Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted

Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Don't destroy user event fields when removal fails

   User event fields are destroyed before the event is removed from
   visibility. But that can fail leaving the still visible event with no
   fields. Move the destroying of the fields to after the event is
   successfully removed from visibility.

 - Initialize function graph state is fork before calling
   copy_exec_state()

   For non-CLONE_VM forks, copy_exec_state() allocates a new
   task_exec_state. If that allocation fails, ftrace_graph_exit_task()
   will free the tasks ret_stack pointer. Since that pointer is still
   using the parent's ret_stack, it mistakenly frees the parent's
   pointer too.

   Call ftrace_graph_init() on the task first which will NULL out the
   new tasks's ret_stack and if the copy fails, it will not free
   anything.

 - Remove FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX

   The macro FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX was added but never used. Remove it.

 - Save ent_size in function graph printing of nested functions

   The function graph tracer needs to look at the next event to see if
   the next event is the return of the current function entry. If it is,
   it prints a single line:

	ktime_get();

   Otherwise it prints it like a nested function:

	tick_nohz_irq_exit() {
	    ktime_get();
	    kcpustat_irq_exit();
	}

   In order to look at the next event, it must save the current event so
   that it has the information to print from it. It saves the event in
   the iterator descriptor called "ent". What it doesn't save is the
   ent_size of the event which is now used to know if the function graph
   arguments are to be printed. The peek doesn't save the size so the
   size used happens to be that of the size of the last event that was
   seen.

   Save the entry event size in the iterator descriptor so that the
   correct size is used.

 - Fix several errors with freeing data in the histogram code

   The histogram code had a lot of leaked or or incorrect accounting
   when failures happen. Correct them.

 - Fix histogram regression of .percent and .graph modifiers

   Up until 6.3 histogram values could have "percent" or "graph"
   modifiers that changed how they were printed. But a change that added
   restricting histograms values from being strings, stack traces and
   other modifiers inadvertently prevented them from using the percent
   and graph modifiers, which were legal use cases for values.

   Put back the percent and graph modifiers.

 - Fix various typos in the comments

 - Set the trace_clock before initializing a histogram with clock
   argument

   The histogram API allows the user to specific which trace clock to
   use via a "clock=" string. The histogram is set up first before the
   clock is checked. If the passed in clock is not valid, it exits
   without fully fixing up the histogram leaving it on the list and a
   use-after-free can trigger.

   Update the clock argument first and if it fails then exit gracefully
   before the histogram trigger is placed on any lists.

 - Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event

   The function ftrace_set_clr_event() modifies the parse string and
   needs to put it back to what was passed in. It searches for ":mod:"
   via a strsep() but fails to put back the first ':' in the string.

   Add back the ':' in the passed in string.

 - Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file

   The options files are dynamically created and some tracers add their
   own options. When a tracer adds their own list of options, the
   trace_array holding them has an array to hold the list of options for
   each tracer. This array increases in size via a krealloc(), and the
   new entry gets a newly allocated array to hold the options of the new
   tracer being added.

   The element in each entry of the tracer's option array holds a
   pointer back to the trace_array, a pointer to the tracer it is
   associated to, a pointer to the flags of the option.

   The issue is that these arrays are freed when the trace_array is
   freed when its instance it represents is removed from the instances
   directory. There's a race that an open of one of these options files
   can happen when the instance is being removed.

   Add a new helper function to be called by the open function of the
   options file to iterate all existing trace_arrays under a lock and
   find the one that has the given option element in one of it's tracer
   arrays. If found, then update the associated trace_array's reference
   counter to keep it from being freed. If not found, have the open call
   return -ENODEV.

 - Disable interrupts when acquiring the lock in rb_wake_up_waiters()

   The function rb_wake_up_waiters() assumes it will be called in
   interrupt context and does not disable irqs when taking
   cpu_buffer->reader_lock, which can be called in hard interrupt
   context. The issue is in PREEMPT_RT, this function is called in
   thread context leaving this lock open to a deadlock.

   Take the lock with interrupts disabled.

 - Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash

   The tmp_ops used in update_ftrace_direct_mod() assigns its
   filter_hash field directly, but that field is annotated as __rcu and
   sparse complains. Assign it with rcu_assign_pointer()

 - Fix use-after-free in enable_trigger_private_data_free()

   The trace_event_call is accessed through the event_trigger_data's
   trace_event_file pointer to put the trace_event_call on freeing. The
   issue is that the trace_event_file data may have been freed already
   causing a use-after-free. Add a field to the event_trigger_data that
   points directly to the trace_event_call so that it can decrement its
   reference directly without needing to go through the
   trace_event_file.

 - Fix accounting of buffer data remote headers

   trace_buffer_desc_size() and trace_remote_alloc_buffer() undercount
   the number of pages is needed for the asked for size as it doesn't
   take into account the meta data on each page. Add a helper function
   to do the calculation properly and use that in these functions.

 - Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing

   The number of pages per remote ring buffer is capped by
   ring_buffer_desc::nr_page_va (32 bits). A buffer_size large enough to
   overflow that field would silently allocate a descriptor smaller than
   what was asked for.

 - Do not resize the subbuf order if any per_cpu buffer is disabled

   The mmapping of ring buffers disables resizing the subbuffers, but it
   is done per-cpu whereas the subbuf size change is done for all the
   per_cpu buffers under the buffer->mutex. It could change the size of
   some while the mapping is happening on others. Have the resize of the
   subbuf order check all the per_cpu buffers under the lock to see if
   any of them is disabled before starting and causing an inconsistency
   between buffers that are being mapped.

* tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: (25 commits)
  ring-buffer: Check resize_disabled before publishing the new subbuf order
  tracing/remotes: Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing
  tracing/remotes: Account for ring buffer page header in size calculation
  tracing: Don't dereference trace_event_file in deferred trigger free
  ftrace: Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash
  ring-buffer: Acquire the lock with irqsave in rb_wake_up_waiters()
  tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
  tracing: Fix ring_buffer_read_page_size() kernel-doc
  tracing: Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event()
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
  tracing: Undo the registration when enabling the histogram trigger fails
  tracing: Take the reference before publishing the named histogram trigger
  tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
  tracing: Fix typo "preceeded" in comment
  tracing: Fix typo "availabe" in comment
  tracing: Let histogram values keep the percent and graph modifiers
  tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
  tracing: Free histogram the field rejected for a bad modifier
  tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
  ...

6 files changed, 1281 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/.kunitconfig b/drivers/nvme/common/.kunitconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..60a038dc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/.kunitconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+CONFIG_KUNIT=y
+CONFIG_PCI=y
+CONFIG_BLOCK=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NVME=y
+CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH=y
+CONFIG_NVME_AUTH_KUNIT_TEST=y
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/Kconfig b/drivers/nvme/common/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f1639db65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+config NVME_KEYRING
+       tristate
+       select KEYS
+
+config NVME_AUTH
+	tristate
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_DH
+	select CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA512
+
+config NVME_AUTH_KUNIT_TEST
+	tristate "KUnit tests for NVMe authentication" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	depends on KUNIT && NVME_AUTH
+	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	help
+	  Enable KUnit tests for some of the common code for NVMe over Fabrics
+	  In-Band Authentication.
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/Makefile b/drivers/nvme/common/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fd9d01a60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+ccflags-y			+= -I$(src)
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_NVME_AUTH)		+= nvme-auth.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_NVME_KEYRING)	+= nvme-keyring.o
+
+nvme-auth-y			+= auth.o
+nvme-keyring-y			+= keyring.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_NVME_AUTH_KUNIT_TEST) += tests/auth_kunit.o
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e2e0c7365
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,781 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Hannes Reinecke, SUSE Linux
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/crc32.h>
+#include <linux/base64.h>
+#include <linux/prandom.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+#include <crypto/dh.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <linux/nvme.h>
+#include <linux/nvme-auth.h>
+
+static u32 nvme_dhchap_seqnum;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(nvme_dhchap_mutex);
+
+u32 nvme_auth_get_seqnum(void)
+{
+	u32 seqnum;
+
+	mutex_lock(&nvme_dhchap_mutex);
+	if (!nvme_dhchap_seqnum)
+		nvme_dhchap_seqnum = get_random_u32();
+	else {
+		nvme_dhchap_seqnum++;
+		if (!nvme_dhchap_seqnum)
+			nvme_dhchap_seqnum++;
+	}
+	seqnum = nvme_dhchap_seqnum;
+	mutex_unlock(&nvme_dhchap_mutex);
+	return seqnum;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_get_seqnum);
+
+static const struct nvme_auth_dhgroup_map {
+	char name[16];
+	char kpp[16];
+} dhgroup_map[] = {
+	[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_NULL] = {
+		.name = "null", .kpp = "null" },
+	[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_2048] = {
+		.name = "ffdhe2048", .kpp = "ffdhe2048(dh)" },
+	[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_3072] = {
+		.name = "ffdhe3072", .kpp = "ffdhe3072(dh)" },
+	[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_4096] = {
+		.name = "ffdhe4096", .kpp = "ffdhe4096(dh)" },
+	[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_6144] = {
+		.name = "ffdhe6144", .kpp = "ffdhe6144(dh)" },
+	[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_8192] = {
+		.name = "ffdhe8192", .kpp = "ffdhe8192(dh)" },
+};
+
+const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(u8 dhgroup_id)
+{
+	if (dhgroup_id >= ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map))
+		return NULL;
+	return dhgroup_map[dhgroup_id].name;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_name);
+
+const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(u8 dhgroup_id)
+{
+	if (dhgroup_id >= ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map))
+		return NULL;
+	return dhgroup_map[dhgroup_id].kpp;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp);
+
+u8 nvme_auth_dhgroup_id(const char *dhgroup_name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!dhgroup_name || !strlen(dhgroup_name))
+		return NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_INVALID;
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
+		if (!strlen(dhgroup_map[i].name))
+			continue;
+		if (!strncmp(dhgroup_map[i].name, dhgroup_name,
+			     strlen(dhgroup_map[i].name)))
+			return i;
+	}
+	return NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_INVALID;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_id);
+
+static const struct nvme_dhchap_hash_map {
+	int len;
+	char hmac[15];
+} hash_map[] = {
+	[NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256] = {
+		.len = 32,
+		.hmac = "hmac(sha256)",
+	},
+	[NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384] = {
+		.len = 48,
+		.hmac = "hmac(sha384)",
+	},
+	[NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512] = {
+		.len = 64,
+		.hmac = "hmac(sha512)",
+	},
+};
+
+const char *nvme_auth_hmac_name(u8 hmac_id)
+{
+	if (hmac_id >= ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map))
+		return NULL;
+	return hash_map[hmac_id].hmac;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_name);
+
+u8 nvme_auth_hmac_id(const char *hmac_name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!hmac_name || !strlen(hmac_name))
+		return NVME_AUTH_HASH_INVALID;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) {
+		if (!strlen(hash_map[i].hmac))
+			continue;
+		if (!strncmp(hash_map[i].hmac, hmac_name,
+			     strlen(hash_map[i].hmac)))
+			return i;
+	}
+	return NVME_AUTH_HASH_INVALID;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_id);
+
+size_t nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(u8 hmac_id)
+{
+	if (hmac_id >= ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map))
+		return 0;
+	return hash_map[hmac_id].len;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len);
+
+u32 nvme_auth_key_struct_size(u32 key_len)
+{
+	struct nvme_dhchap_key key;
+
+	return struct_size(&key, key, key_len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_key_struct_size);
+
+struct nvme_dhchap_key *nvme_auth_extract_key(const char *secret, u8 key_hash)
+{
+	struct nvme_dhchap_key *key;
+	const char *p;
+	u32 crc;
+	int ret, key_len;
+	size_t allocated_len = strlen(secret);
+
+	/* Secret might be affixed with a ':' */
+	p = strrchr(secret, ':');
+	if (p)
+		allocated_len = p - secret;
+	key = nvme_auth_alloc_key(allocated_len, 0);
+	if (!key)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	key_len = base64_decode(secret, allocated_len, key->key, true, BASE64_STD);
+	if (key_len < 0) {
+		pr_debug("base64 key decoding error %d\n",
+			 key_len);
+		ret = key_len;
+		goto out_free_key;
+	}
+
+	if (key_len != 36 && key_len != 52 &&
+	    key_len != 68) {
+		pr_err("Invalid key len %d\n", key_len);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_free_key;
+	}
+
+	/* The last four bytes is the CRC in little-endian format */
+	key_len -= 4;
+	/*
+	 * The linux implementation doesn't do pre- and post-increments,
+	 * so we have to do it manually.
+	 */
+	crc = ~crc32(~0, key->key, key_len);
+
+	if (get_unaligned_le32(key->key + key_len) != crc) {
+		pr_err("key crc mismatch (key %08x, crc %08x)\n",
+		       get_unaligned_le32(key->key + key_len), crc);
+		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+		goto out_free_key;
+	}
+	key->len = key_len;
+	key->hash = key_hash;
+	return key;
+out_free_key:
+	nvme_auth_free_key(key);
+	return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_extract_key);
+
+struct nvme_dhchap_key *nvme_auth_alloc_key(u32 len, u8 hash)
+{
+	u32 num_bytes = nvme_auth_key_struct_size(len);
+	struct nvme_dhchap_key *key = kzalloc(num_bytes, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (key) {
+		key->len = len;
+		key->hash = hash;
+	}
+	return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_alloc_key);
+
+void nvme_auth_free_key(struct nvme_dhchap_key *key)
+{
+	if (!key)
+		return;
+	kfree_sensitive(key);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_free_key);
+
+/*
+ * Start computing an HMAC value, given the algorithm ID and raw key.
+ *
+ * The context should be zeroized at the end of its lifetime.  The caller can do
+ * that implicitly by calling nvme_auth_hmac_final(), or explicitly (needed when
+ * a context is abandoned without finalizing it) by calling memzero_explicit().
+ */
+int nvme_auth_hmac_init(struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx *hmac, u8 hmac_id,
+			const u8 *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+	hmac->hmac_id = hmac_id;
+	switch (hmac_id) {
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256:
+		hmac_sha256_init_usingrawkey(&hmac->sha256, key, key_len);
+		return 0;
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384:
+		hmac_sha384_init_usingrawkey(&hmac->sha384, key, key_len);
+		return 0;
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512:
+		hmac_sha512_init_usingrawkey(&hmac->sha512, key, key_len);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n", __func__, hmac_id);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_init);
+
+void nvme_auth_hmac_update(struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx *hmac, const u8 *data,
+			   size_t data_len)
+{
+	switch (hmac->hmac_id) {
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256:
+		hmac_sha256_update(&hmac->sha256, data, data_len);
+		return;
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384:
+		hmac_sha384_update(&hmac->sha384, data, data_len);
+		return;
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512:
+		hmac_sha512_update(&hmac->sha512, data, data_len);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* Unreachable because nvme_auth_hmac_init() validated hmac_id */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_update);
+
+/* Finish computing an HMAC value.  Note that this zeroizes the HMAC context. */
+void nvme_auth_hmac_final(struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx *hmac, u8 *out)
+{
+	switch (hmac->hmac_id) {
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256:
+		hmac_sha256_final(&hmac->sha256, out);
+		return;
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384:
+		hmac_sha384_final(&hmac->sha384, out);
+		return;
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512:
+		hmac_sha512_final(&hmac->sha512, out);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* Unreachable because nvme_auth_hmac_init() validated hmac_id */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_final);
+
+static int nvme_auth_hmac(u8 hmac_id, const u8 *key, size_t key_len,
+			  const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx hmac;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = nvme_auth_hmac_init(&hmac, hmac_id, key, key_len);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, data, data_len);
+		nvme_auth_hmac_final(&hmac, out);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_hash(u8 hmac_id, const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *out)
+{
+	switch (hmac_id) {
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256:
+		sha256(data, data_len, out);
+		return 0;
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384:
+		sha384(data, data_len, out);
+		return 0;
+	case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512:
+		sha512(data, data_len, out);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n", __func__, hmac_id);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+struct nvme_dhchap_key *nvme_auth_transform_key(
+		const struct nvme_dhchap_key *key, const char *nqn)
+{
+	struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx hmac;
+	struct nvme_dhchap_key *transformed_key;
+	int ret, key_len;
+
+	if (!key) {
+		pr_warn("No key specified\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+	}
+	if (key->hash == 0) {
+		key_len = nvme_auth_key_struct_size(key->len);
+		transformed_key = kmemdup(key, key_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!transformed_key)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		return transformed_key;
+	}
+	ret = nvme_auth_hmac_init(&hmac, key->hash, key->key, key->len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	key_len = nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(key->hash);
+	transformed_key = nvme_auth_alloc_key(key_len, key->hash);
+	if (!transformed_key) {
+		memzero_explicit(&hmac, sizeof(hmac));
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+	nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, nqn, strlen(nqn));
+	nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, "NVMe-over-Fabrics", 17);
+	nvme_auth_hmac_final(&hmac, transformed_key->key);
+	return transformed_key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_transform_key);
+
+/**
+ * nvme_auth_augmented_challenge() - Compute the augmented DH-HMAC-CHAP challenge
+ * @hmac_id: Hash algorithm identifier
+ * @skey: Session key
+ * @skey_len: Length of @skey
+ * @challenge: Challenge value
+ * @aug: Output buffer for the augmented challenge
+ * @hlen: Hash output length (length of @challenge and @aug)
+ *
+ * NVMe base specification 8.3.5.5.4: The augmented challenge is computed
+ * applying the HMAC function using the hash function H() selected by the
+ * HashID parameter ... with the hash of the ephemeral DH key ... as HMAC key
+ * to the challenge C (i.e., Ca = HMAC(H(g^xy mod p), C)).
+ *
+ * As the session key skey is already H(g^xy mod p) per section 8.3.5.5.9, use
+ * it directly as the HMAC key without additional hashing.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure.
+ */
+int nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(u8 hmac_id, const u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
+				  const u8 *challenge, u8 *aug, size_t hlen)
+{
+	return nvme_auth_hmac(hmac_id, skey, skey_len, challenge, hlen, aug);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_augmented_challenge);
+
+int nvme_auth_gen_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm, u8 dh_gid)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = crypto_kpp_set_secret(dh_tfm, NULL, 0);
+	if (ret)
+		pr_debug("failed to set private key, error %d\n", ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_privkey);
+
+int nvme_auth_gen_pubkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm,
+		u8 *host_key, size_t host_key_len)
+{
+	struct kpp_request *req;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
+	struct scatterlist dst;
+	int ret;
+
+	req = kpp_request_alloc(dh_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+	kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
+	sg_init_one(&dst, host_key, host_key_len);
+	kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, host_key_len);
+	kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				 crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+	ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req), &wait);
+	kpp_request_free(req);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_pubkey);
+
+/**
+ * nvme_auth_gen_session_key() - Generate an ephemeral session key
+ * @dh_tfm: Diffie-Hellman transform with local private key already set
+ * @public_key: Peer's public key
+ * @public_key_len: Length of @public_key
+ * @sess_key: Output buffer for the session key
+ * @sess_key_len: Size of @sess_key buffer
+ * @hash_id: Hash algorithm identifier
+ *
+ * NVMe base specification 8.3.5.5.9: The session key Ks shall be computed from
+ * the ephemeral DH key (i.e., g^xy mod p) ... by applying the hash function
+ * H() selected by the HashID parameter ... (i.e., Ks = H(g^xy mod p)).
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure.
+ */
+int nvme_auth_gen_session_key(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm,
+		const u8 *public_key, size_t public_key_len,
+		u8 *sess_key, size_t sess_key_len, u8 hash_id)
+{
+	struct kpp_request *req;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
+	struct scatterlist src, dst;
+	u8 *dh_secret;
+	size_t dh_secret_len, hash_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	hash_len = nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(hash_id);
+	if (!hash_len) {
+		pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n", __func__, hash_id);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (sess_key_len != hash_len) {
+		pr_warn("%s: sess_key buffer missized (%zu != %zu)\n",
+			__func__, sess_key_len, hash_len);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	dh_secret_len = crypto_kpp_maxsize(dh_tfm);
+	dh_secret = kzalloc(dh_secret_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!dh_secret)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	req = kpp_request_alloc(dh_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_secret;
+	}
+
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+	sg_init_one(&src, public_key, public_key_len);
+	kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, public_key_len);
+	sg_init_one(&dst, dh_secret, dh_secret_len);
+	kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, dh_secret_len);
+	kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				 crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+	ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req), &wait);
+	kpp_request_free(req);
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_secret;
+
+	ret = nvme_auth_hash(hash_id, dh_secret, dh_secret_len, sess_key);
+
+out_free_secret:
+	kfree_sensitive(dh_secret);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_session_key);
+
+int nvme_auth_parse_key(const char *secret, struct nvme_dhchap_key **ret_key)
+{
+	struct nvme_dhchap_key *key;
+	u8 key_hash;
+
+	if (!secret) {
+		*ret_key = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (sscanf(secret, "DHHC-1:%hhd:%*s:", &key_hash) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pass in the secret without the 'DHHC-1:XX:' prefix */
+	key = nvme_auth_extract_key(secret + 10, key_hash);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		*ret_key = NULL;
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+	}
+
+	*ret_key = key;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_parse_key);
+
+/**
+ * nvme_auth_generate_psk - Generate a PSK for TLS
+ * @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
+ * @skey: Session key
+ * @skey_len: Length of @skey
+ * @c1: Value of challenge C1
+ * @c2: Value of challenge C2
+ * @hash_len: Hash length of the hash algorithm
+ * @ret_psk: Pointer to the resulting generated PSK
+ * @ret_len: length of @ret_psk
+ *
+ * Generate a PSK for TLS as specified in NVMe base specification, section
+ * 8.13.5.9: Generated PSK for TLS
+ *
+ * The generated PSK for TLS shall be computed applying the HMAC function
+ * using the hash function H( ) selected by the HashID parameter in the
+ * DH-HMAC-CHAP_Challenge message with the session key KS as key to the
+ * concatenation of the two challenges C1 and C2 (i.e., generated
+ * PSK = HMAC(KS, C1 || C2)).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success with a valid generated PSK pointer in @ret_psk and
+ * the length of @ret_psk in @ret_len, or a negative error number otherwise.
+ */
+int nvme_auth_generate_psk(u8 hmac_id, const u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
+			   const u8 *c1, const u8 *c2, size_t hash_len,
+			   u8 **ret_psk, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+	size_t psk_len = nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(hmac_id);
+	struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx hmac;
+	u8 *psk;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!c1 || !c2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = nvme_auth_hmac_init(&hmac, hmac_id, skey, skey_len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	psk = kzalloc(psk_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!psk) {
+		memzero_explicit(&hmac, sizeof(hmac));
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, c1, hash_len);
+	nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, c2, hash_len);
+	nvme_auth_hmac_final(&hmac, psk);
+	*ret_psk = psk;
+	*ret_len = psk_len;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_psk);
+
+/**
+ * nvme_auth_generate_digest - Generate TLS PSK digest
+ * @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
+ * @psk: Generated input PSK
+ * @psk_len: Length of @psk
+ * @subsysnqn: NQN of the subsystem
+ * @hostnqn: NQN of the host
+ * @ret_digest: Pointer to the returned digest
+ *
+ * Generate a TLS PSK digest as specified in TP8018 Section 3.6.1.3:
+ *   TLS PSK and PSK identity Derivation
+ *
+ * The PSK digest shall be computed by encoding in Base64 (refer to RFC
+ * 4648) the result of the application of the HMAC function using the hash
+ * function specified in item 4 above (ie the hash function of the cipher
+ * suite associated with the PSK identity) with the PSK as HMAC key to the
+ * concatenation of:
+ * - the NQN of the host (i.e., NQNh) not including the null terminator;
+ * - a space character;
+ * - the NQN of the NVM subsystem (i.e., NQNc) not including the null
+ *   terminator;
+ * - a space character; and
+ * - the seventeen ASCII characters "NVMe-over-Fabrics"
+ * (i.e., <PSK digest> = Base64(HMAC(PSK, NQNh || " " || NQNc || " " ||
+ *  "NVMe-over-Fabrics"))).
+ * The length of the PSK digest depends on the hash function used to compute
+ * it as follows:
+ * - If the SHA-256 hash function is used, the resulting PSK digest is 44
+ *   characters long; or
+ * - If the SHA-384 hash function is used, the resulting PSK digest is 64
+ *   characters long.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success with a valid digest pointer in @ret_digest, or a
+ * negative error number on failure.
+ */
+int nvme_auth_generate_digest(u8 hmac_id, const u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
+			      const char *subsysnqn, const char *hostnqn,
+			      char **ret_digest)
+{
+	struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx hmac;
+	u8 digest[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	size_t hash_len = nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(hmac_id);
+	char *enc;
+	size_t enc_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!subsysnqn || !hostnqn))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (hash_len == 0) {
+		pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n",
+			__func__, hmac_id);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	switch (hash_len) {
+	case 32:
+		enc_len = 44;
+		break;
+	case 48:
+		enc_len = 64;
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm '%s'\n",
+			__func__, nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	enc = kzalloc(enc_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!enc) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = nvme_auth_hmac_init(&hmac, hmac_id, psk, psk_len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+	nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, hostnqn, strlen(hostnqn));
+	nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, " ", 1);
+	nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, subsysnqn, strlen(subsysnqn));
+	nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, " NVMe-over-Fabrics", 18);
+	nvme_auth_hmac_final(&hmac, digest);
+
+	ret = base64_encode(digest, hash_len, enc, true, BASE64_STD);
+	if (ret < enc_len) {
+		ret = -ENOKEY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*ret_digest = enc;
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	if (ret)
+		kfree_sensitive(enc);
+	memzero_explicit(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_digest);
+
+/**
+ * nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk - Derive TLS PSK
+ * @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
+ * @psk: generated input PSK
+ * @psk_len: size of @psk
+ * @psk_digest: TLS PSK digest
+ * @ret_psk: Pointer to the resulting TLS PSK
+ *
+ * Derive a TLS PSK as specified in TP8018 Section 3.6.1.3:
+ *   TLS PSK and PSK identity Derivation
+ *
+ * The TLS PSK shall be derived as follows from an input PSK
+ * (i.e., either a retained PSK or a generated PSK) and a PSK
+ * identity using the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand-Label operations
+ * (refer to RFC 5869 and RFC 8446) where the hash function is the
+ * one specified by the hash specifier of the PSK identity:
+ * 1. PRK = HKDF-Extract(0, Input PSK); and
+ * 2. TLS PSK = HKDF-Expand-Label(PRK, "nvme-tls-psk", PskIdentityContext, L),
+ * where PskIdentityContext is the hash identifier indicated in
+ * the PSK identity concatenated to a space character and to the
+ * Base64 PSK digest (i.e., "<hash> <PSK digest>") and L is the
+ * output size in bytes of the hash function (i.e., 32 for SHA-256
+ * and 48 for SHA-384).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success with a valid psk pointer in @ret_psk or a negative
+ * error number otherwise.
+ */
+int nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(int hmac_id, const u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
+			     const char *psk_digest, u8 **ret_psk)
+{
+	static const u8 default_salt[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	static const char label[18] = "tls13 nvme-tls-psk";
+	u8 prk[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	size_t hash_len, ctx_len;
+	u8 *hmac_data = NULL, *tls_key;
+	size_t i;
+	int ret;
+
+	hash_len = nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(hmac_id);
+	if (hash_len == 0) {
+		pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n",
+			__func__, hmac_id);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (hmac_id == NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512) {
+		pr_warn("%s: unsupported hash algorithm %s\n",
+			__func__, nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (psk_len != hash_len) {
+		pr_warn("%s: unexpected psk_len %zu\n", __func__, psk_len);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* HKDF-Extract */
+	ret = nvme_auth_hmac(hmac_id, default_salt, hash_len, psk, psk_len,
+			     prk);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * HKDF-Expand-Label (RFC 8446 section 7.1), with output length equal to
+	 * the hash length (so only a single HMAC operation is needed)
+	 */
+
+	hmac_data = kmalloc(/* output length */ 2 +
+			    /* label */ 1 + sizeof(label) +
+			    /* context (max) */ 1 + 3 + 1 + strlen(psk_digest) +
+			    /* counter */ 1,
+			    GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!hmac_data) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* output length */
+	i = 0;
+	hmac_data[i++] = hash_len >> 8;
+	hmac_data[i++] = hash_len;
+
+	/* label */
+	static_assert(sizeof(label) <= 255);
+	hmac_data[i] = sizeof(label);
+	memcpy(&hmac_data[i + 1], label, sizeof(label));
+	i += 1 + sizeof(label);
+
+	/* context */
+	ctx_len = sprintf(&hmac_data[i + 1], "%02d %s", hmac_id, psk_digest);
+	if (ctx_len > 255) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	hmac_data[i] = ctx_len;
+	i += 1 + ctx_len;
+
+	/* counter (this overwrites the NUL terminator written by sprintf) */
+	hmac_data[i++] = 1;
+
+	tls_key = kzalloc(psk_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tls_key) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = nvme_auth_hmac(hmac_id, prk, hash_len, hmac_data, i, tls_key);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree_sensitive(tls_key);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*ret_psk = tls_key;
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(hmac_data);
+	memzero_explicit(prk, sizeof(prk));
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NVMe Authentication framework");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..32d16c531
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2023 Hannes Reinecke, SUSE Labs
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <linux/nvme.h>
+#include <linux/nvme-tcp.h>
+#include <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
+
+static struct key *nvme_keyring;
+
+key_serial_t nvme_keyring_id(void)
+{
+	return nvme_keyring->serial;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_keyring_id);
+
+static bool nvme_tls_psk_revoked(struct key *psk)
+{
+	return test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &psk->flags) ||
+		test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &psk->flags);
+}
+
+struct key *nvme_tls_key_lookup(key_serial_t key_id)
+{
+	struct key *key = key_lookup(key_id);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_err("key id %08x not found\n", key_id);
+		return key;
+	}
+	if (nvme_tls_psk_revoked(key)) {
+		pr_err("key id %08x revoked\n", key_id);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+	}
+	return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_tls_key_lookup);
+
+static void nvme_tls_psk_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
+{
+	seq_puts(m, key->description);
+	seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
+}
+
+static bool nvme_tls_psk_match(const struct key *key,
+			       const struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+	const char *match_id;
+	size_t match_len;
+
+	if (!key->description) {
+		pr_debug("%s: no key description\n", __func__);
+		return false;
+	}
+	if (!match_data->raw_data) {
+		pr_debug("%s: no match data\n", __func__);
+		return false;
+	}
+	match_id = match_data->raw_data;
+	match_len = strlen(match_id);
+	pr_debug("%s: match '%s' '%s' len %zd\n",
+		 __func__, match_id, key->description, match_len);
+	return !memcmp(key->description, match_id, match_len);
+}
+
+static int nvme_tls_psk_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+	match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
+	match_data->cmp = nvme_tls_psk_match;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct key_type nvme_tls_psk_key_type = {
+	.name           = "psk",
+	.flags          = KEY_TYPE_NET_DOMAIN,
+	.preparse       = user_preparse,
+	.free_preparse  = user_free_preparse,
+	.match_preparse = nvme_tls_psk_match_preparse,
+	.instantiate    = generic_key_instantiate,
+	.revoke         = user_revoke,
+	.destroy        = user_destroy,
+	.describe       = nvme_tls_psk_describe,
+	.read           = user_read,
+};
+
+static struct key *nvme_tls_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
+		const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn,
+		u8 hmac, u8 psk_ver, bool generated)
+{
+	char *identity;
+	size_t identity_len = (NVMF_NQN_SIZE) * 2 + 11;
+	key_ref_t keyref;
+	key_serial_t keyring_id;
+
+	identity = kzalloc(identity_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!identity)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	snprintf(identity, identity_len, "NVMe%u%c%02u %s %s",
+		 psk_ver, generated ? 'G' : 'R', hmac, hostnqn, subnqn);
+
+	if (!keyring)
+		keyring = nvme_keyring;
+	keyring_id = key_serial(keyring);
+	pr_debug("keyring %x lookup tls psk '%s'\n",
+		 keyring_id, identity);
+	keyref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, true),
+				&nvme_tls_psk_key_type,
+				identity, false);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyref)) {
+		pr_debug("lookup tls psk '%s' failed, error %ld\n",
+			 identity, PTR_ERR(keyref));
+		kfree(identity);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+	}
+	kfree(identity);
+
+	return key_ref_to_ptr(keyref);
+}
+
+/**
+ * nvme_tls_psk_refresh - Refresh TLS PSK
+ * @keyring: Keyring holding the TLS PSK
+ * @hostnqn: Host NQN to use
+ * @subnqn: Subsystem NQN to use
+ * @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
+ * @data: TLS PSK key material
+ * @data_len: Length of @data
+ * @digest: TLS PSK digest
+ *
+ * Refresh a generated version 1 TLS PSK with the identity generated
+ * from @hmac_id, @hostnqn, @subnqn, and @digest in the keyring given
+ * by @keyring.
+ *
+ * Returns the updated key success or an error pointer otherwise.
+ */
+struct key *nvme_tls_psk_refresh(struct key *keyring,
+		const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn, u8 hmac_id,
+		u8 *data, size_t data_len, const char *digest)
+{
+	key_perm_t keyperm =
+		KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ |
+		KEY_POS_WRITE | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR |
+		KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
+	char *identity;
+	key_ref_t keyref;
+	key_serial_t keyring_id;
+	struct key *key;
+
+	if (!hostnqn || !subnqn || !data || !data_len)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	identity = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "NVMe1G%02d %s %s %s",
+		 hmac_id, hostnqn, subnqn, digest);
+	if (!identity)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (!keyring)
+		keyring = nvme_keyring;
+	keyring_id = key_serial(keyring);
+	pr_debug("keyring %x refresh tls psk '%s'\n",
+		 keyring_id, identity);
+	keyref = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring, true),
+				"psk", identity, data, data_len,
+				keyperm, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+				      KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN |
+				      KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyref)) {
+		pr_debug("refresh tls psk '%s' failed, error %ld\n",
+			 identity, PTR_ERR(keyref));
+		kfree(identity);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+	}
+	kfree(identity);
+	/*
+	 * Set the default timeout to 1 hour
+	 * as suggested in TP8018.
+	 */
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(keyref);
+	key_set_timeout(key, 3600);
+	return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_tls_psk_refresh);
+
+/*
+ * NVMe PSK priority list
+ *
+ * 'Retained' PSKs (ie 'generated == false') should be preferred to 'generated'
+ * PSKs, PSKs with hash (psk_ver 1) should be preferred to PSKs without hash
+ * (psk_ver 0), and SHA-384 should be preferred to SHA-256.
+ */
+static struct nvme_tls_psk_priority_list {
+	bool generated;
+	u8 psk_ver;
+	enum nvme_tcp_tls_cipher cipher;
+} nvme_tls_psk_prio[] = {
+	{ .generated = false,
+	  .psk_ver = 1,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
+	{ .generated = false,
+	  .psk_ver = 1,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
+	{ .generated = false,
+	  .psk_ver = 0,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
+	{ .generated = false,
+	  .psk_ver = 0,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
+	{ .generated = true,
+	  .psk_ver = 1,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
+	{ .generated = true,
+	  .psk_ver = 1,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
+	{ .generated = true,
+	  .psk_ver = 0,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
+	{ .generated = true,
+	  .psk_ver = 0,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
+};
+
+/*
+ * nvme_tls_psk_default - Return the preferred PSK to use for TLS ClientHello
+ */
+key_serial_t nvme_tls_psk_default(struct key *keyring,
+		      const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn)
+{
+	struct key *tls_key;
+	key_serial_t tls_key_id;
+	int prio;
+
+	for (prio = 0; prio < ARRAY_SIZE(nvme_tls_psk_prio); prio++) {
+		bool generated = nvme_tls_psk_prio[prio].generated;
+		u8 ver = nvme_tls_psk_prio[prio].psk_ver;
+		enum nvme_tcp_tls_cipher cipher = nvme_tls_psk_prio[prio].cipher;
+
+		tls_key = nvme_tls_psk_lookup(keyring, hostnqn, subnqn,
+					      cipher, ver, generated);
+		if (!IS_ERR(tls_key)) {
+			tls_key_id = tls_key->serial;
+			key_put(tls_key);
+			return tls_key_id;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_tls_psk_default);
+
+static int __init nvme_keyring_init(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	nvme_keyring = keyring_alloc(".nvme",
+				     GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
+				     current_cred(),
+				     (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				     (KEY_USR_ALL & ~KEY_USR_SETATTR),
+				     KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(nvme_keyring))
+		return PTR_ERR(nvme_keyring);
+
+	err = register_key_type(&nvme_tls_psk_key_type);
+	if (err) {
+		key_put(nvme_keyring);
+		return err;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit nvme_keyring_exit(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&nvme_tls_psk_key_type);
+	key_revoke(nvme_keyring);
+	key_put(nvme_keyring);
+}
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NVMe Keyring implementation");
+module_init(nvme_keyring_init);
+module_exit(nvme_keyring_exit);
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/tests/auth_kunit.c b/drivers/nvme/common/tests/auth_kunit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..28b8dd1e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/tests/auth_kunit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Unit tests for NVMe authentication functions
+ *
+ * Copyright 2026 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/nvme.h>
+#include <linux/nvme-auth.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+struct nvme_auth_test_values {
+	u8 hmac_id;
+	size_t hash_len;
+	u8 expected_psk[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	char *expected_psk_digest;
+	u8 expected_tls_psk[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+};
+
+static void kfree_action(void *ptr)
+{
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kunit_add_kfree_action(struct kunit *test, void *ptr)
+{
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0,
+			kunit_add_action_or_reset(test, kfree_action, ptr));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the derivation of a TLS PSK from the initial skey.  The vals parameter
+ * gives the expected value of tls_psk as well as the intermediate values psk
+ * and psk_digest.  The inputs are implicitly the fixed values set below.
+ */
+static void
+test_nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(struct kunit *test,
+			      const struct nvme_auth_test_values *vals)
+{
+	const u8 hmac_id = vals->hmac_id;
+	const size_t hash_len = vals->hash_len;
+	const size_t skey_len = hash_len;
+	u8 skey[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 c1[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 c2[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	const char *subsysnqn = "subsysnqn";
+	const char *hostnqn = "hostnqn";
+	u8 *psk = NULL, *tls_psk = NULL;
+	char *psk_digest = NULL;
+	size_t psk_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	for (int i = 0; i < NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE; i++) {
+		skey[i] = 'A' + i;
+		c1[i] = i;
+		c2[i] = 0xff - i;
+	}
+
+	ret = nvme_auth_generate_psk(hmac_id, skey, skey_len, c1, c2, hash_len,
+				     &psk, &psk_len);
+	kunit_add_kfree_action(test, psk);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, ret);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, hash_len, psk_len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ(test, vals->expected_psk, psk, psk_len);
+
+	ret = nvme_auth_generate_digest(hmac_id, psk, psk_len, subsysnqn,
+					hostnqn, &psk_digest);
+	kunit_add_kfree_action(test, psk_digest);
+	if (vals->expected_psk_digest == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * Algorithm has an ID assigned but is not supported by
+		 * nvme_auth_generate_digest().
+		 */
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, -EINVAL, ret);
+		return;
+	}
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, ret);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_STREQ(test, vals->expected_psk_digest, psk_digest);
+
+	ret = nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(hmac_id, psk, psk_len, psk_digest,
+				       &tls_psk);
+	kunit_add_kfree_action(test, tls_psk);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, ret);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ(test, vals->expected_tls_psk, tls_psk, psk_len);
+}
+
+static void test_nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk_hmac_sha256(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	static const struct nvme_auth_test_values vals = {
+		.hmac_id = NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256,
+		.hash_len = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.expected_psk = {
+			0x17, 0x33, 0xc5, 0x9f, 0xa7, 0xf4, 0x8f, 0xcf,
+			0x37, 0xf5, 0xf2, 0x6f, 0xc4, 0xff, 0x02, 0x68,
+			0xad, 0x4f, 0x78, 0xe0, 0x30, 0xf4, 0xf3, 0xb0,
+			0xbf, 0xd1, 0xd4, 0x7e, 0x7b, 0xb1, 0x44, 0x7a,
+		},
+		.expected_psk_digest = "OldoKuTfKddMuyCznAZojkWD7P4D9/AtzDzLimtOxqI=",
+		.expected_tls_psk = {
+			0x3c, 0x17, 0xda, 0x62, 0x84, 0x74, 0xa0, 0x4d,
+			0x22, 0x47, 0xc4, 0xca, 0xb4, 0x79, 0x68, 0xc9,
+			0x15, 0x38, 0x81, 0x93, 0xf7, 0xc0, 0x71, 0xbd,
+			0x94, 0x89, 0xcc, 0x36, 0x66, 0xcd, 0x7c, 0xc8,
+		},
+	};
+
+	test_nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(test, &vals);
+}
+
+static void test_nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk_hmac_sha384(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	static const struct nvme_auth_test_values vals = {
+		.hmac_id = NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384,
+		.hash_len = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.expected_psk = {
+			0xf1, 0x4b, 0x2d, 0xd3, 0x23, 0x4c, 0x45, 0x96,
+			0x94, 0xd3, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8b, 0xd6,
+			0xb3, 0x7c, 0x2c, 0x6d, 0xe8, 0x49, 0xe2, 0x2e,
+			0x11, 0x87, 0x49, 0x00, 0x1c, 0xe4, 0xbb, 0xe8,
+			0x64, 0x0b, 0x9e, 0x3a, 0x74, 0x8c, 0xb1, 0x1c,
+			0xe4, 0xb1, 0xd7, 0x1d, 0x35, 0x9c, 0xce, 0x39,
+		},
+		.expected_psk_digest = "cffMWk8TSS7HOQebjgYEIkrPrjWPV4JE5cdPB8WhEvY4JBW5YynKyv66XscN4A9n",
+		.expected_tls_psk = {
+			0x27, 0x74, 0x75, 0x32, 0x33, 0x53, 0x7b, 0x3f,
+			0xa5, 0x0e, 0xb7, 0xd1, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x45,
+			0x7d, 0x85, 0xf4, 0x90, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x5b, 0x22,
+			0x36, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x5d, 0x80, 0x93, 0x9d, 0x08,
+			0x98, 0xff, 0xf1, 0x5b, 0xb8, 0xb7, 0x71, 0x19,
+			0xd2, 0xbe, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x42, 0x3e, 0x75, 0x90,
+		},
+	};
+
+	test_nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(test, &vals);
+}
+
+static void test_nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk_hmac_sha512(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	static const struct nvme_auth_test_values vals = {
+		.hmac_id = NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512,
+		.hash_len = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.expected_psk = {
+			0x9c, 0x9f, 0x08, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x8b, 0x47, 0xd2,
+			0xd7, 0x5f, 0x4b, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x07, 0x04, 0x24,
+			0x48, 0x7b, 0x44, 0x5d, 0xd9, 0x6e, 0x70, 0xc4,
+			0xc0, 0x9b, 0x55, 0xe8, 0xb6, 0x00, 0x01, 0x52,
+			0xa3, 0x36, 0x3c, 0x34, 0x54, 0x04, 0x3f, 0x38,
+			0xf0, 0xb8, 0x50, 0x36, 0xde, 0xd4, 0x06, 0x55,
+			0x35, 0x0a, 0xa8, 0x7b, 0x8b, 0x6a, 0x28, 0x2b,
+			0x5c, 0x1a, 0xca, 0xe1, 0x62, 0x33, 0xdd, 0x5b,
+		},
+		/* nvme_auth_generate_digest() doesn't support SHA-512 yet. */
+		.expected_psk_digest = NULL,
+	};
+
+	test_nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(test, &vals);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case nvme_auth_test_cases[] = {
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk_hmac_sha256),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk_hmac_sha384),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk_hmac_sha512),
+	{},
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite nvme_auth_test_suite = {
+	.name = "nvme-auth",
+	.test_cases = nvme_auth_test_cases,
+};
+kunit_test_suite(nvme_auth_test_suite);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Unit tests for NVMe authentication functions");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");