diff options
| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /drivers/net/phy/sfp.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/phy/sfp.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/phy/sfp.h | 44 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/sfp.h b/drivers/net/phy/sfp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..879dff7af --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/net/phy/sfp.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +#ifndef SFP_H +#define SFP_H + +#include <linux/ethtool.h> +#include <linux/sfp.h> + +struct sfp; + +struct sfp_quirk { + const char *vendor; + const char *part; + void (*support)(const struct sfp_eeprom_id *id, + struct sfp_module_caps *caps); + void (*fixup)(struct sfp *sfp); +}; + +struct sfp_socket_ops { + void (*attach)(struct sfp *sfp); + void (*detach)(struct sfp *sfp); + void (*start)(struct sfp *sfp); + void (*stop)(struct sfp *sfp); + void (*set_signal_rate)(struct sfp *sfp, unsigned int rate_kbd); + int (*module_info)(struct sfp *sfp, struct ethtool_modinfo *modinfo); + int (*module_eeprom)(struct sfp *sfp, struct ethtool_eeprom *ee, + u8 *data); + int (*module_eeprom_by_page)(struct sfp *sfp, + const struct ethtool_module_eeprom *page, + struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); +}; + +int sfp_add_phy(struct sfp_bus *bus, struct phy_device *phydev); +void sfp_remove_phy(struct sfp_bus *bus); +void sfp_link_up(struct sfp_bus *bus); +void sfp_link_down(struct sfp_bus *bus); +int sfp_module_insert(struct sfp_bus *bus, const struct sfp_eeprom_id *id, + const struct sfp_quirk *quirk); +void sfp_module_remove(struct sfp_bus *bus); +int sfp_module_start(struct sfp_bus *bus); +void sfp_module_stop(struct sfp_bus *bus); +struct sfp_bus *sfp_register_socket(struct device *dev, struct sfp *sfp, + const struct sfp_socket_ops *ops); +void sfp_unregister_socket(struct sfp_bus *bus); + +#endif |
