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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/video/fbdev/bt455.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/video/fbdev/bt455.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/video/fbdev/bt455.h | 90 |
1 files changed, 90 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/bt455.h b/drivers/video/fbdev/bt455.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dd1404b40 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/bt455.h @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * linux/drivers/video/bt455.h + * + * Copyright 2003 Thiemo Seufer <seufer@csv.ica.uni-stuttgart.de> + * Copyright 2016 Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org> + * + * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General + * Public License. See the file COPYING in the main directory of this + * archive for more details. + */ +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* + * Bt455 byte-wide registers, 32-bit aligned. + */ +struct bt455_regs { + volatile u8 addr_cmap; + u8 pad0[3]; + volatile u8 addr_cmap_data; + u8 pad1[3]; + volatile u8 addr_clr; + u8 pad2[3]; + volatile u8 addr_ovly; + u8 pad3[3]; +}; + +static inline void bt455_select_reg(struct bt455_regs *regs, int ir) +{ + mb(); + regs->addr_cmap = ir & 0x0f; +} + +static inline void bt455_reset_reg(struct bt455_regs *regs) +{ + mb(); + regs->addr_clr = 0; +} + +/* + * Read/write to a Bt455 color map register. + */ +static inline void bt455_read_cmap_next(struct bt455_regs *regs, u8 *grey) +{ + mb(); + regs->addr_cmap_data; + rmb(); + *grey = regs->addr_cmap_data & 0xf; + rmb(); + regs->addr_cmap_data; +} + +static inline void bt455_write_cmap_next(struct bt455_regs *regs, u8 grey) +{ + wmb(); + regs->addr_cmap_data = 0x0; + wmb(); + regs->addr_cmap_data = grey & 0xf; + wmb(); + regs->addr_cmap_data = 0x0; +} + +static inline void bt455_write_ovly_next(struct bt455_regs *regs, u8 grey) +{ + wmb(); + regs->addr_ovly = 0x0; + wmb(); + regs->addr_ovly = grey & 0xf; + wmb(); + regs->addr_ovly = 0x0; +} + +static inline void bt455_read_cmap_entry(struct bt455_regs *regs, + int cr, u8 *grey) +{ + bt455_select_reg(regs, cr); + bt455_read_cmap_next(regs, grey); +} + +static inline void bt455_write_cmap_entry(struct bt455_regs *regs, + int cr, u8 grey) +{ + bt455_select_reg(regs, cr); + bt455_write_cmap_next(regs, grey); +} + +static inline void bt455_write_ovly_entry(struct bt455_regs *regs, u8 grey) +{ + bt455_reset_reg(regs); + bt455_write_ovly_next(regs, grey); +} |
