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authorAdrian Betschart <adrian.betschart@cinemaone.ch>2026-09-11 17:13:14 +0200
committerAlex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>2026-10-01 17:18:05 -0400
commit106b4a2a78b2a2f14885604891957b84bba502db (patch)
tree5d40eef2428fb1a4791ab46a4b19091a5910eac2 /drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c
downloadlinux-stable-106b4a2a78b2a2f14885604891957b84bba502db.tar.gz
linux-stable-106b4a2a78b2a2f14885604891957b84bba502db.zip
drm/amd/display: Try RGB before YCbCr 4:4:4 in stream validationgrafted
amdgpu_dm_create_validate_stream_for_sink() walks encoding_order[] and uses the first encoding that validates. YCbCr 4:4:4 is listed before RGB, so an HDMI sink that advertises 4:4:4 gets YCbCr 4:4:4 whenever the "color format" property is left at AUTO, even though RGB fits the same link. That contradicts the documented AUTO behaviour for HDMI in enum drm_connector_color_format (RGB, falling back to YCbCr 4:2:0 only when the bandwidth is not available or the mode is 4:2:0-only), which the amdgpu implementation of the property also describes. It also leaves the "Broadcast RGB" property without effect on such sinks, since the quantization range it selects only applies to RGB output. Try RGB first. The mask still holds every encoding the sink supports, so a mode that cannot carry RGB falls back exactly as before. For reference, v7.2 picked RGB here unless YCbCr 4:4:4 was forced through debugfs, while earlier kernels picked YCbCr 4:4:4 for any HDMI sink that advertised it. Fixes: 0b0ff65d3ca1 ("drm/amd/display: Refactor stream validation") Suggested-by: Adolfo Rodrigues <adolfotregosa@gmail.com> Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-fable-5-1 Signed-off-by: Adrian Betschart <adrian.betschart@cinemaone.ch> Reviewed-by: Fangzhi Zuo <jerry.zuo@amd.com> Tested-by: Adolfo Rodrigues <adolfotregosa@gmail.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 7de432bc753133764dc40d37f9388da56de251e7)
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c457
1 files changed, 457 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..67db57249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This is for all the tests related to copy_to_user() and copy_from_user()
+ * hardening.
+ */
+#include "lkdtm.h"
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+
+/*
+ * Many of the tests here end up using const sizes, but those would
+ * normally be ignored by hardened usercopy, so force the compiler
+ * into choosing the non-const path to make sure we trigger the
+ * hardened usercopy checks by added "unconst" to all the const copies,
+ * and making sure "cache_size" isn't optimized into a const.
+ */
+static volatile size_t unconst;
+static volatile size_t cache_size = 1024;
+static struct kmem_cache *whitelist_cache;
+
+static const unsigned char test_text[] = "This is a test.\n";
+
+/*
+ * Instead of adding -Wno-return-local-addr, just pass the stack address
+ * through a function to obfuscate it from the compiler.
+ */
+static noinline unsigned char *trick_compiler(unsigned char *stack)
+{
+ return stack + unconst;
+}
+
+static noinline unsigned char *do_usercopy_stack_callee(int value)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[128];
+ int i;
+
+ /* Exercise stack to avoid everything living in registers. */
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) {
+ buf[i] = value & 0xff;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Put the target buffer in the middle of stack allocation
+ * so that we don't step on future stack users regardless
+ * of stack growth direction.
+ */
+ return trick_compiler(&buf[(128/2)-32]);
+}
+
+static noinline void do_usercopy_stack(bool to_user, bool bad_frame)
+{
+ unsigned long user_addr;
+ unsigned char good_stack[32];
+ unsigned char *bad_stack;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Exercise stack to avoid everything living in registers. */
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(good_stack); i++)
+ good_stack[i] = test_text[i % sizeof(test_text)];
+
+ /* This is a pointer to outside our current stack frame. */
+ if (bad_frame) {
+ bad_stack = do_usercopy_stack_callee((uintptr_t)&bad_stack);
+ } else {
+ /* Put start address just inside stack. */
+ bad_stack = task_stack_page(current) + THREAD_SIZE;
+ bad_stack -= sizeof(unsigned long);
+ }
+
+#ifdef ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
+ pr_info("stack : %px\n", (void *)current_stack_pointer);
+#endif
+ pr_info("good_stack: %px-%px\n", good_stack, good_stack + sizeof(good_stack));
+ pr_info("bad_stack : %px-%px\n", bad_stack, bad_stack + sizeof(good_stack));
+
+ user_addr = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0);
+ if (user_addr >= TASK_SIZE) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to allocate user memory\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (to_user) {
+ pr_info("attempting good copy_to_user of local stack\n");
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)user_addr, good_stack,
+ unconst + sizeof(good_stack))) {
+ pr_warn("copy_to_user failed unexpectedly?!\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad copy_to_user of distant stack\n");
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)user_addr, bad_stack,
+ unconst + sizeof(good_stack))) {
+ pr_warn("copy_to_user failed, but lacked Oops\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * There isn't a safe way to not be protected by usercopy
+ * if we're going to write to another thread's stack.
+ */
+ if (!bad_frame)
+ goto free_user;
+
+ pr_info("attempting good copy_from_user of local stack\n");
+ if (copy_from_user(good_stack, (void __user *)user_addr,
+ unconst + sizeof(good_stack))) {
+ pr_warn("copy_from_user failed unexpectedly?!\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad copy_from_user of distant stack\n");
+ if (copy_from_user(bad_stack, (void __user *)user_addr,
+ unconst + sizeof(good_stack))) {
+ pr_warn("copy_from_user failed, but lacked Oops\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+ }
+
+free_user:
+ vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This checks for whole-object size validation with hardened usercopy,
+ * with or without usercopy whitelisting.
+ */
+static void do_usercopy_slab_size(bool to_user)
+{
+ unsigned long user_addr;
+ unsigned char *one, *two;
+ void __user *test_user_addr;
+ void *test_kern_addr;
+ size_t size = unconst + 1024;
+
+ one = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ two = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!one || !two) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to allocate kernel memory\n");
+ goto free_kernel;
+ }
+
+ user_addr = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0);
+ if (user_addr >= TASK_SIZE) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to allocate user memory\n");
+ goto free_kernel;
+ }
+
+ memset(one, 'A', size);
+ memset(two, 'B', size);
+
+ test_user_addr = (void __user *)(user_addr + 16);
+ test_kern_addr = one + 16;
+
+ if (to_user) {
+ pr_info("attempting good copy_to_user of correct size\n");
+ if (copy_to_user(test_user_addr, test_kern_addr, size / 2)) {
+ pr_warn("copy_to_user failed unexpectedly?!\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad copy_to_user of too large size\n");
+ if (copy_to_user(test_user_addr, test_kern_addr, size)) {
+ pr_warn("copy_to_user failed, but lacked Oops\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+ } else {
+ pr_info("attempting good copy_from_user of correct size\n");
+ if (copy_from_user(test_kern_addr, test_user_addr, size / 2)) {
+ pr_warn("copy_from_user failed unexpectedly?!\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad copy_from_user of too large size\n");
+ if (copy_from_user(test_kern_addr, test_user_addr, size)) {
+ pr_warn("copy_from_user failed, but lacked Oops\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+ }
+ pr_err("FAIL: bad usercopy not detected!\n");
+ pr_expected_config_param(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, "hardened_usercopy");
+
+free_user:
+ vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+free_kernel:
+ kfree(one);
+ kfree(two);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This checks for the specific whitelist window within an object. If this
+ * test passes, then do_usercopy_slab_size() tests will pass too.
+ */
+static void do_usercopy_slab_whitelist(bool to_user)
+{
+ unsigned long user_alloc;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned char __user *user_addr;
+ size_t offset, size;
+
+ /* Make sure cache was prepared. */
+ if (!whitelist_cache) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to allocate kernel cache\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate a buffer with a whitelisted window in the buffer.
+ */
+ buf = kmem_cache_alloc(whitelist_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to allocate buffer from whitelist cache\n");
+ goto free_alloc;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate user memory we'll poke at. */
+ user_alloc = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0);
+ if (user_alloc >= TASK_SIZE) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to allocate user memory\n");
+ goto free_alloc;
+ }
+ user_addr = (void __user *)user_alloc;
+
+ memset(buf, 'B', cache_size);
+
+ /* Whitelisted window in buffer, from kmem_cache_create_usercopy. */
+ offset = (cache_size / 4) + unconst;
+ size = (cache_size / 16) + unconst;
+
+ if (to_user) {
+ pr_info("attempting good copy_to_user inside whitelist\n");
+ if (copy_to_user(user_addr, buf + offset, size)) {
+ pr_warn("copy_to_user failed unexpectedly?!\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad copy_to_user outside whitelist\n");
+ if (copy_to_user(user_addr, buf + offset - 1, size)) {
+ pr_warn("copy_to_user failed, but lacked Oops\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+ } else {
+ pr_info("attempting good copy_from_user inside whitelist\n");
+ if (copy_from_user(buf + offset, user_addr, size)) {
+ pr_warn("copy_from_user failed unexpectedly?!\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad copy_from_user outside whitelist\n");
+ if (copy_from_user(buf + offset - 1, user_addr, size)) {
+ pr_warn("copy_from_user failed, but lacked Oops\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+ }
+ pr_err("FAIL: bad usercopy not detected!\n");
+ pr_expected_config_param(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, "hardened_usercopy");
+
+free_user:
+ vm_munmap(user_alloc, PAGE_SIZE);
+free_alloc:
+ if (buf)
+ kmem_cache_free(whitelist_cache, buf);
+}
+
+/* Callable tests. */
+static void lkdtm_USERCOPY_SLAB_SIZE_TO(void)
+{
+ do_usercopy_slab_size(true);
+}
+
+static void lkdtm_USERCOPY_SLAB_SIZE_FROM(void)
+{
+ do_usercopy_slab_size(false);
+}
+
+static void lkdtm_USERCOPY_SLAB_WHITELIST_TO(void)
+{
+ do_usercopy_slab_whitelist(true);
+}
+
+static void lkdtm_USERCOPY_SLAB_WHITELIST_FROM(void)
+{
+ do_usercopy_slab_whitelist(false);
+}
+
+static void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_TO(void)
+{
+ do_usercopy_stack(true, true);
+}
+
+static void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM(void)
+{
+ do_usercopy_stack(false, true);
+}
+
+static void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND(void)
+{
+ do_usercopy_stack(true, false);
+}
+
+static void lkdtm_USERCOPY_KERNEL(void)
+{
+ unsigned long user_addr;
+
+ user_addr = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0);
+ if (user_addr >= TASK_SIZE) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to allocate user memory\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("attempting good copy_to_user from kernel rodata: %px\n",
+ test_text);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)user_addr, test_text,
+ unconst + sizeof(test_text))) {
+ pr_warn("copy_to_user failed unexpectedly?!\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad copy_to_user from kernel text: %px\n",
+ vm_mmap);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)user_addr, vm_mmap,
+ unconst + PAGE_SIZE)) {
+ pr_warn("copy_to_user failed, but lacked Oops\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+ pr_err("FAIL: bad copy_to_user() not detected!\n");
+ pr_expected_config_param(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, "hardened_usercopy");
+
+free_user:
+ vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This expects "kaddr" to point to a PAGE_SIZE allocation, which means
+ * a more complete test that would include copy_from_user() would risk
+ * memory corruption. Just test copy_to_user() here, as that exercises
+ * almost exactly the same code paths.
+ */
+static void do_usercopy_page_span(const char *name, void *kaddr)
+{
+ unsigned long uaddr;
+
+ uaddr = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0);
+ if (uaddr >= TASK_SIZE) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to allocate user memory\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize contents. */
+ memset(kaddr, 0xAA, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /* Bump the kaddr forward to detect a page-spanning overflow. */
+ kaddr += PAGE_SIZE / 2;
+
+ pr_info("attempting good copy_to_user() from kernel %s: %px\n",
+ name, kaddr);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)uaddr, kaddr,
+ unconst + (PAGE_SIZE / 2))) {
+ pr_err("copy_to_user() failed unexpectedly?!\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad copy_to_user() from kernel %s: %px\n",
+ name, kaddr);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)uaddr, kaddr, unconst + PAGE_SIZE)) {
+ pr_warn("Good, copy_to_user() failed, but lacked Oops(?!)\n");
+ goto free_user;
+ }
+
+ pr_err("FAIL: bad copy_to_user() not detected!\n");
+ pr_expected_config_param(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, "hardened_usercopy");
+
+free_user:
+ vm_munmap(uaddr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void lkdtm_USERCOPY_VMALLOC(void)
+{
+ void *addr;
+
+ addr = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (!addr) {
+ pr_err("vmalloc() failed!?\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ do_usercopy_page_span("vmalloc", addr);
+ vfree(addr);
+}
+
+static void lkdtm_USERCOPY_FOLIO(void)
+{
+ struct folio *folio;
+ void *addr;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Folio checking currently misses 0-order allocations, so
+ * allocate and bump forward to the last page.
+ */
+ folio = folio_alloc(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, 1);
+ if (!folio) {
+ pr_err("folio_alloc() failed!?\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ addr = folio_address(folio);
+ if (addr)
+ do_usercopy_page_span("folio", addr + PAGE_SIZE);
+ else
+ pr_err("folio_address() failed?!\n");
+ folio_put(folio);
+}
+
+void __init lkdtm_usercopy_init(void)
+{
+ /* Prepare cache that lacks SLAB_USERCOPY flag. */
+ whitelist_cache =
+ kmem_cache_create_usercopy("lkdtm-usercopy", cache_size,
+ 0, 0,
+ cache_size / 4,
+ cache_size / 16,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+void __exit lkdtm_usercopy_exit(void)
+{
+ kmem_cache_destroy(whitelist_cache);
+}
+
+static struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
+ CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_SLAB_SIZE_TO),
+ CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_SLAB_SIZE_FROM),
+ CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_SLAB_WHITELIST_TO),
+ CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_SLAB_WHITELIST_FROM),
+ CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_TO),
+ CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM),
+ CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND),
+ CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_VMALLOC),
+ CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_FOLIO),
+ CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_KERNEL),
+};
+
+struct crashtype_category usercopy_crashtypes = {
+ .crashtypes = crashtypes,
+ .len = ARRAY_SIZE(crashtypes),
+};