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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/misc/cardreader/rts5260.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/misc/cardreader/rts5260.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/misc/cardreader/rts5260.h | 45 |
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rts5260.h b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rts5260.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..53a1411c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rts5260.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +#ifndef __RTS5260_H__ +#define __RTS5260_H__ + +#define RTS5260_DVCC_CTRL 0xFF73 +#define RTS5260_DVCC_OCP_EN (0x01 << 7) +#define RTS5260_DVCC_OCP_THD_MASK (0x07 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DVCC_POWERON (0x01 << 3) +#define RTS5260_DVCC_OCP_CL_EN (0x01 << 2) + +#define RTS5260_DVIO_CTRL 0xFF75 +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_EN (0x01 << 7) +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_THD_MASK (0x07 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DVIO_POWERON (0x01 << 3) +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_CL_EN (0x01 << 2) + +#define RTS5260_DV331812_CFG 0xFF71 +#define RTS5260_DV331812_OCP_EN (0x01 << 7) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_OCP_THD_MASK (0x07 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_POWERON (0x01 << 3) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_SEL (0x01 << 2) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_VDD1 (0x01 << 2) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_VDD2 (0x00 << 2) + +#define RTS5260_DV331812_OCP_THD_120 (0x00 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_OCP_THD_140 (0x01 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_OCP_THD_160 (0x02 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_OCP_THD_180 (0x03 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_OCP_THD_210 (0x04 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_OCP_THD_240 (0x05 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_OCP_THD_270 (0x06 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DV331812_OCP_THD_300 (0x07 << 4) + +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_THD_250 (0x00 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_THD_300 (0x01 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_THD_350 (0x02 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_THD_400 (0x03 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_THD_450 (0x04 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_THD_500 (0x05 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_THD_550 (0x06 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DVIO_OCP_THD_600 (0x07 << 4) + +#define RTS5260_DVCC_OCP_THD_550 (0x00 << 4) +#define RTS5260_DVCC_OCP_THD_970 (0x05 << 4) + +#endif |