_report_new - Generate a new attestation token.
+ *
+ * @report: pointer to the TSM report context information.
+ * @data:  pointer to the context specific data for this module.
+ *
+ * Initialise the attestation token generation using the challenge data
+ * passed in the TSM descriptor. Allocate memory for the attestation token
+ * and retrieve the attestation token on the same CPU on which the
+ * attestation token generation was initialised.
+ *
+ * The challenge data must be at least 32 bytes and no more than 64 bytes. If
+ * less than 64 bytes are provided it will be zero padded to 64 bytes.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0        - Attestation token generated successfully.
+ * * %-EINVAL  - A parameter was not valid.
+ * * %-ENOMEM  - Out of memory.
+ * * %-EFAULT  - Failed to get IPA for memory page(s).
+ */
+static int arm_cca_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long rsi_result;
+	long max_size;
+	unsigned long token_size = 0;
+	struct arm_cca_token_info info;
+	void *buf;
+	u8 *token __free(kvfree) = NULL;
+	struct tsm_report_desc *desc = &report->desc;
+
+	if (desc->inblob_len < 32 || desc->inblob_len > 64)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * The attestation token 'init' and 'continue' calls must be
+	 * performed on the same CPU, so disable CPU migration around
+	 * those operations.
+	 */
+	migrate_disable();
+
+	max_size = rsi_attestation_token_init(desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len);
+	if (max_size <= 0) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto exit_migrate_enable;
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate outblob */
+	token = kvzalloc(max_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!token) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto exit_migrate_enable;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Since the outblob may not be physically contiguous, use a page
+	 * to bounce the buffer from RMM.
+	 */
+	buf = alloc_pages_exact(RSI_GRANULE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto exit_migrate_enable;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the PA of the memory page(s) that were allocated */
+	info.granule = (unsigned long)virt_to_phys(buf);
+
+	/* Loop until the token is ready or there is an error */
+	do {
+		/* Retrieve one RSI_GRANULE_SIZE data per loop iteration */
+		info.offset = 0;
+		do {
+			/*
+			 * Retrieve a sub-granule chunk of data per loop
+			 * iteration.
+			 */
+			rsi_result = arm_cca_attestation_continue(&info);
+		} while (rsi_result == RSI_INCOMPLETE &&
+			 info.offset < RSI_GRANULE_SIZE);
+
+		/* Break out in case of failure */
+		if (rsi_result != RSI_SUCCESS && rsi_result != RSI_INCOMPLETE) {
+			ret = -ENXIO;
+			token_size = 0;
+			goto exit_free_granule_page;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Copy the retrieved token data from the granule
+		 * to the token buffer, ensuring that the RMM doesn't
+		 * overflow the buffer.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON(token_size + info.offset > max_size))
+			break;
+		memcpy(&token[token_size], buf, info.offset);
+		token_size += info.offset;
+	} while (rsi_result == RSI_INCOMPLETE);
+
+	report->outblob = no_free_ptr(token);
+exit_free_granule_page:
+	report->outblob_len = token_size;
+	free_pages_exact(buf, RSI_GRANULE_SIZE);
+exit_migrate_enable:
+	migrate_enable();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct tsm_report_ops arm_cca_tsm_ops = {
+	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
+	.report_new = arm_cca_report_new,
+};
+
+/**
+ * arm_cca_guest_init - Register with the Trusted Security Module (TSM)
+ * interface.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0        - Registered successfully with the TSM interface.
+ * * %-ENODEV  - The execution context is not an Arm Realm.
+ * * %-EBUSY   - Already registered.
+ */
+static int __init arm_cca_guest_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!is_realm_world())
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	ret = tsm_report_register(&arm_cca_tsm_ops, NULL);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_err("Error %d registering with TSM\n", ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+module_init(arm_cca_guest_init);
+
+/**
+ * arm_cca_guest_exit - unregister with the Trusted Security Module (TSM)
+ * interface.
+ */
+static void __exit arm_cca_guest_exit(void)
+{
+	tsm_report_unregister(&arm_cca_tsm_ops);
+}
+module_exit(arm_cca_guest_exit);
+
+/* modalias, so userspace can autoload this module when RSI is available */
+static const struct platform_device_id arm_cca_match[] __maybe_unused = {
+	{ .name = RSI_PDEV_NAME },
+	{ }
+};
+
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(platform, arm_cca_match);
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Arm CCA Guest TSM Driver");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..94d88e5da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config EFI_SECRET
+	tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support"
+	depends on EFI && (X86_64 || ARM64)
+	select EFI_COCO_SECRET
+	select SECURITYFS
+	help
+	  This is a driver for accessing the EFI secret area via securityfs.
+	  The EFI secret area is a memory area designated by the firmware for
+	  confidential computing secret injection (for example for AMD SEV
+	  guests).  The driver exposes the secrets as files in
+	  <securityfs>/secrets/coco.  Files can be read and deleted (deleting
+	  a file wipes the secret from memory).
+
+	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here.
+	  The module will be called efi_secret.
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c7047ce80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret.o
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5946c5abe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * efi_secret module
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+/**
+ * DOC: efi_secret: Allow reading EFI confidential computing (coco) secret area
+ * via securityfs interface.
+ *
+ * When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
+ * /sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in securityfs.
+ * In it, a file is created for each secret entry.  The name of each such file
+ * is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/cacheflush.h>
+
+#define EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES 64
+
+struct efi_secret {
+	struct dentry *secrets_dir;
+	void __iomem *secret_data;
+	u64 secret_data_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structure of the EFI secret area
+ *
+ * Offset   Length
+ * (bytes)  (bytes)  Usage
+ * -------  -------  -----
+ *       0       16  Secret table header GUID (must be 1e74f542-71dd-4d66-963e-ef4287ff173b)
+ *      16        4  Length of bytes of the entire secret area
+ *
+ *      20       16  First secret entry's GUID
+ *      36        4  First secret entry's length in bytes (= 16 + 4 + x)
+ *      40        x  First secret entry's data
+ *
+ *    40+x       16  Second secret entry's GUID
+ *    56+x        4  Second secret entry's length in bytes (= 16 + 4 + y)
+ *    60+x        y  Second secret entry's data
+ *
+ * (... and so on for additional entries)
+ *
+ * The GUID of each secret entry designates the usage of the secret data.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * struct secret_header - Header of entire secret area; this should be followed
+ * by instances of struct secret_entry.
+ * @guid:	Must be EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID
+ * @len:	Length in bytes of entire secret area, including header
+ */
+struct secret_header {
+	efi_guid_t guid;
+	u32 len;
+} __attribute((packed));
+
+/**
+ * struct secret_entry - Holds one secret entry
+ * @guid:	Secret-specific GUID (or NULL_GUID if this secret entry was deleted)
+ * @len:	Length of secret entry, including its guid and len fields
+ * @data:	The secret data (full of zeros if this secret entry was deleted)
+ */
+struct secret_entry {
+	efi_guid_t guid;
+	u32 len;
+	u8 data[];
+} __attribute((packed));
+
+static size_t secret_entry_data_len(struct secret_entry *e)
+{
+	return e->len - sizeof(*e);
+}
+
+static struct efi_secret the_efi_secret;
+
+static inline struct efi_secret *efi_secret_get(void)
+{
+	return &the_efi_secret;
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_bin_file_show(struct seq_file *file, void *data)
+{
+	struct secret_entry *e = file->private;
+
+	if (e)
+		seq_write(file, e->data, secret_entry_data_len(e));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(efi_secret_bin_file);
+
+/*
+ * Overwrite memory content with zeroes, and ensure that dirty cache lines are
+ * actually written back to memory, to clear out the secret.
+ */
+static void wipe_memory(void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	memzero_explicit(addr, size);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+	clflush_cache_range(addr, size);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	struct secret_entry *e = (struct secret_entry *)inode->i_private;
+
+	if (e) {
+		/* Zero out the secret data */
+		wipe_memory(e->data, secret_entry_data_len(e));
+		e->guid = NULL_GUID;
+	}
+
+	inode->i_private = NULL;
+
+	return simple_unlink(inode, dentry);
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations efi_secret_dir_inode_operations = {
+	.lookup         = simple_lookup,
+	.unlink         = efi_secret_unlink,
+};
+
+static int efi_secret_map_area(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+	struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area;
+
+	if (efi.coco_secret == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "Secret area address is not available\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	secret_area = memremap(efi.coco_secret, sizeof(*secret_area), MEMREMAP_WB);
+	if (secret_area == NULL) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "Could not map secret area EFI config entry\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	if (!secret_area->base_pa || secret_area->size < sizeof(struct secret_header)) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev,
+			"Invalid secret area memory location (base_pa=0x%llx size=0x%llx)\n",
+			secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto unmap;
+	}
+
+	s->secret_data = ioremap_encrypted(secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
+	if (s->secret_data == NULL) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "Could not map secret area\n");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto unmap;
+	}
+
+	s->secret_data_len = secret_area->size;
+	ret = 0;
+
+unmap:
+	memunmap(secret_area);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void efi_secret_securityfs_teardown(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+
+	securityfs_remove(s->secrets_dir);
+	s->secrets_dir = NULL;
+
+	dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "Removed securityfs entries\n");
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_securityfs_setup(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+	int ret = 0, i = 0, bytes_left;
+	unsigned char *ptr;
+	struct secret_header *h;
+	struct secret_entry *e;
+	struct dentry *dent, *dir;
+	char guid_str[EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN + 1];
+
+	ptr = (void __force *)s->secret_data;
+	h = (struct secret_header *)ptr;
+	if (efi_guidcmp(h->guid, EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID)) {
+		/*
+		 * This is not an error: it just means that EFI defines secret
+		 * area but it was not populated by the Guest Owner.
+		 */
+		dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area does not start with correct GUID\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+	if (h->len < sizeof(*h)) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area reported length is too small\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (h->len > s->secret_data_len) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area reported length is too big\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	s->secrets_dir = NULL;
+
+	dent = securityfs_create_dir("secrets", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "Error creating secrets securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n",
+			PTR_ERR(dent));
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+	}
+	s->secrets_dir = dent;
+
+	dir = securityfs_create_dir("coco", s->secrets_dir);
+	if (IS_ERR(dir)) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "Error creating coco securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n",
+			PTR_ERR(dir));
+		return PTR_ERR(dir);
+	}
+	d_inode(dir)->i_op = &efi_secret_dir_inode_operations;
+
+	bytes_left = h->len - sizeof(*h);
+	ptr += sizeof(*h);
+	while (bytes_left >= (int)sizeof(*e) && i < EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES) {
+		e = (struct secret_entry *)ptr;
+		if (e->len < sizeof(*e) || e->len > (unsigned int)bytes_left) {
+			dev_err(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area is corrupted\n");
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto err_cleanup;
+		}
+
+		/* Skip deleted entries (which will have NULL_GUID) */
+		if (efi_guidcmp(e->guid, NULL_GUID)) {
+			efi_guid_to_str(&e->guid, guid_str);
+
+			dent = securityfs_create_file(guid_str, 0440, dir, (void *)e,
+						      &efi_secret_bin_file_fops);
+			if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+				dev_err(&dev->dev, "Error creating efi_secret securityfs entry\n");
+				ret = PTR_ERR(dent);
+				goto err_cleanup;
+			}
+			i++;
+		}
+		ptr += e->len;
+		bytes_left -= e->len;
+	}
+
+	dev_info(&dev->dev, "Created %d entries in securityfs secrets/coco\n", i);
+	return 0;
+
+err_cleanup:
+	efi_secret_securityfs_teardown(dev);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void efi_secret_unmap_area(void)
+{
+	struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+
+	if (s->secret_data) {
+		iounmap(s->secret_data);
+		s->secret_data = NULL;
+		s->secret_data_len = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_probe(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = efi_secret_map_area(dev);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = efi_secret_securityfs_setup(dev);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_unmap;
+
+	return ret;
+
+err_unmap:
+	efi_secret_unmap_area();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void efi_secret_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	efi_secret_securityfs_teardown(dev);
+	efi_secret_unmap_area();
+}
+
+static struct platform_driver efi_secret_driver = {
+	.probe = efi_secret_probe,
+	.remove = efi_secret_remove,
+	.driver = {
+		.name = "efi_secret",
+	},
+};
+
+module_platform_driver(efi_secret_driver);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Confidential computing EFI secret area access");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_ALIAS("platform:efi_secret");
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/guest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/guest/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..da570dc4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/guest/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Confidential computing shared guest collateral
+#
+config TSM_GUEST
+	bool
+
+config TSM_REPORTS
+	select TSM_GUEST
+	select CONFIGFS_FS
+	tristate
+
+config TSM_MEASUREMENTS
+	select TSM_GUEST
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	bool
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/guest/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/guest/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ec4860bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/guest/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+obj-$(CONFIG_TSM_REPORTS)	+= tsm_report.o
+tsm_report-y := report.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TSM_MEASUREMENTS)	+= tsm-mr.o
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/guest/report.c b/drivers/virt/coco/guest/report.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b254a1416
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/guest/report.c
@@ -0,0 +1,539 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Copyright(c) 2023 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/tsm.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/configfs.h>
+
+static struct tsm_provider {
+	const struct tsm_report_ops *ops;
+	void *data;
+	atomic_t count;
+} provider;
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tsm_rwsem);
+
+/**
+ * DOC: Trusted Security Module (TSM) Attestation Report Interface
+ *
+ * The TSM report interface is a common provider of blobs that facilitate
+ * attestation of a TVM (confidential computing guest) by an attestation
+ * service. A TSM report combines a user-defined blob (likely a public-key with
+ * a nonce for a key-exchange protocol) with a signed attestation report. That
+ * combined blob is then used to obtain secrets provided by an agent that can
+ * validate the attestation report. The expectation is that this interface is
+ * invoked infrequently, however configfs allows for multiple agents to
+ * own their own report generation instances to generate reports as
+ * often as needed.
+ *
+ * The attestation report format is TSM provider specific, when / if a standard
+ * materializes that can be published instead of the vendor layout. Until then
+ * the 'provider' attribute indicates the format of 'outblob', and optionally
+ * 'auxblob' and 'manifestblob'.
+ */
+
+struct tsm_report_state {
+	struct tsm_report report;
+	unsigned long write_generation;
+	unsigned long read_generation;
+	struct config_item cfg;
+};
+
+enum tsm_data_select {
+	TSM_REPORT,
+	TSM_CERTS,
+	TSM_MANIFEST,
+};
+
+static struct tsm_report *to_tsm_report(struct config_item *cfg)
+{
+	struct tsm_report_state *state =
+		container_of(cfg, struct tsm_report_state, cfg);
+
+	return &state->report;
+}
+
+static struct tsm_report_state *to_state(struct tsm_report *report)
+{
+	return container_of(report, struct tsm_report_state, report);
+}
+
+static int try_advance_write_generation(struct tsm_report *report)
+{
+	struct tsm_report_state *state = to_state(report);
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&tsm_rwsem);
+
+	/*
+	 * Malicious or broken userspace has written enough times for
+	 * read_generation == write_generation by modular arithmetic without an
+	 * interim read. Stop accepting updates until the current report
+	 * configuration is read.
+	 */
+	if (state->write_generation == state->read_generation - 1)
+		return -EBUSY;
+	state->write_generation++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_privlevel_store(struct config_item *cfg,
+					  const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	struct tsm_report *report = to_tsm_report(cfg);
+	unsigned int val;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = kstrtouint(buf, 0, &val);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	guard(rwsem_write)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	if (!provider.ops)
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	/*
+	 * The valid privilege levels that a TSM might accept, if it accepts a
+	 * privilege level setting at all, are a max of TSM_PRIVLEVEL_MAX (see
+	 * SEV-SNP GHCB) and a minimum of a TSM selected floor value no less
+	 * than 0.
+	 */
+	if (provider.ops->privlevel_floor > val || val > TSM_REPORT_PRIVLEVEL_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = try_advance_write_generation(report);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	report->desc.privlevel = val;
+
+	return len;
+}
+CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, privlevel);
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_privlevel_floor_show(struct config_item *cfg,
+					       char *buf)
+{
+	guard(rwsem_read)(&tsm_rwsem);
+
+	if (!provider.ops)
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%u\n", provider.ops->privlevel_floor);
+}
+CONFIGFS_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, privlevel_floor);
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_service_provider_store(struct config_item *cfg,
+						 const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	struct tsm_report *report = to_tsm_report(cfg);
+	size_t sp_len;
+	char *sp;
+	int rc;
+
+	guard(rwsem_write)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	rc = try_advance_write_generation(report);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	sp_len = (buf[len - 1] != '\n') ? len : len - 1;
+
+	sp = kstrndup(buf, sp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	kfree(report->desc.service_provider);
+
+	report->desc.service_provider = sp;
+
+	return len;
+}
+CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, service_provider);
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_service_guid_store(struct config_item *cfg,
+					     const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	struct tsm_report *report = to_tsm_report(cfg);
+	int rc;
+
+	guard(rwsem_write)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	rc = try_advance_write_generation(report);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	report->desc.service_guid = guid_null;
+
+	rc = guid_parse(buf, &report->desc.service_guid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return len;
+}
+CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, service_guid);
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_service_manifest_version_store(struct config_item *cfg,
+							 const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	struct tsm_report *report = to_tsm_report(cfg);
+	unsigned int val;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = kstrtouint(buf, 0, &val);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	guard(rwsem_write)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	rc = try_advance_write_generation(report);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	report->desc.service_manifest_version = val;
+
+	return len;
+}
+CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, service_manifest_version);
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_inblob_write(struct config_item *cfg,
+				       const void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	struct tsm_report *report = to_tsm_report(cfg);
+	int rc;
+
+	guard(rwsem_write)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	rc = try_advance_write_generation(report);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	report->desc.inblob_len = count;
+	memcpy(report->desc.inblob, buf, count);
+	return count;
+}
+CONFIGFS_BIN_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, inblob, NULL, TSM_REPORT_INBLOB_MAX);
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_generation_show(struct config_item *cfg, char *buf)
+{
+	struct tsm_report *report = to_tsm_report(cfg);
+	struct tsm_report_state *state = to_state(report);
+
+	guard(rwsem_read)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lu\n", state->write_generation);
+}
+CONFIGFS_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, generation);
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_provider_show(struct config_item *cfg, char *buf)
+{
+	guard(rwsem_read)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	if (!provider.ops)
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", provider.ops->name);
+}
+CONFIGFS_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, provider);
+
+static ssize_t __read_report(struct tsm_report *report, void *buf, size_t count,
+			     enum tsm_data_select select)
+{
+	loff_t offset = 0;
+	ssize_t len;
+	u8 *out;
+
+	if (select == TSM_REPORT) {
+		out = report->outblob;
+		len = report->outblob_len;
+	} else if (select == TSM_MANIFEST) {
+		out = report->manifestblob;
+		len = report->manifestblob_len;
+	} else {
+		out = report->auxblob;
+		len = report->auxblob_len;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Recall that a NULL @buf is configfs requesting the size of
+	 * the buffer.
+	 */
+	if (!buf)
+		return len;
+	return memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &offset, out, len);
+}
+
+static ssize_t read_cached_report(struct tsm_report *report, void *buf,
+				  size_t count, enum tsm_data_select select)
+{
+	struct tsm_report_state *state = to_state(report);
+
+	guard(rwsem_read)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	if (!report->desc.inblob_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * A given TSM backend always fills in ->outblob regardless of
+	 * whether the report includes an auxblob/manifestblob or not.
+	 */
+	if (!report->outblob ||
+	    state->read_generation != state->write_generation)
+		return -EWOULDBLOCK;
+
+	return __read_report(report, buf, count, select);
+}
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_read(struct tsm_report *report, void *buf,
+			       size_t count, enum tsm_data_select select)
+{
+	struct tsm_report_state *state = to_state(report);
+	const struct tsm_report_ops *ops;
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	/* try to read from the existing report if present and valid... */
+	rc = read_cached_report(report, buf, count, select);
+	if (rc >= 0 || rc != -EWOULDBLOCK)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* slow path, report may need to be regenerated... */
+	guard(rwsem_write)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	ops = provider.ops;
+	if (!ops)
+		return -ENXIO;
+	if (!report->desc.inblob_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* did another thread already generate this report? */
+	if (report->outblob &&
+	    state->read_generation == state->write_generation)
+		goto out;
+
+	kvfree(report->outblob);
+	kvfree(report->auxblob);
+	kvfree(report->manifestblob);
+	report->outblob = NULL;
+	report->auxblob = NULL;
+	report->manifestblob = NULL;
+	rc = ops->report_new(report, provider.data);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+	state->read_generation = state->write_generation;
+out:
+	return __read_report(report, buf, count, select);
+}
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_outblob_read(struct config_item *cfg, void *buf,
+				       size_t count)
+{
+	struct tsm_report *report = to_tsm_report(cfg);
+
+	return tsm_report_read(report, buf, count, TSM_REPORT);
+}
+CONFIGFS_BIN_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, outblob, NULL, TSM_REPORT_OUTBLOB_MAX);
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_auxblob_read(struct config_item *cfg, void *buf,
+				       size_t count)
+{
+	struct tsm_report *report = to_tsm_report(cfg);
+
+	return tsm_report_read(report, buf, count, TSM_CERTS);
+}
+CONFIGFS_BIN_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, auxblob, NULL, TSM_REPORT_OUTBLOB_MAX);
+
+static ssize_t tsm_report_manifestblob_read(struct config_item *cfg, void *buf,
+					    size_t count)
+{
+	struct tsm_report *report = to_tsm_report(cfg);
+
+	return tsm_report_read(report, buf, count, TSM_MANIFEST);
+}
+CONFIGFS_BIN_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, manifestblob, NULL, TSM_REPORT_OUTBLOB_MAX);
+
+static struct configfs_attribute *tsm_report_attrs[] = {
+	[TSM_REPORT_GENERATION] = &tsm_report_attr_generation,
+	[TSM_REPORT_PROVIDER] = &tsm_report_attr_provider,
+	[TSM_REPORT_PRIVLEVEL] = &tsm_report_attr_privlevel,
+	[TSM_REPORT_PRIVLEVEL_FLOOR] = &tsm_report_attr_privlevel_floor,
+	[TSM_REPORT_SERVICE_PROVIDER] = &tsm_report_attr_service_provider,
+	[TSM_REPORT_SERVICE_GUID] = &tsm_report_attr_service_guid,
+	[TSM_REPORT_SERVICE_MANIFEST_VER] = &tsm_report_attr_service_manifest_version,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+static struct configfs_bin_attribute *tsm_report_bin_attrs[] = {
+	[TSM_REPORT_INBLOB] = &tsm_report_attr_inblob,
+	[TSM_REPORT_OUTBLOB] = &tsm_report_attr_outblob,
+	[TSM_REPORT_AUXBLOB] = &tsm_report_attr_auxblob,
+	[TSM_REPORT_MANIFESTBLOB] = &tsm_report_attr_manifestblob,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+static void tsm_report_item_release(struct config_item *cfg)
+{
+	struct tsm_report *report = to_tsm_report(cfg);
+	struct tsm_report_state *state = to_state(report);
+
+	kvfree(report->manifestblob);
+	kvfree(report->auxblob);
+	kvfree(report->outblob);
+	kfree(report->desc.service_provider);
+	kfree(state);
+}
+
+static struct configfs_item_operations tsm_report_item_ops = {
+	.release = tsm_report_item_release,
+};
+
+static bool tsm_report_is_visible(struct config_item *item,
+				  struct configfs_attribute *attr, int n)
+{
+	guard(rwsem_read)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	if (!provider.ops)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!provider.ops->report_attr_visible)
+		return true;
+
+	return provider.ops->report_attr_visible(n);
+}
+
+static bool tsm_report_is_bin_visible(struct config_item *item,
+				      struct configfs_bin_attribute *attr, int n)
+{
+	guard(rwsem_read)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	if (!provider.ops)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!provider.ops->report_bin_attr_visible)
+		return true;
+
+	return provider.ops->report_bin_attr_visible(n);
+}
+
+static struct configfs_group_operations tsm_report_attr_group_ops = {
+	.is_visible = tsm_report_is_visible,
+	.is_bin_visible = tsm_report_is_bin_visible,
+};
+
+static const struct config_item_type tsm_report_type = {
+	.ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.ct_bin_attrs = tsm_report_bin_attrs,
+	.ct_attrs = tsm_report_attrs,
+	.ct_item_ops = &tsm_report_item_ops,
+	.ct_group_ops = &tsm_report_attr_group_ops,
+};
+
+static struct config_item *tsm_report_make_item(struct config_group *group,
+						const char *name)
+{
+	struct tsm_report_state *state;
+
+	guard(rwsem_read)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	if (!provider.ops)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO);
+
+	state = kzalloc_obj(*state);
+	if (!state)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	atomic_inc(&provider.count);
+	config_item_init_type_name(&state->cfg, name, &tsm_report_type);
+	return &state->cfg;
+}
+
+static void tsm_report_drop_item(struct config_group *group, struct config_item *item)
+{
+	config_item_put(item);
+	atomic_dec(&provider.count);
+}
+
+static struct configfs_group_operations tsm_report_group_ops = {
+	.make_item = tsm_report_make_item,
+	.drop_item = tsm_report_drop_item,
+};
+
+static const struct config_item_type tsm_reports_type = {
+	.ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.ct_group_ops = &tsm_report_group_ops,
+};
+
+static const struct config_item_type tsm_root_group_type = {
+	.ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static struct configfs_subsystem tsm_configfs = {
+	.su_group = {
+		.cg_item = {
+			.ci_namebuf = "tsm",
+			.ci_type = &tsm_root_group_type,
+		},
+	},
+	.su_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tsm_configfs.su_mutex),
+};
+
+int tsm_report_register(const struct tsm_report_ops *ops, void *priv)
+{
+	const struct tsm_report_ops *conflict;
+
+	guard(rwsem_write)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	conflict = provider.ops;
+	if (conflict) {
+		pr_err("\"%s\" ops already registered\n", conflict->name);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	if (atomic_read(&provider.count)) {
+		pr_err("configfs/tsm/report not empty\n");
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	provider.ops = ops;
+	provider.data = priv;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tsm_report_register);
+
+int tsm_report_unregister(const struct tsm_report_ops *ops)
+{
+	guard(rwsem_write)(&tsm_rwsem);
+	if (ops != provider.ops)
+		return -EBUSY;
+	if (atomic_read(&provider.count))
+		pr_warn("\"%s\" unregistered with items present in configfs/tsm/report\n",
+			provider.ops->name);
+	provider.ops = NULL;
+	provider.data = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tsm_report_unregister);
+
+static struct config_group *tsm_report_group;
+
+static int __init tsm_report_init(void)
+{
+	struct config_group *root = &tsm_configfs.su_group;
+	struct config_group *tsm;
+	int rc;
+
+	config_group_init(root);
+	rc = configfs_register_subsystem(&tsm_configfs);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tsm = configfs_register_default_group(root, "report",
+					      &tsm_reports_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(tsm)) {
+		configfs_unregister_subsystem(&tsm_configfs);
+		return PTR_ERR(tsm);
+	}
+	tsm_report_group = tsm;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+module_init(tsm_report_init);
+
+static void __exit tsm_report_exit(void)
+{
+	configfs_unregister_default_group(tsm_report_group);
+	configfs_unregister_subsystem(&tsm_configfs);
+}
+module_exit(tsm_report_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Provide Trusted Security Module attestation reports via configfs");
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/guest/tsm-mr.c b/drivers/virt/coco/guest/tsm-mr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..657b9c573
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/guest/tsm-mr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Copyright(c) 2024-2025 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/tsm_mr.h>
+
+/*
+ * struct tm_context - contains everything necessary to implement sysfs
+ * attributes for MRs.
+ * @rwsem: protects the MR cache from concurrent access.
+ * @agrp: contains all MR attributes created by tsm_mr_create_attribute_group().
+ * @tm: input to tsm_mr_create_attribute_group() containing MR definitions/ops.
+ * @in_sync: %true if MR cache is up-to-date.
+ * @mrs: array of &struct bin_attribute, one for each MR.
+ *
+ * This internal structure contains everything needed to implement
+ * tm_digest_read() and tm_digest_write().
+ *
+ * Given tm->refresh() is potentially expensive, tm_digest_read() caches MR
+ * values and calls tm->refresh() only when necessary. Only live MRs (i.e., with
+ * %TSM_MR_F_LIVE set) can trigger tm->refresh(), while others are assumed to
+ * retain their values from the last tm->write(). @in_sync tracks if there have
+ * been tm->write() calls since the last tm->refresh(). That is, tm->refresh()
+ * will be called only when a live MR is being read and the cache is stale
+ * (@in_sync is %false).
+ *
+ * tm_digest_write() sets @in_sync to %false and calls tm->write(), whose
+ * semantics is arch and MR specific. Most (if not all) writable MRs support the
+ * extension semantics (i.e., tm->write() extends the input buffer into the MR).
+ */
+struct tm_context {
+	struct rw_semaphore rwsem;
+	struct attribute_group agrp;
+	const struct tsm_measurements *tm;
+	bool in_sync;
+	struct bin_attribute mrs[];
+};
+
+static ssize_t tm_digest_read(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+			      const struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buffer,
+			      loff_t off, size_t count)
+{
+	struct tm_context *ctx;
+	const struct tsm_measurement_register *mr;
+	int rc;
+
+	ctx = attr->private;
+	rc = down_read_interruptible(&ctx->rwsem);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	mr = &ctx->tm->mrs[attr - ctx->mrs];
+
+	/*
+	 * @ctx->in_sync indicates if the MR cache is stale. It is a global
+	 * instead of a per-MR flag for simplicity, as most (if not all) archs
+	 * allow reading all MRs in oneshot.
+	 *
+	 * ctx->refresh() is necessary only for LIVE MRs, while others retain
+	 * their values from their respective last ctx->write().
+	 */
+	if ((mr->mr_flags & TSM_MR_F_LIVE) && !ctx->in_sync) {
+		up_read(&ctx->rwsem);
+
+		rc = down_write_killable(&ctx->rwsem);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		if (!ctx->in_sync) {
+			rc = ctx->tm->refresh(ctx->tm);
+			ctx->in_sync = !rc;
+			trace_tsm_mr_refresh(mr, rc);
+		}
+
+		downgrade_write(&ctx->rwsem);
+	}
+
+	memcpy(buffer, mr->mr_value + off, count);
+	trace_tsm_mr_read(mr);
+
+	up_read(&ctx->rwsem);
+	return rc ?: count;
+}
+
+static ssize_t tm_digest_write(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+			       const struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buffer,
+			       loff_t off, size_t count)
+{
+	struct tm_context *ctx;
+	const struct tsm_measurement_register *mr;
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	/* partial writes are not supported */
+	if (off != 0 || count != attr->size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ctx = attr->private;
+	mr = &ctx->tm->mrs[attr - ctx->mrs];
+
+	rc = down_write_killable(&ctx->rwsem);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ctx->tm->write(ctx->tm, mr, buffer);
+
+	/* mark MR cache stale */
+	if (!rc) {
+		ctx->in_sync = false;
+		trace_tsm_mr_write(mr, buffer);
+	}
+
+	up_write(&ctx->rwsem);
+	return rc ?: count;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tsm_mr_create_attribute_group() - creates an attribute group for measurement
+ * registers (MRs)
+ * @tm: pointer to &struct tsm_measurements containing the MR definitions.
+ *
+ * This function creates attributes corresponding to the MR definitions
+ * provided by @tm->mrs.
+ *
+ * The created attributes will reference @tm and its members. The caller must
+ * not free @tm until after tsm_mr_free_attribute_group() is called.
+ *
+ * Context: Process context. May sleep due to memory allocation.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * On success, the pointer to a an attribute group is returned; otherwise
+ * * %-EINVAL - Invalid MR definitions.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory.
+ */
+const struct attribute_group *
+tsm_mr_create_attribute_group(const struct tsm_measurements *tm)
+{
+	size_t nlen;
+
+	if (!tm || !tm->mrs)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/* aggregated length of all MR names */
+	nlen = 0;
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < tm->nr_mrs; ++i) {
+		if ((tm->mrs[i].mr_flags & TSM_MR_F_LIVE) && !tm->refresh)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+		if ((tm->mrs[i].mr_flags & TSM_MR_F_WRITABLE) && !tm->write)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+		if (!tm->mrs[i].mr_name)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+		if (tm->mrs[i].mr_flags & TSM_MR_F_NOHASH)
+			continue;
+
+		if (tm->mrs[i].mr_hash >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+		/* MR sysfs attribute names have the form of MRNAME:HASH */
+		nlen += strlen(tm->mrs[i].mr_name) + 1 +
+			strlen(hash_algo_name[tm->mrs[i].mr_hash]) + 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * @attrs and the MR name strings are combined into a single allocation
+	 * so that we don't have to free MR names one-by-one in
+	 * tsm_mr_free_attribute_group()
+	 */
+	const struct bin_attribute **attrs __free(kfree) =
+		kzalloc(sizeof(*attrs) * (tm->nr_mrs + 1) + nlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	struct tm_context *ctx __free(kfree) =
+		kzalloc_flex(*ctx, mrs, tm->nr_mrs);
+	char *name, *end;
+
+	if (!ctx || !attrs)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	/* @attrs is followed immediately by MR name strings */
+	name = (char *)&attrs[tm->nr_mrs + 1];
+	end = name + nlen;
+
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < tm->nr_mrs; ++i) {
+		struct bin_attribute *bap = &ctx->mrs[i];
+
+		sysfs_bin_attr_init(bap);
+
+		if (tm->mrs[i].mr_flags & TSM_MR_F_NOHASH)
+			bap->attr.name = tm->mrs[i].mr_name;
+		else if (name < end) {
+			bap->attr.name = name;
+			name += snprintf(name, end - name, "%s:%s",
+					 tm->mrs[i].mr_name,
+					 hash_algo_name[tm->mrs[i].mr_hash]);
+			++name;
+		} else
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+		/* check for duplicated MR definitions */
+		for (size_t j = 0; j < i; ++j)
+			if (!strcmp(bap->attr.name, attrs[j]->attr.name))
+				return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+		if (tm->mrs[i].mr_flags & TSM_MR_F_READABLE) {
+			bap->attr.mode |= 0444;
+			bap->read = tm_digest_read;
+		}
+
+		if (tm->mrs[i].mr_flags & TSM_MR_F_WRITABLE) {
+			bap->attr.mode |= 0200;
+			bap->write = tm_digest_write;
+		}
+
+		bap->size = tm->mrs[i].mr_size;
+		bap->private = ctx;
+
+		attrs[i] = bap;
+	}
+
+	if (name != end)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	init_rwsem(&ctx->rwsem);
+	ctx->agrp.name = "measurements";
+	ctx->agrp.bin_attrs = no_free_ptr(attrs);
+	ctx->tm = tm;
+	return &no_free_ptr(ctx)->agrp;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tsm_mr_create_attribute_group);
+
+/**
+ * tsm_mr_free_attribute_group() - frees the attribute group returned by
+ * tsm_mr_create_attribute_group()
+ * @attr_grp: attribute group returned by tsm_mr_create_attribute_group()
+ *
+ * Context: Process context.
+ */
+void tsm_mr_free_attribute_group(const struct attribute_group *attr_grp)
+{
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(attr_grp)) {
+		kfree(attr_grp->bin_attrs);
+		kfree(container_of(attr_grp, struct tm_context, agrp));
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tsm_mr_free_attribute_group);
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..928b8e166
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+config ARM_PKVM_GUEST
+	bool "Arm pKVM protected guest driver"
+	depends on ARM64 && DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL
+	help
+	  Protected guests running under the pKVM hypervisor on arm64
+	  are isolated from the host and must issue hypercalls to enable
+	  interaction with virtual devices. This driver implements
+	  support for probing and issuing these hypercalls.
+
+	  If unsure, say 'N'.
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4bee24579
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_PKVM_GUEST) += arm-pkvm-guest.o
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/arm-pkvm-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/arm-pkvm-guest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..26fe9c3f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/arm-pkvm-guest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Support for the hypercall interface exposed to protected guests by
+ * pKVM.
+ *
+ * Author: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2024 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
+#include <linux/array_size.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+
+static size_t pkvm_granule;
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(pkvm_guest);
+
+static int arm_smccc_do_one_page(u32 func_id, phys_addr_t phys)
+{
+	phys_addr_t end = phys + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	while (phys < end) {
+		struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+		arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(func_id, phys, 0, 0, &res);
+		if (res.a0 != SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS)
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		phys += pkvm_granule;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __set_memory_range(u32 func_id, unsigned long start, int numpages)
+{
+	void *addr = (void *)start, *end = addr + numpages * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	while (addr < end) {
+		int err;
+
+		err = arm_smccc_do_one_page(func_id, virt_to_phys(addr));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int pkvm_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
+{
+	return __set_memory_range(ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_MEM_UNSHARE_FUNC_ID,
+				  addr, numpages);
+}
+
+static int pkvm_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
+{
+	return __set_memory_range(ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_MEM_SHARE_FUNC_ID,
+				  addr, numpages);
+}
+
+static const struct arm64_mem_crypt_ops pkvm_crypt_ops = {
+	.encrypt	= pkvm_set_memory_encrypted,
+	.decrypt	= pkvm_set_memory_decrypted,
+};
+
+static int mmio_guard_ioremap_hook(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size,
+				   pgprot_t *prot)
+{
+	phys_addr_t end;
+	pteval_t protval = pgprot_val(*prot);
+
+	/*
+	 * We only expect MMIO emulation for regions mapped with device
+	 * attributes.
+	 */
+	if (protval != PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE && protval != PROT_DEVICE_nGnRnE)
+		return 0;
+
+	end = PAGE_ALIGN(phys + size);
+	phys = PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(phys);
+
+	while (phys < end) {
+		const int func_id = ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_MMIO_GUARD_FUNC_ID;
+
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(arm_smccc_do_one_page(func_id, phys));
+		phys += PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void pkvm_init_hyp_services(void)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct arm_smccc_res res;
+	const u32 funcs[] = {
+		ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_HYP_MEMINFO,
+		ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_MEM_SHARE,
+		ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_MEM_UNSHARE,
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(funcs); ++i) {
+		if (!kvm_arm_hyp_service_available(funcs[i]))
+			return;
+	}
+
+	arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_HYP_MEMINFO_FUNC_ID,
+			     0, 0, 0, &res);
+	if (res.a0 > PAGE_SIZE) /* Includes error codes */
+		return;
+
+	pkvm_granule = res.a0;
+	arm64_mem_crypt_ops_register(&pkvm_crypt_ops);
+
+	if (kvm_arm_hyp_service_available(ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_MMIO_GUARD))
+		arm64_ioremap_prot_hook_register(&mmio_guard_ioremap_hook);
+
+	static_branch_enable(&pkvm_guest);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a6405ab6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+config SEV_GUEST
+	tristate "AMD SEV Guest driver"
+	default m
+	depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	select TSM_REPORTS
+	help
+	  SEV-SNP firmware provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with
+	  the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read,
+	  alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver provides
+	  userspace interface to communicate with the PSP to request the
+	  attestation report and more.
+
+	  If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called sev-guest.
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..63d67c277
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST) += sev-guest.o
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..935537a41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,716 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) guest driver interface
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021-2024 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/tsm.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <linux/sockptr.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/uuid.h>
+#include <linux/configfs.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/psp-sev.h>
+
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
+
+#define DEVICE_NAME	"sev-guest"
+
+#define SVSM_MAX_RETRIES		3
+
+struct snp_guest_dev {
+	struct device *dev;
+	struct miscdevice misc;
+
+	struct snp_msg_desc *msg_desc;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The VMPCK ID represents the key used by the SNP guest to communicate with the
+ * SEV firmware in the AMD Secure Processor (ASP, aka PSP). By default, the key
+ * used will be the key associated with the VMPL at which the guest is running.
+ * Should the default key be wiped (see snp_disable_vmpck()), this parameter
+ * allows for using one of the remaining VMPCKs.
+ */
+static int vmpck_id = -1;
+module_param(vmpck_id, int, 0444);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP.");
+
+static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct miscdevice *dev = file->private_data;
+
+	return container_of(dev, struct snp_guest_dev, misc);
+}
+
+struct snp_req_resp {
+	sockptr_t req_data;
+	sockptr_t resp_data;
+};
+
+static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
+{
+	struct snp_report_req *report_req __free(kfree) = NULL;
+	struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc = snp_dev->msg_desc;
+	struct snp_report_resp *report_resp;
+	struct snp_guest_req req = {};
+	int rc, resp_len;
+
+	if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	report_req = kzalloc_obj(*report_req, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!report_req)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(report_req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(*report_req)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/*
+	 * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
+	 * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
+	 * authtag.
+	 */
+	resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + AUTHTAG_LEN;
+	report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!report_resp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	req.msg_version = arg->msg_version;
+	req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ;
+	req.vmpck_id = mdesc->vmpck_id;
+	req.req_buf = report_req;
+	req.req_sz = sizeof(*report_req);
+	req.resp_buf = report_resp->data;
+	req.resp_sz = resp_len;
+	req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
+
+	rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req);
+	arg->exitinfo2 = req.exitinfo2;
+	if (rc)
+		goto e_free;
+
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, report_resp, sizeof(*report_resp)))
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+
+e_free:
+	kfree(report_resp);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
+{
+	struct snp_derived_key_resp *derived_key_resp __free(kfree) = NULL;
+	struct snp_derived_key_req *derived_key_req __free(kfree) = NULL;
+	struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc = snp_dev->msg_desc;
+	struct snp_guest_req req = {};
+	int rc, resp_len;
+
+	if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
+	 * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
+	 * authtag.
+	 */
+	resp_len = sizeof(derived_key_resp->data) + AUTHTAG_LEN;
+	derived_key_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!derived_key_resp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	derived_key_req = kzalloc_obj(*derived_key_req, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!derived_key_req)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(derived_key_req, (void __user *)arg->req_data,
+			   sizeof(*derived_key_req)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	req.msg_version = arg->msg_version;
+	req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ;
+	req.vmpck_id = mdesc->vmpck_id;
+	req.req_buf = derived_key_req;
+	req.req_sz = sizeof(*derived_key_req);
+	req.resp_buf = derived_key_resp;
+	req.resp_sz = resp_len;
+	req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
+
+	rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req);
+	arg->exitinfo2 = req.exitinfo2;
+	if (!rc) {
+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, derived_key_resp,
+				 sizeof(derived_key_resp->data)))
+			rc = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	/* The response buffer contains the sensitive data, explicitly clear it. */
+	memzero_explicit(derived_key_resp, sizeof(*derived_key_resp));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg,
+			  struct snp_req_resp *io)
+
+{
+	struct snp_ext_report_req *report_req __free(kfree) = NULL;
+	struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc = snp_dev->msg_desc;
+	struct snp_report_resp *report_resp;
+	struct snp_guest_req req = {};
+	int ret, npages = 0, resp_len;
+	sockptr_t certs_address;
+	u64 pfn;
+
+	if (sockptr_is_null(io->req_data) || sockptr_is_null(io->resp_data))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	report_req = kzalloc_obj(*report_req, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!report_req)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_sockptr(report_req, io->req_data, sizeof(*report_req)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* caller does not want certificate data */
+	if (!report_req->certs_len || !report_req->certs_address)
+		goto cmd;
+
+	if (report_req->certs_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(report_req->certs_len, PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (sockptr_is_kernel(io->resp_data)) {
+		certs_address = KERNEL_SOCKPTR((void *)report_req->certs_address);
+	} else {
+		certs_address = USER_SOCKPTR((void __user *)report_req->certs_address);
+		if (!access_ok(certs_address.user, report_req->certs_len))
+			return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize the intermediate buffer with all zeros. This buffer
+	 * is used in the guest request message to get the certs blob from
+	 * the host. If host does not supply any certs in it, then copy
+	 * zeros to indicate that certificate data was not provided.
+	 */
+	npages = report_req->certs_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	req.certs_data = alloc_pages_exact(npages << PAGE_SHIFT,
+					   GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!req.certs_data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	pfn = PHYS_PFN(virt_to_phys(req.certs_data));
+	ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)req.certs_data, npages);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("failed to mark page shared, ret=%d\n", ret);
+		snp_leak_pages(pfn, npages);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+cmd:
+	/*
+	 * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
+	 * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
+	 * authtag.
+	 */
+	resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + AUTHTAG_LEN;
+	report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!report_resp) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto e_free_data;
+	}
+
+	req.input.data_npages = npages;
+
+	req.msg_version = arg->msg_version;
+	req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ;
+	req.vmpck_id = mdesc->vmpck_id;
+	req.req_buf = &report_req->data;
+	req.req_sz = sizeof(report_req->data);
+	req.resp_buf = report_resp->data;
+	req.resp_sz = resp_len;
+	req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST;
+
+	ret = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req);
+	arg->exitinfo2 = req.exitinfo2;
+
+	/* If certs length is invalid then copy the returned length */
+	if (arg->vmm_error == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN) {
+		report_req->certs_len = req.input.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+		if (copy_to_sockptr(io->req_data, report_req, sizeof(*report_req)))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free;
+
+	if (npages && copy_to_sockptr(certs_address, req.certs_data, report_req->certs_len)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_sockptr(io->resp_data, report_resp, sizeof(*report_resp)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+e_free:
+	kfree(report_resp);
+e_free_data:
+	if (npages) {
+		if (set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)req.certs_data, npages)) {
+			WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n");
+			snp_leak_pages(pfn, npages);
+		} else {
+			free_pages_exact(req.certs_data, npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = to_snp_dev(file);
+	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+	struct snp_guest_request_ioctl input;
+	struct snp_req_resp io;
+	int ret = -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&input, argp, sizeof(input)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	input.exitinfo2 = 0xff;
+
+	/* Message version must be non-zero */
+	if (!input.msg_version)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (ioctl) {
+	case SNP_GET_REPORT:
+		ret = get_report(snp_dev, &input);
+		break;
+	case SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY:
+		ret = get_derived_key(snp_dev, &input);
+		break;
+	case SNP_GET_EXT_REPORT:
+		/*
+		 * As get_ext_report() may be called from the ioctl() path and a
+		 * kernel internal path (configfs-tsm), decorate the passed
+		 * buffers as user pointers.
+		 */
+		io.req_data = USER_SOCKPTR((void __user *)input.req_data);
+		io.resp_data = USER_SOCKPTR((void __user *)input.resp_data);
+		ret = get_ext_report(snp_dev, &input, &io);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (input.exitinfo2 && copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(input)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations snp_guest_fops = {
+	.owner	= THIS_MODULE,
+	.unlocked_ioctl = snp_guest_ioctl,
+};
+
+struct snp_msg_report_resp_hdr {
+	u32 status;
+	u32 report_size;
+	u8 rsvd[24];
+};
+
+struct snp_msg_cert_entry {
+	guid_t guid;
+	u32 offset;
+	u32 length;
+};
+
+static int sev_svsm_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data)
+{
+	unsigned int rep_len, man_len, certs_len;
+	struct tsm_report_desc *desc = &report->desc;
+	struct svsm_attest_call ac = {};
+	unsigned int retry_count;
+	void *rep, *man, *certs;
+	struct svsm_call call;
+	unsigned int size;
+	bool try_again;
+	void *buffer;
+	u64 call_id;
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate pages for the request:
+	 * - Report blob (4K)
+	 * - Manifest blob (4K)
+	 * - Certificate blob (16K)
+	 *
+	 * Above addresses must be 4K aligned
+	 */
+	rep_len = SZ_4K;
+	man_len = SZ_4K;
+	certs_len = SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE;
+
+	if (guid_is_null(&desc->service_guid)) {
+		call_id = SVSM_ATTEST_CALL(SVSM_ATTEST_SERVICES);
+	} else {
+		export_guid(ac.service_guid, &desc->service_guid);
+		ac.service_manifest_ver = desc->service_manifest_version;
+
+		call_id = SVSM_ATTEST_CALL(SVSM_ATTEST_SINGLE_SERVICE);
+	}
+
+	retry_count = 0;
+
+retry:
+	memset(&call, 0, sizeof(call));
+
+	size = rep_len + man_len + certs_len;
+	buffer = alloc_pages_exact(size, __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rep = buffer;
+	ac.report_buf.pa = __pa(rep);
+	ac.report_buf.len = rep_len;
+
+	man = rep + rep_len;
+	ac.manifest_buf.pa = __pa(man);
+	ac.manifest_buf.len = man_len;
+
+	certs = man + man_len;
+	ac.certificates_buf.pa = __pa(certs);
+	ac.certificates_buf.len = certs_len;
+
+	ac.nonce.pa = __pa(desc->inblob);
+	ac.nonce.len = desc->inblob_len;
+
+	ret = snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(call_id, &call, &ac);
+	if (ret) {
+		free_pages_exact(buffer, size);
+
+		switch (call.rax_out) {
+		case SVSM_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER:
+			try_again = false;
+
+			if (ac.report_buf.len > rep_len) {
+				rep_len = PAGE_ALIGN(ac.report_buf.len);
+				try_again = true;
+			}
+
+			if (ac.manifest_buf.len > man_len) {
+				man_len = PAGE_ALIGN(ac.manifest_buf.len);
+				try_again = true;
+			}
+
+			if (ac.certificates_buf.len > certs_len) {
+				certs_len = PAGE_ALIGN(ac.certificates_buf.len);
+				try_again = true;
+			}
+
+			/* If one of the buffers wasn't large enough, retry the request */
+			if (try_again && retry_count < SVSM_MAX_RETRIES) {
+				retry_count++;
+				goto retry;
+			}
+
+			return -EINVAL;
+		default:
+			pr_err_ratelimited("SVSM attestation request failed (%d / 0x%llx)\n",
+					   ret, call.rax_out);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate all the blob memory buffers at once so that the cleanup is
+	 * done for errors that occur after the first allocation (i.e. before
+	 * using no_free_ptr()).
+	 */
+	rep_len = ac.report_buf.len;
+	void *rbuf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(rep_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	man_len = ac.manifest_buf.len;
+	void *mbuf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(man_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	certs_len = ac.certificates_buf.len;
+	void *cbuf __free(kvfree) = certs_len ? kvzalloc(certs_len, GFP_KERNEL) : NULL;
+
+	if (!rbuf || !mbuf || (certs_len && !cbuf)) {
+		free_pages_exact(buffer, size);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(rbuf, rep, rep_len);
+	report->outblob = no_free_ptr(rbuf);
+	report->outblob_len = rep_len;
+
+	memcpy(mbuf, man, man_len);
+	report->manifestblob = no_free_ptr(mbuf);
+	report->manifestblob_len = man_len;
+
+	if (certs_len) {
+		memcpy(cbuf, certs, certs_len);
+		report->auxblob = no_free_ptr(cbuf);
+		report->auxblob_len = certs_len;
+	}
+
+	free_pages_exact(buffer, size);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sev_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data)
+{
+	struct snp_msg_cert_entry *cert_table;
+	struct tsm_report_desc *desc = &report->desc;
+	struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = data;
+	struct snp_msg_report_resp_hdr hdr;
+	const u32 report_size = SZ_4K;
+	const u32 ext_size = SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE;
+	u32 certs_size, i, size = report_size + ext_size;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (desc->inblob_len != SNP_REPORT_USER_DATA_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (desc->service_provider) {
+		if (strcmp(desc->service_provider, "svsm"))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		return sev_svsm_report_new(report, data);
+	}
+
+	void *buf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cert_table = buf + report_size;
+	struct snp_ext_report_req ext_req = {
+		.data = { .vmpl = desc->privlevel },
+		.certs_address = (__u64)cert_table,
+		.certs_len = ext_size,
+	};
+	memcpy(&ext_req.data.user_data, desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len);
+
+	struct snp_guest_request_ioctl input = {
+		.msg_version = 1,
+		.req_data = (__u64)&ext_req,
+		.resp_data = (__u64)buf,
+		.exitinfo2 = 0xff,
+	};
+	struct snp_req_resp io = {
+		.req_data = KERNEL_SOCKPTR(&ext_req),
+		.resp_data = KERNEL_SOCKPTR(buf),
+	};
+
+	ret = get_ext_report(snp_dev, &input, &io);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	memcpy(&hdr, buf, sizeof(hdr));
+	if (hdr.status == SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (hdr.status == SEV_RET_INVALID_KEY)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (hdr.status)
+		return -ENXIO;
+	if ((hdr.report_size + sizeof(hdr)) > report_size)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	void *rbuf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(hdr.report_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rbuf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(rbuf, buf + sizeof(hdr), hdr.report_size);
+	report->outblob = no_free_ptr(rbuf);
+	report->outblob_len = hdr.report_size;
+
+	certs_size = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < ext_size / sizeof(struct snp_msg_cert_entry); i++) {
+		struct snp_msg_cert_entry *ent = &cert_table[i];
+
+		if (guid_is_null(&ent->guid) && !ent->offset && !ent->length)
+			break;
+		certs_size = max(certs_size, ent->offset + ent->length);
+	}
+
+	/* Suspicious that the response populated entries without populating size */
+	if (!certs_size && i)
+		dev_warn_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "certificate slots conveyed without size\n");
+
+	/* No certs to report */
+	if (!certs_size)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Suspicious that the certificate blob size contract was violated
+	 */
+	if (certs_size > ext_size) {
+		dev_warn_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "certificate data truncated\n");
+		certs_size = ext_size;
+	}
+
+	void *cbuf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(certs_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cbuf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(cbuf, cert_table, certs_size);
+	report->auxblob = no_free_ptr(cbuf);
+	report->auxblob_len = certs_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool sev_report_attr_visible(int n)
+{
+	switch (n) {
+	case TSM_REPORT_GENERATION:
+	case TSM_REPORT_PROVIDER:
+	case TSM_REPORT_PRIVLEVEL:
+	case TSM_REPORT_PRIVLEVEL_FLOOR:
+		return true;
+	case TSM_REPORT_SERVICE_PROVIDER:
+	case TSM_REPORT_SERVICE_GUID:
+	case TSM_REPORT_SERVICE_MANIFEST_VER:
+		return snp_vmpl;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool sev_report_bin_attr_visible(int n)
+{
+	switch (n) {
+	case TSM_REPORT_INBLOB:
+	case TSM_REPORT_OUTBLOB:
+	case TSM_REPORT_AUXBLOB:
+		return true;
+	case TSM_REPORT_MANIFESTBLOB:
+		return snp_vmpl;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static struct tsm_report_ops sev_tsm_report_ops = {
+	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
+	.report_new = sev_report_new,
+	.report_attr_visible = sev_report_attr_visible,
+	.report_bin_attr_visible = sev_report_bin_attr_visible,
+};
+
+static void unregister_sev_tsm(void *data)
+{
+	tsm_report_unregister(&sev_tsm_report_ops);
+}
+
+static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
+	struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev;
+	struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc;
+	struct miscdevice *misc;
+	int ret;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!snp_dev)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mdesc = snp_msg_alloc();
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mdesc))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = snp_msg_init(mdesc, vmpck_id);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_msg_init;
+
+	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev);
+	snp_dev->dev = dev;
+
+	misc = &snp_dev->misc;
+	misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
+	misc->name = DEVICE_NAME;
+	misc->fops = &snp_guest_fops;
+
+	/* Set the privlevel_floor attribute based on the vmpck_id */
+	sev_tsm_report_ops.privlevel_floor = mdesc->vmpck_id;
+
+	ret = tsm_report_register(&sev_tsm_report_ops, snp_dev);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_msg_init;
+
+	ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&pdev->dev, unregister_sev_tsm, NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_msg_init;
+
+	ret =  misc_register(misc);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_msg_init;
+
+	snp_dev->msg_desc = mdesc;
+	dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using VMPCK%d communication key)\n",
+		 mdesc->vmpck_id);
+	return 0;
+
+e_msg_init:
+	snp_msg_free(mdesc);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit sev_guest_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+
+	snp_msg_free(snp_dev->msg_desc);
+	misc_deregister(&snp_dev->misc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This driver is meant to be a common SEV guest interface driver and to
+ * support any SEV guest API. As such, even though it has been introduced
+ * with the SEV-SNP support, it is named "sev-guest".
+ *
+ * sev_guest_remove() lives in .exit.text. For drivers registered via
+ * module_platform_driver_probe() this is ok because they cannot get unbound
+ * at runtime. So mark the driver struct with __refdata to prevent modpost
+ * triggering a section mismatch warning.
+ */
+static struct platform_driver sev_guest_driver __refdata = {
+	.remove		= __exit_p(sev_guest_remove),
+	.driver		= {
+		.name = "sev-guest",
+	},
+};
+
+module_platform_driver_probe(sev_guest_driver, sev_guest_probe);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_VERSION("1.0.0");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AMD SEV Guest Driver");
+MODULE_ALIAS("platform:sev-guest");
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dbbdc1438
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+config TDX_GUEST_DRIVER
+	tristate "TDX Guest driver"
+	depends on INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+	select TSM_REPORTS
+	select TSM_MEASUREMENTS
+	help
+	  The driver provides userspace interface to communicate with
+	  the TDX module to request the TDX guest details like attestation
+	  report.
+
+	  To compile this driver as module, choose M here. The module will
+	  be called tdx-guest.
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..775cb463f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+obj-$(CONFIG_TDX_GUEST_DRIVER) += tdx-guest.o
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/tdx-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/tdx-guest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d0303e31e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/tdx-guest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * TDX guest user interface driver
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)			KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/sockptr.h>
+#include <linux/tsm.h>
+#include <linux/tsm-mr.h>
+
+#include <uapi/linux/tdx-guest.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
+
+/* TDREPORT buffer */
+static u8 *tdx_report_buf;
+
+/* Lock to serialize TDG.MR.REPORT and TDG.MR.RTMR.EXTEND TDCALLs */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(mr_lock);
+
+/* TDREPORT fields */
+enum {
+	TDREPORT_reportdata = 128,
+	TDREPORT_tee_tcb_info = 256,
+	TDREPORT_tdinfo = TDREPORT_tee_tcb_info + 256,
+	TDREPORT_attributes = TDREPORT_tdinfo,
+	TDREPORT_xfam = TDREPORT_attributes + sizeof(u64),
+	TDREPORT_mrtd = TDREPORT_xfam + sizeof(u64),
+	TDREPORT_mrconfigid = TDREPORT_mrtd + SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	TDREPORT_mrowner = TDREPORT_mrconfigid + SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	TDREPORT_mrownerconfig = TDREPORT_mrowner + SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	TDREPORT_rtmr0 = TDREPORT_mrownerconfig + SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	TDREPORT_rtmr1 = TDREPORT_rtmr0 + SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	TDREPORT_rtmr2 = TDREPORT_rtmr1 + SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	TDREPORT_rtmr3 = TDREPORT_rtmr2 + SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	TDREPORT_servtd_hash = TDREPORT_rtmr3 + SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+};
+
+static int tdx_do_report(sockptr_t data, sockptr_t tdreport)
+{
+	scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -EINTR, &mr_lock) {
+		u8 *reportdata = tdx_report_buf + TDREPORT_reportdata;
+		int ret;
+
+		if (!sockptr_is_null(data) &&
+		    copy_from_sockptr(reportdata, data, TDX_REPORTDATA_LEN))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		ret = tdx_mcall_get_report0(reportdata, tdx_report_buf);
+		if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "tdx_mcall_get_report0() failed: %d", ret))
+			return ret;
+
+		if (!sockptr_is_null(tdreport) &&
+		    copy_to_sockptr(tdreport, tdx_report_buf, TDX_REPORT_LEN))
+			return -EFAULT;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_do_extend(u8 mr_ind, const u8 *data)
+{
+	scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -EINTR, &mr_lock) {
+		/*
+		 * TDX requires @extend_buf to be 64-byte aligned.
+		 * It's safe to use REPORTDATA buffer for that purpose because
+		 * tdx_mr_report/extend_lock() are mutually exclusive.
+		 */
+		u8 *extend_buf = tdx_report_buf + TDREPORT_reportdata;
+		int ret;
+
+		memcpy(extend_buf, data, SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+		ret = tdx_mcall_extend_rtmr(mr_ind, extend_buf);
+		if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "tdx_mcall_extend_rtmr(%u) failed: %d", mr_ind, ret))
+			return ret;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define TDX_MR_(r) .mr_value = (void *)TDREPORT_##r, TSM_MR_(r, SHA384)
+static struct tsm_measurement_register tdx_mrs[] = {
+	{ TDX_MR_(rtmr0) | TSM_MR_F_RTMR },
+	{ TDX_MR_(rtmr1) | TSM_MR_F_RTMR },
+	{ TDX_MR_(rtmr2) | TSM_MR_F_RTMR },
+	{ TDX_MR_(rtmr3) | TSM_MR_F_RTMR },
+	{ TDX_MR_(mrtd) },
+	{ TDX_MR_(mrconfigid) | TSM_MR_F_NOHASH },
+	{ TDX_MR_(mrowner) | TSM_MR_F_NOHASH },
+	{ TDX_MR_(mrownerconfig) | TSM_MR_F_NOHASH },
+};
+#undef TDX_MR_
+
+static int tdx_mr_refresh(const struct tsm_measurements *tm)
+{
+	return tdx_do_report(KERNEL_SOCKPTR(NULL), KERNEL_SOCKPTR(NULL));
+}
+
+static int tdx_mr_extend(const struct tsm_measurements *tm,
+			 const struct tsm_measurement_register *mr,
+			 const u8 *data)
+{
+	return tdx_do_extend(mr - tm->mrs, data);
+}
+
+static struct tsm_measurements tdx_measurements = {
+	.mrs = tdx_mrs,
+	.nr_mrs = ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_mrs),
+	.refresh = tdx_mr_refresh,
+	.write = tdx_mr_extend,
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group *tdx_mr_init(void)
+{
+	const struct attribute_group *g;
+	int rc;
+
+	u8 *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TDX_REPORT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	tdx_report_buf = buf;
+	rc = tdx_mr_refresh(&tdx_measurements);
+	if (rc)
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+
+	/*
+	 * @mr_value was initialized with the offset only, while the base
+	 * address is being added here.
+	 */
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_mrs); ++i)
+		*(long *)&tdx_mrs[i].mr_value += (long)buf;
+
+	g = tsm_mr_create_attribute_group(&tdx_measurements);
+	if (!IS_ERR(g))
+		tdx_report_buf = no_free_ptr(buf);
+
+	return g;
+}
+
+static void tdx_mr_deinit(const struct attribute_group *mr_grp)
+{
+	tsm_mr_free_attribute_group(mr_grp);
+	kfree(tdx_report_buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Intel's SGX QE implementation generally uses Quote size less
+ * than 8K (2K Quote data + ~5K of certificate blob).
+ * DICE-based attestation uses layered evidence that requires
+ * larger Quote size (~100K).
+ */
+#define GET_QUOTE_BUF_SIZE		SZ_128K
+
+#define GET_QUOTE_CMD_VER		1
+
+/* TDX GetQuote status codes */
+#define GET_QUOTE_SUCCESS		0
+#define GET_QUOTE_IN_FLIGHT		0xffffffffffffffff
+
+#define TDX_QUOTE_MAX_LEN		(GET_QUOTE_BUF_SIZE - sizeof(struct tdx_quote_buf))
+
+/* struct tdx_quote_buf: Format of Quote request buffer.
+ * @version: Quote format version, filled by TD.
+ * @status: Status code of Quote request, filled by VMM.
+ * @in_len: Length of TDREPORT, filled by TD.
+ * @out_len: Length of Quote data, filled by VMM.
+ * @data: Quote data on output or TDREPORT on input.
+ *
+ * More details of Quote request buffer can be found in TDX
+ * Guest-Host Communication Interface (GHCI) for Intel TDX 1.0,
+ * section titled "TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetQuote>"
+ */
+struct tdx_quote_buf {
+	u64 version;
+	u64 status;
+	u32 in_len;
+	u32 out_len;
+	u8 data[];
+};
+
+/* Quote data buffer */
+static void *quote_data;
+
+/* Lock to streamline quote requests */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(quote_lock);
+
+/*
+ * GetQuote request timeout in seconds. Expect that 30 seconds
+ * is enough time for QE to respond to any Quote requests.
+ */
+static u32 getquote_timeout = 30;
+
+static long tdx_get_report0(struct tdx_report_req __user *req)
+{
+	return tdx_do_report(USER_SOCKPTR(req->reportdata),
+			     USER_SOCKPTR(req->tdreport));
+}
+
+static void free_quote_buf(void *buf)
+{
+	size_t len = PAGE_ALIGN(GET_QUOTE_BUF_SIZE);
+	unsigned int count = len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)buf, count)) {
+		pr_err("Failed to restore encryption mask for Quote buffer, leak it\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	free_pages_exact(buf, len);
+}
+
+static void *alloc_quote_buf(void)
+{
+	size_t len = PAGE_ALIGN(GET_QUOTE_BUF_SIZE);
+	unsigned int count = len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	void *addr;
+
+	addr = alloc_pages_exact(len, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!addr)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)addr, count))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * wait_for_quote_completion() - Wait for Quote request completion
+ * @quote_buf: Address of Quote buffer.
+ * @timeout: Timeout in seconds to wait for the Quote generation.
+ *
+ * As per TDX GHCI v1.0 specification, sec titled "TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetQuote>",
+ * the status field in the Quote buffer will be set to GET_QUOTE_IN_FLIGHT
+ * while VMM processes the GetQuote request, and will change it to success
+ * or error code after processing is complete. So wait till the status
+ * changes from GET_QUOTE_IN_FLIGHT or the request being timed out.
+ */
+static int wait_for_quote_completion(struct tdx_quote_buf *quote_buf, u32 timeout)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Quote requests usually take a few seconds to complete, so waking up
+	 * once per second to recheck the status is fine for this use case.
+	 */
+	while (quote_buf->status == GET_QUOTE_IN_FLIGHT && i++ < timeout) {
+		if (msleep_interruptible(MSEC_PER_SEC))
+			return -EINTR;
+	}
+
+	return (i == timeout) ? -ETIMEDOUT : 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_report_new_locked(struct tsm_report *report, void *data)
+{
+	u8 *buf;
+	struct tdx_quote_buf *quote_buf = quote_data;
+	struct tsm_report_desc *desc = &report->desc;
+	u32 out_len;
+	int ret;
+	u64 err;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the previous request is timedout or interrupted, and the
+	 * Quote buf status is still in GET_QUOTE_IN_FLIGHT (owned by
+	 * VMM), don't permit any new request.
+	 */
+	if (quote_buf->status == GET_QUOTE_IN_FLIGHT)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	if (desc->inblob_len != TDX_REPORTDATA_LEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(quote_data, 0, GET_QUOTE_BUF_SIZE);
+
+	/* Update Quote buffer header */
+	quote_buf->version = GET_QUOTE_CMD_VER;
+	quote_buf->in_len = TDX_REPORT_LEN;
+
+	ret = tdx_do_report(KERNEL_SOCKPTR(desc->inblob),
+			    KERNEL_SOCKPTR(quote_buf->data));
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	err = tdx_hcall_get_quote(quote_data, GET_QUOTE_BUF_SIZE);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("GetQuote hypercall failed, status:%llx\n", err);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	ret = wait_for_quote_completion(quote_buf, getquote_timeout);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("GetQuote request timedout\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (quote_buf->status != GET_QUOTE_SUCCESS) {
+		pr_debug("GetQuote request failed, status:%llx\n", quote_buf->status);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	out_len = READ_ONCE(quote_buf->out_len);
+
+	if (out_len > TDX_QUOTE_MAX_LEN)
+		return -EFBIG;
+
+	buf = kvmemdup(quote_buf->data, out_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	report->outblob = buf;
+	report->outblob_len = out_len;
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: parse the PEM-formatted cert chain out of the quote buffer when
+	 * provided
+	 */
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int tdx_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data)
+{
+	scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -EINTR, &quote_lock)
+		return tdx_report_new_locked(report, data);
+}
+
+static bool tdx_report_attr_visible(int n)
+{
+	switch (n) {
+	case TSM_REPORT_GENERATION:
+	case TSM_REPORT_PROVIDER:
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool tdx_report_bin_attr_visible(int n)
+{
+	switch (n) {
+	case TSM_REPORT_INBLOB:
+	case TSM_REPORT_OUTBLOB:
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static long tdx_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case TDX_CMD_GET_REPORT0:
+		return tdx_get_report0((struct tdx_report_req __user *)arg);
+	default:
+		return -ENOTTY;
+	}
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations tdx_guest_fops = {
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.unlocked_ioctl = tdx_guest_ioctl,
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group *tdx_attr_groups[] = {
+	NULL, /* measurements */
+	NULL
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice tdx_misc_dev = {
+	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
+	.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+	.fops = &tdx_guest_fops,
+	.groups = tdx_attr_groups,
+};
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id tdx_guest_ids[] = {
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST, NULL),
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, tdx_guest_ids);
+
+static const struct tsm_report_ops tdx_tsm_ops = {
+	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
+	.report_new = tdx_report_new,
+	.report_attr_visible = tdx_report_attr_visible,
+	.report_bin_attr_visible = tdx_report_bin_attr_visible,
+};
+
+static int __init tdx_guest_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!x86_match_cpu(tdx_guest_ids))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	tdx_attr_groups[0] = tdx_mr_init();
+	if (IS_ERR(tdx_attr_groups[0]))
+		return PTR_ERR(tdx_attr_groups[0]);
+
+	ret = misc_register(&tdx_misc_dev);
+	if (ret)
+		goto deinit_mr;
+
+	quote_data = alloc_quote_buf();
+	if (!quote_data) {
+		pr_err("Failed to allocate Quote buffer\n");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_misc;
+	}
+
+	ret = tsm_report_register(&tdx_tsm_ops, NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_quote;
+
+	return 0;
+
+free_quote:
+	free_quote_buf(quote_data);
+free_misc:
+	misc_deregister(&tdx_misc_dev);
+deinit_mr:
+	tdx_mr_deinit(tdx_attr_groups[0]);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+module_init(tdx_guest_init);
+
+static void __exit tdx_guest_exit(void)
+{
+	tsm_report_unregister(&tdx_tsm_ops);
+	free_quote_buf(quote_data);
+	misc_deregister(&tdx_misc_dev);
+	tdx_mr_deinit(tdx_attr_groups[0]);
+}
+module_exit(tdx_guest_exit);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TDX Guest Driver");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..57d0c01a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+config TDX_HOST_SERVICES
+	tristate
+	depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST
+	select FW_LOADER
+	select FW_UPLOAD
+	default m
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e61e749a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_TDX_HOST_SERVICES) += tdx-host.o
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e8ed8dfa5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * TDX host user interface driver
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2025 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/device/faux.h>
+#include <linux/firmware.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/seamldr.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id tdx_host_ids[] = {
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM, NULL),
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, tdx_host_ids);
+
+static ssize_t version_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			    char *buf)
+{
+	const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_sysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();
+	const struct tdx_sys_info_version *ver;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!tdx_sysinfo)
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	/*
+	 * The version number can change during an update.
+	 * Lock out updates while printing the version.
+	 */
+	seamldr_lock_module_update();
+
+	ver = &tdx_sysinfo->version;
+	ret = sysfs_emit(buf, TDX_VERSION_FMT "\n", ver->major_version,
+						    ver->minor_version,
+						    ver->update_version);
+	seamldr_unlock_module_update();
+
+	return ret;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(version);
+
+static struct attribute *tdx_host_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_version.attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group tdx_host_group = {
+	.attrs = tdx_host_attrs,
+};
+
+static ssize_t seamldr_version_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+				    char *buf)
+{
+	struct seamldr_info info;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = seamldr_get_info(&info);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, TDX_VERSION_FMT "\n", info.major_version,
+						     info.minor_version,
+						     info.update_version);
+}
+
+static ssize_t num_remaining_updates_show(struct device *dev,
+					  struct device_attribute *attr,
+					  char *buf)
+{
+	struct seamldr_info info;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = seamldr_get_info(&info);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%u\n", info.num_remaining_updates);
+}
+
+/*
+ * These attributes are intended for managing TDX module updates. Reading
+ * them issues a slow, serialized P-SEAMLDR query, so keep them admin-only.
+ */
+static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(seamldr_version);
+static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(num_remaining_updates);
+
+static struct attribute *seamldr_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_seamldr_version.attr,
+	&dev_attr_num_remaining_updates.attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+static bool supports_runtime_update(void)
+{
+	const struct tdx_sys_info *sysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();
+
+	if (!sysinfo)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!tdx_supports_runtime_update(sysinfo))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * This bug makes P-SEAMLDR calls clobber the current VMCS
+	 * which breaks KVM. Avoid P-SEAMLDR calls by hiding all
+	 * attributes if the CPU has this bug.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SEAMRET_INVD_VMCS))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static umode_t seamldr_group_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, int idx)
+{
+	if (!supports_runtime_update())
+		return 0;
+
+	return attr->mode;
+}
+
+static const struct attribute_group seamldr_group = {
+	.attrs = seamldr_attrs,
+	.is_visible = seamldr_group_visible,
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group *tdx_host_groups[] = {
+	&tdx_host_group,
+	&seamldr_group,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+static enum fw_upload_err tdx_fw_prepare(struct fw_upload *fwl,
+					 const u8 *data, u32 data_len)
+{
+	return FW_UPLOAD_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static enum fw_upload_err tdx_fw_write(struct fw_upload *fwl, const u8 *data,
+				       u32 offset, u32 data_len, u32 *written)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = seamldr_install_module(data, data_len);
+	switch (ret) {
+	case 0:
+		*written = data_len;
+		return FW_UPLOAD_ERR_NONE;
+	default:
+		return FW_UPLOAD_ERR_FW_INVALID;
+	}
+}
+
+static enum fw_upload_err tdx_fw_poll_complete(struct fw_upload *fwl)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The upload completed during tdx_fw_write().
+	 * Never poll for completion.
+	 */
+	return FW_UPLOAD_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static void tdx_fw_cancel(struct fw_upload *fwl)
+{
+	/*
+	 * TDX module updates are not cancellable.
+	 * Provide a no-op callback to satisfy fw_upload_ops.
+	 */
+}
+
+static const struct fw_upload_ops tdx_fw_ops = {
+	.prepare	= tdx_fw_prepare,
+	.write		= tdx_fw_write,
+	.poll_complete	= tdx_fw_poll_complete,
+	.cancel		= tdx_fw_cancel,
+};
+
+static void seamldr_deinit(void *tdx_fwl)
+{
+	firmware_upload_unregister(tdx_fwl);
+}
+
+static int seamldr_init(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct fw_upload *tdx_fwl;
+
+	if (!supports_runtime_update())
+		return 0;
+
+	tdx_fwl = firmware_upload_register(THIS_MODULE, dev, "tdx_module",
+					   &tdx_fw_ops, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(tdx_fwl))
+		return PTR_ERR(tdx_fwl);
+
+	return devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, seamldr_deinit, tdx_fwl);
+}
+
+static int tdx_host_probe(struct faux_device *fdev)
+{
+	return seamldr_init(&fdev->dev);
+}
+
+static const struct faux_device_ops tdx_host_ops = {
+	.probe		= tdx_host_probe,
+};
+
+static struct faux_device *fdev;
+
+static int __init tdx_host_init(void)
+{
+	if (!x86_match_cpu(tdx_host_ids) || !tdx_get_sysinfo())
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	fdev = faux_device_create_with_groups(KBUILD_MODNAME, NULL,
+					      &tdx_host_ops,
+					      tdx_host_groups);
+	if (!fdev)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+module_init(tdx_host_init);
+
+static void __exit tdx_host_exit(void)
+{
+	faux_device_destroy(fdev);
+}
+module_exit(tdx_host_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TDX Host Services");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm-core.c b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm-core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e78499335
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm-core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Copyright(c) 2024-2025 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/tsm.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/pci-tsm.h>
+
+static void tsm_release(struct device *);
+static const struct class tsm_class = {
+	.name		= "tsm",
+	.dev_release	= tsm_release
+};
+static DEFINE_IDA(tsm_ida);
+
+static int match_id(struct device *dev, const void *data)
+{
+	struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev = container_of(dev, struct tsm_dev, dev);
+	int id = *(const int *)data;
+
+	return tsm_dev->id == id;
+}
+
+struct tsm_dev *find_tsm_dev(int id)
+{
+	struct device *dev = class_find_device(&tsm_class, NULL, &id, match_id);
+
+	if (!dev)
+		return NULL;
+	return container_of(dev, struct tsm_dev, dev);
+}
+
+static struct tsm_dev *alloc_tsm_dev(struct device *parent)
+{
+	struct device *dev;
+	int id;
+
+	struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev __free(kfree) =
+		kzalloc_obj(*tsm_dev);
+	if (!tsm_dev)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	id = ida_alloc(&tsm_ida, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (id < 0)
+		return ERR_PTR(id);
+
+	tsm_dev->id = id;
+	dev = &tsm_dev->dev;
+	dev->parent = parent;
+	dev->class = &tsm_class;
+	device_initialize(dev);
+
+	return no_free_ptr(tsm_dev);
+}
+
+static struct tsm_dev *tsm_register_pci_or_reset(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev,
+						 struct pci_tsm_ops *pci_ops)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!pci_ops)
+		return tsm_dev;
+
+	tsm_dev->pci_ops = pci_ops;
+	rc = pci_tsm_register(tsm_dev);
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_err(tsm_dev->dev.parent,
+			"PCI/TSM registration failure: %d\n", rc);
+		device_unregister(&tsm_dev->dev);
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+	}
+
+	/* Notify TSM userspace that PCI/TSM operations are now possible */
+	kobject_uevent(&tsm_dev->dev.kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE);
+	return tsm_dev;
+}
+
+struct tsm_dev *tsm_register(struct device *parent, struct pci_tsm_ops *pci_ops)
+{
+	struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev __free(put_tsm_dev) = alloc_tsm_dev(parent);
+	struct device *dev;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (IS_ERR(tsm_dev))
+		return tsm_dev;
+
+	dev = &tsm_dev->dev;
+	rc = dev_set_name(dev, "tsm%d", tsm_dev->id);
+	if (rc)
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+
+	rc = device_add(dev);
+	if (rc)
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+
+	return tsm_register_pci_or_reset(no_free_ptr(tsm_dev), pci_ops);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tsm_register);
+
+void tsm_unregister(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev)
+{
+	if (tsm_dev->pci_ops)
+		pci_tsm_unregister(tsm_dev);
+	device_unregister(&tsm_dev->dev);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tsm_unregister);
+
+static void tsm_release(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev = container_of(dev, typeof(*tsm_dev), dev);
+
+	ida_free(&tsm_ida, tsm_dev->id);
+	kfree(tsm_dev);
+}
+
+static int __init tsm_init(void)
+{
+	return class_register(&tsm_class);
+}
+module_init(tsm_init)
+
+static void __exit tsm_exit(void)
+{
+	class_unregister(&tsm_class);
+}
+module_exit(tsm_exit)
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TEE Security Manager Class Device");