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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/of/module.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/of/module.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/of/module.c81
1 files changed, 81 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/of/module.c b/drivers/of/module.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1e735fc13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/of/module.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Linux kernel module helpers.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+ssize_t of_modalias(const struct device_node *np, char *str, ssize_t len)
+{
+ const char *compat;
+ char *c;
+ struct property *p;
+ ssize_t csize;
+ ssize_t tsize;
+
+ /*
+ * Prevent a kernel oops in vsnprintf() -- it only allows passing a
+ * NULL ptr when the length is also 0. Also filter out the negative
+ * lengths...
+ */
+ if ((len > 0 && !str) || len < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Name & Type */
+ /* %p eats all alphanum characters, so %c must be used here */
+ csize = snprintf(str, len, "of:N%pOFn%c%s", np, 'T',
+ of_node_get_device_type(np));
+ tsize = csize;
+ if (csize >= len)
+ csize = len > 0 ? len - 1 : 0;
+ len -= csize;
+ str += csize;
+
+ of_property_for_each_string(np, "compatible", p, compat) {
+ csize = snprintf(str, len, "C%s", compat);
+ tsize += csize;
+ if (csize >= len)
+ continue;
+ for (c = str; c; ) {
+ c = strchr(c, ' ');
+ if (c)
+ *c++ = '_';
+ }
+ len -= csize;
+ str += csize;
+ }
+
+ return tsize;
+}
+
+int of_request_module(const struct device_node *np)
+{
+ char *str;
+ ssize_t size;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!np)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ size = of_modalias(np, NULL, 0);
+ if (size < 0)
+ return size;
+
+ /* Reserve an additional byte for the trailing '\0' */
+ size++;
+
+ str = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!str)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ of_modalias(np, str, size);
+ str[size - 1] = '\0';
+ ret = request_module(str);
+ kfree(str);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(of_request_module);