staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 37 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/misc/ocxl/main.c b/drivers/misc/ocxl/main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..658974143
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/misc/ocxl/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+// Copyright 2017 IBM Corp.
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <asm/mmu.h>
+#include "ocxl_internal.h"
+
+static int __init init_ocxl(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!tlbie_capable)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = ocxl_file_init();
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = pci_register_driver(&ocxl_pci_driver);
+	if (rc) {
+		ocxl_file_exit();
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void exit_ocxl(void)
+{
+	pci_unregister_driver(&ocxl_pci_driver);
+	ocxl_file_exit();
+}
+
+module_init(init_ocxl);
+module_exit(exit_ocxl);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Open Coherent Accelerator");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");