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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/scsi/scsi_debugfs.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/scsi/scsi_debugfs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/scsi/scsi_debugfs.c | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_debugfs.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_debugfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..eb52e39f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_debugfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/cleanup.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <scsi/scsi_cmnd.h> +#include <scsi/scsi_dbg.h> +#include <scsi/scsi_host.h> +#include "scsi_debugfs.h" + +#define SCSI_CMD_FLAG_NAME(name)[const_ilog2(SCMD_##name)] = #name +static const char *const scsi_cmd_flags[] = { + SCSI_CMD_FLAG_NAME(TAGGED), + SCSI_CMD_FLAG_NAME(INITIALIZED), + SCSI_CMD_FLAG_NAME(LAST), +}; +#undef SCSI_CMD_FLAG_NAME + +static int scsi_flags_show(struct seq_file *m, const unsigned long flags, + const char *const *flag_name, int flag_name_count) +{ + bool sep = false; + int i; + + for_each_set_bit(i, &flags, BITS_PER_LONG) { + if (sep) + seq_puts(m, "|"); + sep = true; + if (i < flag_name_count && flag_name[i]) + seq_puts(m, flag_name[i]); + else + seq_printf(m, "%d", i); + } + return 0; +} + +static const char *scsi_cmd_list_info(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd) +{ + struct Scsi_Host *shost = cmd->device->host; + struct scsi_cmnd *cmd2; + + guard(spinlock_irq)(shost->host_lock); + + list_for_each_entry(cmd2, &shost->eh_abort_list, eh_entry) + if (cmd == cmd2) + return "on eh_abort_list"; + + list_for_each_entry(cmd2, &shost->eh_cmd_q, eh_entry) + if (cmd == cmd2) + return "on eh_cmd_q"; + + return NULL; +} + +void scsi_show_rq(struct seq_file *m, struct request *rq) +{ + struct scsi_cmnd *cmd = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(rq); + int alloc_ms = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies - cmd->jiffies_at_alloc); + int timeout_ms = jiffies_to_msecs(rq->timeout); + char buf[80] = "(?)"; + + if (cmd->flags & SCMD_INITIALIZED) { + const char *list_info = scsi_cmd_list_info(cmd); + + __scsi_format_command(buf, sizeof(buf), cmd->cmnd, cmd->cmd_len); + seq_printf(m, ", .cmd=%s, .retries=%d, .allowed=%d, .result = %#x%s%s", + buf, cmd->retries, cmd->allowed, cmd->result, + list_info ? ", " : "", list_info ? : ""); + seq_printf(m, ", .timeout=%d.%03d, allocated %d.%03d s ago", + timeout_ms / 1000, timeout_ms % 1000, + alloc_ms / 1000, alloc_ms % 1000); + } + seq_printf(m, ", .flags="); + scsi_flags_show(m, cmd->flags, scsi_cmd_flags, + ARRAY_SIZE(scsi_cmd_flags)); +} |
