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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/reset/reset-bcm6345.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/reset/reset-bcm6345.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/reset/reset-bcm6345.c | 133 |
1 files changed, 133 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/reset/reset-bcm6345.c b/drivers/reset/reset-bcm6345.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..441d9dd76 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/reset/reset-bcm6345.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * BCM6345 Reset Controller Driver + * + * Copyright (C) 2020 Álvaro Fernández Rojas <noltari@gmail.com> + */ + +#include <linux/delay.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/platform_device.h> +#include <linux/reset-controller.h> + +#define BCM6345_RESET_NUM 32 +#define BCM6345_RESET_SLEEP_MIN_US 10000 +#define BCM6345_RESET_SLEEP_MAX_US 20000 + +struct bcm6345_reset { + struct reset_controller_dev rcdev; + void __iomem *base; + spinlock_t lock; +}; + +static inline struct bcm6345_reset * +to_bcm6345_reset(struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev) +{ + return container_of(rcdev, struct bcm6345_reset, rcdev); +} + +static int bcm6345_reset_update(struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, + unsigned long id, bool assert) +{ + struct bcm6345_reset *bcm6345_reset = to_bcm6345_reset(rcdev); + unsigned long flags; + uint32_t val; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&bcm6345_reset->lock, flags); + val = __raw_readl(bcm6345_reset->base); + if (assert) + val &= ~BIT(id); + else + val |= BIT(id); + __raw_writel(val, bcm6345_reset->base); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bcm6345_reset->lock, flags); + + return 0; +} + +static int bcm6345_reset_assert(struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, + unsigned long id) +{ + return bcm6345_reset_update(rcdev, id, true); +} + +static int bcm6345_reset_deassert(struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, + unsigned long id) +{ + return bcm6345_reset_update(rcdev, id, false); +} + +static int bcm6345_reset_reset(struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, + unsigned long id) +{ + bcm6345_reset_update(rcdev, id, true); + usleep_range(BCM6345_RESET_SLEEP_MIN_US, + BCM6345_RESET_SLEEP_MAX_US); + + bcm6345_reset_update(rcdev, id, false); + /* + * Ensure component is taken out reset state by sleeping also after + * deasserting the reset. Otherwise, the component may not be ready + * for operation. + */ + usleep_range(BCM6345_RESET_SLEEP_MIN_US, + BCM6345_RESET_SLEEP_MAX_US); + + return 0; +} + +static int bcm6345_reset_status(struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, + unsigned long id) +{ + struct bcm6345_reset *bcm6345_reset = to_bcm6345_reset(rcdev); + + return !(__raw_readl(bcm6345_reset->base) & BIT(id)); +} + +static const struct reset_control_ops bcm6345_reset_ops = { + .assert = bcm6345_reset_assert, + .deassert = bcm6345_reset_deassert, + .reset = bcm6345_reset_reset, + .status = bcm6345_reset_status, +}; + +static int bcm6345_reset_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct bcm6345_reset *bcm6345_reset; + + bcm6345_reset = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, + sizeof(*bcm6345_reset), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bcm6345_reset) + return -ENOMEM; + + bcm6345_reset->base = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0); + if (IS_ERR(bcm6345_reset->base)) + return PTR_ERR(bcm6345_reset->base); + + spin_lock_init(&bcm6345_reset->lock); + bcm6345_reset->rcdev.ops = &bcm6345_reset_ops; + bcm6345_reset->rcdev.owner = THIS_MODULE; + bcm6345_reset->rcdev.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node; + bcm6345_reset->rcdev.of_reset_n_cells = 1; + bcm6345_reset->rcdev.nr_resets = BCM6345_RESET_NUM; + + return devm_reset_controller_register(&pdev->dev, + &bcm6345_reset->rcdev); +} + +static const struct of_device_id bcm6345_reset_of_match[] = { + { .compatible = "brcm,bcm6345-reset" }, + { .compatible = "brcm,bcm63xx-ephy-ctrl" }, + { /* sentinel */ }, +}; + +static struct platform_driver bcm6345_reset_driver = { + .probe = bcm6345_reset_probe, + .driver = { + .name = "bcm6345-reset", + .of_match_table = bcm6345_reset_of_match, + .suppress_bind_attrs = true, + }, +}; +builtin_platform_driver(bcm6345_reset_driver); |
