staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/usb/common/Makefile b/drivers/usb/common/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ac4d21ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/usb/common/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for the usb common parts.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_USB_COMMON)	  += usb-common.o
+usb-common-y			  += common.o
+usb-common-$(CONFIG_TRACING)	  += debug.o
+usb-common-$(CONFIG_USB_LED_TRIG) += led.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_USB_CONN_GPIO)	+= usb-conn-gpio.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_USB_OTG_FSM) += usb-otg-fsm.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_USB_ULPI_BUS)	+= ulpi.o