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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /drivers/perf/arm_brbe.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/perf/arm_brbe.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/perf/arm_brbe.h | 47 |
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_brbe.h b/drivers/perf/arm_brbe.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b7c7d8796 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/perf/arm_brbe.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Branch Record Buffer Extension Helpers. + * + * Copyright (C) 2022-2025 ARM Limited + * + * Author: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> + */ + +struct arm_pmu; +struct perf_branch_stack; +struct perf_event; + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BRBE +void brbe_probe(struct arm_pmu *arm_pmu); +unsigned int brbe_num_branch_records(const struct arm_pmu *armpmu); +void brbe_invalidate(void); + +void brbe_enable(const struct arm_pmu *arm_pmu); +void brbe_disable(void); + +bool brbe_branch_attr_valid(struct perf_event *event); +void brbe_read_filtered_entries(struct perf_branch_stack *branch_stack, + const struct perf_event *event); +#else +static inline void brbe_probe(struct arm_pmu *arm_pmu) { } +static inline unsigned int brbe_num_branch_records(const struct arm_pmu *armpmu) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void brbe_invalidate(void) { } + +static inline void brbe_enable(const struct arm_pmu *arm_pmu) { }; +static inline void brbe_disable(void) { }; + +static inline bool brbe_branch_attr_valid(struct perf_event *event) +{ + WARN_ON_ONCE(!has_branch_stack(event)); + return false; +} + +static void brbe_read_filtered_entries(struct perf_branch_stack *branch_stack, + const struct perf_event *event) +{ +} +#endif |
