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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/of/kobj.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/of/kobj.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/of/kobj.c | 168 |
1 files changed, 168 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/of/kobj.c b/drivers/of/kobj.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9f17305f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/of/kobj.c @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/of.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> + +#include <kunit/visibility.h> + +#include "of_private.h" + +/* true when node is initialized */ +static int of_node_is_initialized(const struct device_node *node) +{ + return node && node->kobj.state_initialized; +} + +/* true when node is attached (i.e. present on sysfs) */ +int of_node_is_attached(const struct device_node *node) +{ + return node && node->kobj.state_in_sysfs; +} + + +#ifndef CONFIG_OF_DYNAMIC +static void of_node_release(struct kobject *kobj) +{ + /* Without CONFIG_OF_DYNAMIC, no nodes gets freed */ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_OF_DYNAMIC */ + +const struct kobj_type of_node_ktype = { + .release = of_node_release, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(of_node_ktype); + +static ssize_t of_node_property_read(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, + const struct bin_attribute *bin_attr, char *buf, + loff_t offset, size_t count) +{ + struct property *pp = container_of(bin_attr, struct property, attr); + return memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &offset, pp->value, pp->length); +} + +/* always return newly allocated name, caller must free after use */ +static const char *safe_name(const struct kobject *kobj, const char *orig_name) +{ + const char *name = orig_name; + struct kernfs_node *kn; + int i = 0; + + /* don't be a hero. After 16 tries give up */ + while (i < 16 && (kn = sysfs_get_dirent(kobj->sd, name))) { + sysfs_put(kn); + if (name != orig_name) + kfree(name); + name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s#%i", orig_name, ++i); + } + + if (name == orig_name) { + name = kstrdup(orig_name, GFP_KERNEL); + } else { + pr_warn("Duplicate name in %s, renamed to \"%s\"\n", + kobject_name(kobj), name); + } + return name; +} + +int __of_add_property_sysfs(struct device_node *np, struct property *pp) +{ + int rc; + + /* Important: Don't leak passwords */ + bool secure = strncmp(pp->name, "security-", 9) == 0; + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SYSFS)) + return 0; + + if (!of_kset || !of_node_is_attached(np)) + return 0; + + sysfs_bin_attr_init(&pp->attr); + pp->attr.attr.name = safe_name(&np->kobj, pp->name); + pp->attr.attr.mode = secure ? 0400 : 0444; + pp->attr.size = secure ? 0 : pp->length; + pp->attr.read = of_node_property_read; + + rc = sysfs_create_bin_file(&np->kobj, &pp->attr); + WARN(rc, "error adding attribute %s to node %pOF\n", pp->name, np); + return rc; +} + +void __of_sysfs_remove_bin_file(struct device_node *np, const struct property *prop) +{ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SYSFS)) + return; + + sysfs_remove_bin_file(&np->kobj, &prop->attr); + kfree(prop->attr.attr.name); +} + +void __of_remove_property_sysfs(struct device_node *np, const struct property *prop) +{ + /* at early boot, bail here and defer setup to of_init() */ + if (of_kset && of_node_is_attached(np)) + __of_sysfs_remove_bin_file(np, prop); +} + +void __of_update_property_sysfs(struct device_node *np, struct property *newprop, + const struct property *oldprop) +{ + /* At early boot, bail out and defer setup to of_init() */ + if (!of_kset) + return; + + if (oldprop) + __of_sysfs_remove_bin_file(np, oldprop); + __of_add_property_sysfs(np, newprop); +} + +int __of_attach_node_sysfs(struct device_node *np) +{ + const char *name; + struct kobject *parent; + struct property *pp; + int rc; + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SYSFS) || !of_kset) + return 0; + + np->kobj.kset = of_kset; + if (!np->parent) { + /* Nodes without parents are new top level trees */ + name = safe_name(&of_kset->kobj, "base"); + parent = NULL; + } else { + name = safe_name(&np->parent->kobj, kbasename(np->full_name)); + parent = &np->parent->kobj; + } + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = kobject_add(&np->kobj, parent, "%s", name); + kfree(name); + if (rc) + return rc; + + for_each_property_of_node(np, pp) + __of_add_property_sysfs(np, pp); + + of_node_get(np); + return 0; +} + +void __of_detach_node_sysfs(struct device_node *np) +{ + struct property *pp; + + BUG_ON(!of_node_is_initialized(np)); + if (!of_kset) + return; + + /* only remove properties if on sysfs */ + if (of_node_is_attached(np)) { + for_each_property_of_node(np, pp) + __of_sysfs_remove_bin_file(np, pp); + kobject_del(&np->kobj); + } + + of_node_put(np); +} |
