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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /drivers/md/dm-vdo/numeric.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md/dm-vdo/numeric.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/dm-vdo/numeric.h | 78 |
1 files changed, 78 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-vdo/numeric.h b/drivers/md/dm-vdo/numeric.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f568dc59e --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/md/dm-vdo/numeric.h @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright 2023 Red Hat + */ + +#ifndef UDS_NUMERIC_H +#define UDS_NUMERIC_H + +#include <linux/unaligned.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* + * These utilities encode or decode a number from an offset in a larger data buffer and then + * advance the offset pointer to the next field in the buffer. + */ + +static inline void decode_s64_le(const u8 *buffer, size_t *offset, s64 *decoded) +{ + *decoded = get_unaligned_le64(buffer + *offset); + *offset += sizeof(s64); +} + +static inline void encode_s64_le(u8 *data, size_t *offset, s64 to_encode) +{ + put_unaligned_le64(to_encode, data + *offset); + *offset += sizeof(s64); +} + +static inline void decode_u64_le(const u8 *buffer, size_t *offset, u64 *decoded) +{ + *decoded = get_unaligned_le64(buffer + *offset); + *offset += sizeof(u64); +} + +static inline void encode_u64_le(u8 *data, size_t *offset, u64 to_encode) +{ + put_unaligned_le64(to_encode, data + *offset); + *offset += sizeof(u64); +} + +static inline void decode_s32_le(const u8 *buffer, size_t *offset, s32 *decoded) +{ + *decoded = get_unaligned_le32(buffer + *offset); + *offset += sizeof(s32); +} + +static inline void encode_s32_le(u8 *data, size_t *offset, s32 to_encode) +{ + put_unaligned_le32(to_encode, data + *offset); + *offset += sizeof(s32); +} + +static inline void decode_u32_le(const u8 *buffer, size_t *offset, u32 *decoded) +{ + *decoded = get_unaligned_le32(buffer + *offset); + *offset += sizeof(u32); +} + +static inline void encode_u32_le(u8 *data, size_t *offset, u32 to_encode) +{ + put_unaligned_le32(to_encode, data + *offset); + *offset += sizeof(u32); +} + +static inline void decode_u16_le(const u8 *buffer, size_t *offset, u16 *decoded) +{ + *decoded = get_unaligned_le16(buffer + *offset); + *offset += sizeof(u16); +} + +static inline void encode_u16_le(u8 *data, size_t *offset, u16 to_encode) +{ + put_unaligned_le16(to_encode, data + *offset); + *offset += sizeof(u16); +} + +#endif /* UDS_NUMERIC_H */ |
