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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/of/module.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/of/module.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/of/module.c | 81 |
1 files changed, 81 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/of/module.c b/drivers/of/module.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1e735fc13 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/of/module.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Linux kernel module helpers. + */ + +#include <linux/of.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +ssize_t of_modalias(const struct device_node *np, char *str, ssize_t len) +{ + const char *compat; + char *c; + struct property *p; + ssize_t csize; + ssize_t tsize; + + /* + * Prevent a kernel oops in vsnprintf() -- it only allows passing a + * NULL ptr when the length is also 0. Also filter out the negative + * lengths... + */ + if ((len > 0 && !str) || len < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Name & Type */ + /* %p eats all alphanum characters, so %c must be used here */ + csize = snprintf(str, len, "of:N%pOFn%c%s", np, 'T', + of_node_get_device_type(np)); + tsize = csize; + if (csize >= len) + csize = len > 0 ? len - 1 : 0; + len -= csize; + str += csize; + + of_property_for_each_string(np, "compatible", p, compat) { + csize = snprintf(str, len, "C%s", compat); + tsize += csize; + if (csize >= len) + continue; + for (c = str; c; ) { + c = strchr(c, ' '); + if (c) + *c++ = '_'; + } + len -= csize; + str += csize; + } + + return tsize; +} + +int of_request_module(const struct device_node *np) +{ + char *str; + ssize_t size; + int ret; + + if (!np) + return -ENODEV; + + size = of_modalias(np, NULL, 0); + if (size < 0) + return size; + + /* Reserve an additional byte for the trailing '\0' */ + size++; + + str = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!str) + return -ENOMEM; + + of_modalias(np, str, size); + str[size - 1] = '\0'; + ret = request_module(str); + kfree(str); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(of_request_module); |
