diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/net/wireguard/device.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/wireguard/device.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/wireguard/device.h | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..43c7cebbf --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _WG_DEVICE_H +#define _WG_DEVICE_H + +#include "noise.h" +#include "allowedips.h" +#include "peerlookup.h" +#include "cookie.h" + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/netdevice.h> +#include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/ptr_ring.h> + +struct wg_device; + +struct multicore_worker { + void *ptr; + struct work_struct work; +}; + +struct crypt_queue { + struct ptr_ring ring; + struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker; + int last_cpu; +}; + +struct prev_queue { + struct sk_buff *head, *tail, *peeked; + struct { struct sk_buff *next, *prev; } empty; // Match first 2 members of struct sk_buff. + atomic_t count; +}; + +struct wg_device { + struct net_device *dev; + struct crypt_queue encrypt_queue, decrypt_queue, handshake_queue; + struct sock __rcu *sock4, *sock6; + struct net __rcu *creating_net; + struct noise_static_identity static_identity; + struct workqueue_struct *packet_crypt_wq,*handshake_receive_wq, *handshake_send_wq; + struct cookie_checker cookie_checker; + struct pubkey_hashtable *peer_hashtable; + struct index_hashtable *index_hashtable; + struct allowedips peer_allowedips; + struct mutex device_update_lock, socket_update_lock; + struct list_head device_list, peer_list; + atomic_t handshake_queue_len; + unsigned int num_peers, device_update_gen; + u32 fwmark; + u16 incoming_port; +}; + +int wg_device_init(void); +void wg_device_uninit(void); + +#endif /* _WG_DEVICE_H */ |
