Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted

Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Don't destroy user event fields when removal fails

   User event fields are destroyed before the event is removed from
   visibility. But that can fail leaving the still visible event with no
   fields. Move the destroying of the fields to after the event is
   successfully removed from visibility.

 - Initialize function graph state is fork before calling
   copy_exec_state()

   For non-CLONE_VM forks, copy_exec_state() allocates a new
   task_exec_state. If that allocation fails, ftrace_graph_exit_task()
   will free the tasks ret_stack pointer. Since that pointer is still
   using the parent's ret_stack, it mistakenly frees the parent's
   pointer too.

   Call ftrace_graph_init() on the task first which will NULL out the
   new tasks's ret_stack and if the copy fails, it will not free
   anything.

 - Remove FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX

   The macro FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX was added but never used. Remove it.

 - Save ent_size in function graph printing of nested functions

   The function graph tracer needs to look at the next event to see if
   the next event is the return of the current function entry. If it is,
   it prints a single line:

	ktime_get();

   Otherwise it prints it like a nested function:

	tick_nohz_irq_exit() {
	    ktime_get();
	    kcpustat_irq_exit();
	}

   In order to look at the next event, it must save the current event so
   that it has the information to print from it. It saves the event in
   the iterator descriptor called "ent". What it doesn't save is the
   ent_size of the event which is now used to know if the function graph
   arguments are to be printed. The peek doesn't save the size so the
   size used happens to be that of the size of the last event that was
   seen.

   Save the entry event size in the iterator descriptor so that the
   correct size is used.

 - Fix several errors with freeing data in the histogram code

   The histogram code had a lot of leaked or or incorrect accounting
   when failures happen. Correct them.

 - Fix histogram regression of .percent and .graph modifiers

   Up until 6.3 histogram values could have "percent" or "graph"
   modifiers that changed how they were printed. But a change that added
   restricting histograms values from being strings, stack traces and
   other modifiers inadvertently prevented them from using the percent
   and graph modifiers, which were legal use cases for values.

   Put back the percent and graph modifiers.

 - Fix various typos in the comments

 - Set the trace_clock before initializing a histogram with clock
   argument

   The histogram API allows the user to specific which trace clock to
   use via a "clock=" string. The histogram is set up first before the
   clock is checked. If the passed in clock is not valid, it exits
   without fully fixing up the histogram leaving it on the list and a
   use-after-free can trigger.

   Update the clock argument first and if it fails then exit gracefully
   before the histogram trigger is placed on any lists.

 - Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event

   The function ftrace_set_clr_event() modifies the parse string and
   needs to put it back to what was passed in. It searches for ":mod:"
   via a strsep() but fails to put back the first ':' in the string.

   Add back the ':' in the passed in string.

 - Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file

   The options files are dynamically created and some tracers add their
   own options. When a tracer adds their own list of options, the
   trace_array holding them has an array to hold the list of options for
   each tracer. This array increases in size via a krealloc(), and the
   new entry gets a newly allocated array to hold the options of the new
   tracer being added.

   The element in each entry of the tracer's option array holds a
   pointer back to the trace_array, a pointer to the tracer it is
   associated to, a pointer to the flags of the option.

   The issue is that these arrays are freed when the trace_array is
   freed when its instance it represents is removed from the instances
   directory. There's a race that an open of one of these options files
   can happen when the instance is being removed.

   Add a new helper function to be called by the open function of the
   options file to iterate all existing trace_arrays under a lock and
   find the one that has the given option element in one of it's tracer
   arrays. If found, then update the associated trace_array's reference
   counter to keep it from being freed. If not found, have the open call
   return -ENODEV.

 - Disable interrupts when acquiring the lock in rb_wake_up_waiters()

   The function rb_wake_up_waiters() assumes it will be called in
   interrupt context and does not disable irqs when taking
   cpu_buffer->reader_lock, which can be called in hard interrupt
   context. The issue is in PREEMPT_RT, this function is called in
   thread context leaving this lock open to a deadlock.

   Take the lock with interrupts disabled.

 - Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash

   The tmp_ops used in update_ftrace_direct_mod() assigns its
   filter_hash field directly, but that field is annotated as __rcu and
   sparse complains. Assign it with rcu_assign_pointer()

 - Fix use-after-free in enable_trigger_private_data_free()

   The trace_event_call is accessed through the event_trigger_data's
   trace_event_file pointer to put the trace_event_call on freeing. The
   issue is that the trace_event_file data may have been freed already
   causing a use-after-free. Add a field to the event_trigger_data that
   points directly to the trace_event_call so that it can decrement its
   reference directly without needing to go through the
   trace_event_file.

 - Fix accounting of buffer data remote headers

   trace_buffer_desc_size() and trace_remote_alloc_buffer() undercount
   the number of pages is needed for the asked for size as it doesn't
   take into account the meta data on each page. Add a helper function
   to do the calculation properly and use that in these functions.

 - Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing

   The number of pages per remote ring buffer is capped by
   ring_buffer_desc::nr_page_va (32 bits). A buffer_size large enough to
   overflow that field would silently allocate a descriptor smaller than
   what was asked for.

 - Do not resize the subbuf order if any per_cpu buffer is disabled

   The mmapping of ring buffers disables resizing the subbuffers, but it
   is done per-cpu whereas the subbuf size change is done for all the
   per_cpu buffers under the buffer->mutex. It could change the size of
   some while the mapping is happening on others. Have the resize of the
   subbuf order check all the per_cpu buffers under the lock to see if
   any of them is disabled before starting and causing an inconsistency
   between buffers that are being mapped.

* tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: (25 commits)
  ring-buffer: Check resize_disabled before publishing the new subbuf order
  tracing/remotes: Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing
  tracing/remotes: Account for ring buffer page header in size calculation
  tracing: Don't dereference trace_event_file in deferred trigger free
  ftrace: Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash
  ring-buffer: Acquire the lock with irqsave in rb_wake_up_waiters()
  tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
  tracing: Fix ring_buffer_read_page_size() kernel-doc
  tracing: Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event()
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
  tracing: Undo the registration when enabling the histogram trigger fails
  tracing: Take the reference before publishing the named histogram trigger
  tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
  tracing: Fix typo "preceeded" in comment
  tracing: Fix typo "availabe" in comment
  tracing: Let histogram values keep the percent and graph modifiers
  tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
  tracing: Free histogram the field rejected for a bad modifier
  tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
  ...

1 files changed, 620 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-inlinecrypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-inlinecrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3479dfe5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-inlinecrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright 2024 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/device-mapper.h>
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+
+#define DM_MSG_PREFIX	"inlinecrypt"
+
+static const struct dm_inlinecrypt_cipher {
+	const char *name;
+	enum blk_crypto_mode_num mode_num;
+} dm_inlinecrypt_ciphers[] = {
+	{
+		.name = "aes-xts-plain64",
+		.mode_num = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS,
+	},
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct inlinecrypt_ctx - private data of an inlinecrypt target
+ * @dev: the underlying device
+ * @start: starting sector of the range of @dev which this target actually maps.
+ *	   For this purpose a "sector" is 512 bytes.
+ * @cipher_string: the name of the encryption algorithm being used
+ * @key_size: size of the encryption key in bytes
+ * @iv_offset: starting offset for IVs.  IVs are generated as if the target were
+ *	       preceded by @iv_offset 512-byte sectors.
+ * @sector_size: crypto sector size in bytes (usually 4096)
+ * @sector_bits: log2(sector_size)
+ * @key_type: type of the key -- either raw or hardware-wrapped
+ * @key: the encryption key to use
+ * @max_dun: the maximum DUN that may be used (computed from other params)
+ */
+struct inlinecrypt_ctx {
+	struct dm_dev *dev;
+	sector_t start;
+	const char *cipher_string;
+	unsigned int key_size;
+	u64 iv_offset;
+	unsigned int sector_size;
+	unsigned int sector_bits;
+	enum blk_crypto_key_type key_type;
+	struct blk_crypto_key key;
+	u64 max_dun;
+};
+
+static const struct dm_inlinecrypt_cipher *
+lookup_cipher(const char *cipher_string)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dm_inlinecrypt_ciphers); i++) {
+		if (strcmp(cipher_string, dm_inlinecrypt_ciphers[i].name) == 0)
+			return &dm_inlinecrypt_ciphers[i];
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void inlinecrypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
+{
+	struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+
+	if (ctx->dev) {
+		if (ctx->key.size)
+			blk_crypto_evict_key(ctx->dev->bdev, &ctx->key);
+		dm_put_device(ti, ctx->dev);
+	}
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx->cipher_string);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+static bool contains_whitespace(const char *str)
+{
+	while (*str)
+		if (isspace(*str++))
+			return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int set_key_user(struct key *key, char *key_bytes,
+			const unsigned int key_bytes_size)
+{
+	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+
+	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+	if (!ukp)
+		return -EKEYREVOKED;
+
+	if (key_bytes_size != ukp->datalen)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(key_bytes, ukp->data, key_bytes_size);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int inlinecrypt_get_keyring_key(const char *key_string, u8 *key_bytes,
+					const unsigned int key_bytes_size)
+{
+	char *key_desc;
+	int ret;
+	struct key_type *type;
+	struct key *key;
+	int (*set_key)(struct key *key, char *key_bytes,
+				   const unsigned int key_bytes_size);
+
+	/*
+	 * Reject key_string with whitespace. dm core currently lacks code for
+	 * proper whitespace escaping in arguments on DM_TABLE_STATUS path.
+	 */
+	if (contains_whitespace(key_string)) {
+		DMERR("whitespace chars not allowed in key string");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* look for next ':' separating key_type from key_description */
+	key_desc = strchr(key_string, ':');
+	if (!key_desc || key_desc == key_string || !strlen(key_desc + 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strncmp(key_string, "logon:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
+		type = &key_type_logon;
+		set_key = set_key_user;
+	} else {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	key = request_key(type, key_desc + 1, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+	down_read(&key->sem);
+
+	ret = set_key(key, (char *)key_bytes, key_bytes_size);
+
+	up_read(&key->sem);
+	key_put(key);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int get_key_size(char **key_string)
+{
+	char *colon, dummy;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (*key_string[0] != ':') {
+		ret = strlen(*key_string);
+
+		if (ret > 2 * BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_ANY_KEY_SIZE
+			|| ret  % 2
+			|| !ret) {
+			DMERR("Invalid keysize");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		return ret >> 1;
+	}
+
+	/* look for next ':' in key string */
+	colon = strpbrk(*key_string + 1, ":");
+	if (!colon)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (sscanf(*key_string + 1, "%u%c", &ret, &dummy) != 2 || dummy != ':')
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* remaining key string should be :<logon|user>:<key_desc> */
+	*key_string = colon;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int inlinecrypt_get_keyring_key(const char *key_string, u8 *key_bytes,
+					const unsigned int key_bytes_size)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int get_key_size(char **key_string)
+{
+	int key_hex_size = strlen(*key_string);
+
+	if (*key_string[0] == ':')
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (key_hex_size > 2 * BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_ANY_KEY_SIZE
+		|| key_hex_size  % 2
+		|| !key_hex_size) {
+		DMERR("Invalid keysize");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return key_hex_size >> 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+static int inlinecrypt_get_key(const char *key_string,
+				u8 key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_ANY_KEY_SIZE],
+				const unsigned int key_size)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (key_size > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_ANY_KEY_SIZE) {
+		DMERR("Invalid keysize");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* ':' means the key is in kernel keyring, short-circuit normal key processing */
+	if (key_string[0] == ':') {
+		/* key string should be :<logon|user>:<key_desc> */
+		ret = inlinecrypt_get_keyring_key(key_string + 1, key, key_size);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (hex2bin(key, key_string, key_size) != 0)
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int inlinecrypt_ctr_optional(struct dm_target *ti,
+				    unsigned int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+	struct dm_arg_set as;
+	static const struct dm_arg _args[] = {
+		{0, 4, "Invalid number of feature args"},
+	};
+	unsigned int opt_params;
+	const char *opt_string;
+	bool iv_large_sectors = false;
+	char dummy;
+	int err;
+
+	as.argc = argc;
+	as.argv = argv;
+
+	err = dm_read_arg_group(_args, &as, &opt_params, &ti->error);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	while (opt_params--) {
+		opt_string = dm_shift_arg(&as);
+		if (!opt_string) {
+			ti->error = "Not enough feature arguments";
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (str_has_prefix(opt_string, "keytype:")) {
+			const char *val = opt_string + strlen("keytype:");
+
+			if (!*val) {
+				ti->error = "Invalid block key type";
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+
+			if (!strcmp(val, "raw")) {
+				ctx->key_type = BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
+			} else if (!strcmp(val, "hw-wrapped")) {
+				ctx->key_type = BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_HW_WRAPPED;
+			} else {
+				ti->error = "Invalid block key type";
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		} else if (!strcmp(opt_string, "allow_discards")) {
+			ti->num_discard_bios = 1;
+		} else if (sscanf(opt_string, "sector_size:%u%c",
+				  &ctx->sector_size, &dummy) == 1) {
+			if (ctx->sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE ||
+			    ctx->sector_size > 4096 ||
+			    !is_power_of_2(ctx->sector_size)) {
+				ti->error = "Invalid sector_size";
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		} else if (!strcmp(opt_string, "iv_large_sectors")) {
+			iv_large_sectors = true;
+		} else {
+			ti->error = "Invalid feature arguments";
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* dm-inlinecrypt doesn't implement iv_large_sectors=false. */
+	if (ctx->sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE && !iv_large_sectors) {
+		ti->error = "iv_large_sectors must be specified";
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an inlinecrypt mapping:
+ * <cipher> [<key>|:<key_size>:<logon>:<key_description>] <iv_offset> <dev_path> <start>
+ *
+ * This syntax matches dm-crypt's, but the set of supported functionality has
+ * been stripped down.
+ */
+static int inlinecrypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx;
+	const struct dm_inlinecrypt_cipher *cipher;
+	u8 key_bytes[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_ANY_KEY_SIZE];
+	unsigned int dun_bytes;
+	unsigned long long tmpll;
+	char dummy;
+	int err;
+
+	if (argc < 5) {
+		ti->error = "Not enough arguments";
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	ctx = kzalloc_obj(*ctx);
+	if (!ctx) {
+		ti->error = "Out of memory";
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	ti->private = ctx;
+
+	/* <cipher> */
+	ctx->cipher_string = kstrdup(argv[0], GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->cipher_string) {
+		ti->error = "Out of memory";
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	cipher = lookup_cipher(ctx->cipher_string);
+	if (!cipher) {
+		ti->error = "Unsupported cipher";
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* <key> */
+	err = get_key_size(&argv[1]);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		ti->error = "Cannot parse key size";
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	ctx->key_size = err;
+
+	err = inlinecrypt_get_key(argv[1], key_bytes, ctx->key_size);
+	if (err) {
+		ti->error = "Malformed key string";
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* <iv_offset> */
+	if (sscanf(argv[2], "%llu%c", &ctx->iv_offset, &dummy) != 1) {
+		ti->error = "Invalid iv_offset sector";
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* <dev_path> */
+	err = dm_get_device(ti, argv[3], dm_table_get_mode(ti->table),
+			    &ctx->dev);
+	if (err) {
+		ti->error = "Device lookup failed";
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* <start> */
+	if (sscanf(argv[4], "%llu%c", &tmpll, &dummy) != 1 ||
+	    tmpll != (sector_t)tmpll) {
+		ti->error = "Invalid start sector";
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	ctx->start = tmpll;
+
+	/* optional arguments */
+	ctx->sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+	ctx->key_type = BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
+	if (argc > 5) {
+		err = inlinecrypt_ctr_optional(ti, argc - 5, &argv[5]);
+		if (err)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+	ctx->sector_bits = ilog2(ctx->sector_size);
+	if (ti->len & ((ctx->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1)) {
+		ti->error = "Device size is not a multiple of sector_size";
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	if (ctx->iv_offset & ((ctx->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1)) {
+		ti->error = "Wrong alignment of iv_offset sector";
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	ctx->max_dun = (ctx->iv_offset + ti->len - 1) >>
+		       (ctx->sector_bits - SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	dun_bytes = DIV_ROUND_UP(fls64(ctx->max_dun), 8);
+
+	err = blk_crypto_init_key(&ctx->key, key_bytes, ctx->key_size,
+				  ctx->key_type, cipher->mode_num,
+				  dun_bytes, ctx->sector_size,
+				  BLK_CRYPTO_CFG_ALLOW_HW);
+	if (err) {
+		ti->error = "Error initializing blk-crypto key";
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	err = blk_crypto_start_using_key(ctx->dev->bdev, &ctx->key);
+	if (err) {
+		ti->error = "Error starting to use blk-crypto";
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	ti->num_flush_bios = 1;
+
+	err = 0;
+	goto out;
+
+bad:
+	inlinecrypt_dtr(ti);
+out:
+	memzero_explicit(key_bytes, sizeof(key_bytes));
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int inlinecrypt_map(struct dm_target *ti, struct bio *bio)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+	sector_t sector_in_target;
+	u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE] = {};
+
+	bio_set_dev(bio, ctx->dev->bdev);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the bio is a device-level request which doesn't target a specific
+	 * sector, there's nothing more to do.
+	 */
+	if (bio_sectors(bio) == 0)
+		return DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED;
+
+	/*
+	 * The bio should never have an encryption context already, since
+	 * dm-inlinecrypt doesn't pass through any inline encryption
+	 * capabilities to the layer above it.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_has_crypt_ctx(bio)))
+		return DM_MAPIO_KILL;
+
+	/* Map the bio's sector to the underlying device. (512-byte sectors) */
+	sector_in_target = dm_target_offset(ti, bio->bi_iter.bi_sector);
+	bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = ctx->start + sector_in_target;
+	/*
+	 * If the bio doesn't have any data (e.g. if it's a DISCARD request),
+	 * there's nothing more to do.
+	 */
+	if (!bio_has_data(bio))
+		return DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED;
+
+	/* Calculate the DUN and enforce data-unit (crypto sector) alignment. */
+	dun[0] = ctx->iv_offset + sector_in_target; /* 512-byte sectors */
+	if (dun[0] & ((ctx->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1))
+		return DM_MAPIO_KILL;
+	dun[0] >>= ctx->sector_bits - SECTOR_SHIFT; /* crypto sectors */
+
+	/*
+	 * This check isn't necessary as we should have calculated max_dun
+	 * correctly, but be safe.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dun[0] > ctx->max_dun))
+		return DM_MAPIO_KILL;
+
+	bio_crypt_set_ctx(bio, &ctx->key, dun, GFP_NOIO);
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we've added an encryption context to the bio and
+	 * blk-crypto-fallback may be needed to process it, it's necessary to
+	 * use the fallback-aware bio submission code rather than
+	 * unconditionally returning DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED.
+	 *
+	 * To get the correct accounting for a dm target in the case where
+	 * __blk_crypto_submit_bio() doesn't take ownership of the bio (returns
+	 * true), call __blk_crypto_submit_bio() directly and return
+	 * DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED in that case, rather than relying on
+	 * blk_crypto_submit_bio() which calls submit_bio() in that case.
+	 *
+	 * TODO: blk-crypto fallback write slow-path currently double-accounts
+	 * IO in vmstat, as encrypted bios are submitted via submit_bio().
+	 * This does not affect data correctness. Consider fixing this if
+	 * a cleaner accounting model for derived bios is introduced.
+	 */
+	if (__blk_crypto_submit_bio(bio))
+		return DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED;
+	return DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED;
+}
+
+static void inlinecrypt_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
+			       unsigned int status_flags, char *result,
+			       unsigned int maxlen)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+	unsigned int sz = 0;
+	int num_feature_args = 0;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case STATUSTYPE_INFO:
+	case STATUSTYPE_IMA:
+		result[0] = '\0';
+		break;
+
+	case STATUSTYPE_TABLE:
+		/*
+		 * Warning: like dm-crypt, dm-inlinecrypt includes the key in
+		 * the returned table.  Userspace is responsible for redacting
+		 * the key when needed.
+		 */
+		DMEMIT("%s %*phN %u %llu %s %llu", ctx->cipher_string,
+		       ctx->key.size, ctx->key.bytes,
+		       ctx->key_type, ctx->iv_offset,
+		       ctx->dev->name, ctx->start);
+		num_feature_args += !!ti->num_discard_bios;
+		if (ctx->sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE)
+			num_feature_args += 2;
+		if (num_feature_args != 0) {
+			DMEMIT(" %d", num_feature_args);
+			if (ti->num_discard_bios)
+				DMEMIT(" allow_discards");
+			if (ctx->sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE) {
+				DMEMIT(" sector_size:%u", ctx->sector_size);
+				DMEMIT(" iv_large_sectors");
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static int inlinecrypt_prepare_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti,
+				     struct block_device **bdev, unsigned int cmd,
+				     unsigned long arg, bool *forward)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+	const struct dm_dev *dev = ctx->dev;
+
+	*bdev = dev->bdev;
+
+	/* Only pass ioctls through if the device sizes match exactly. */
+	return ctx->start != 0 || ti->len != bdev_nr_sectors(dev->bdev);
+}
+
+static int inlinecrypt_iterate_devices(struct dm_target *ti,
+				       iterate_devices_callout_fn fn,
+				       void *data)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+
+	return fn(ti, ctx->dev, ctx->start, ti->len, data);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
+static int inlinecrypt_report_zones(struct dm_target *ti,
+				    struct dm_report_zones_args *args,
+				    unsigned int nr_zones)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+
+	return dm_report_zones(ctx->dev->bdev, ctx->start,
+			ctx->start + dm_target_offset(ti, args->next_sector),
+			args, nr_zones);
+}
+#else
+#define inlinecrypt_report_zones NULL
+#endif
+
+static void inlinecrypt_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti,
+				 struct queue_limits *limits)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+	const unsigned int sector_size = ctx->sector_size;
+
+	limits->logical_block_size =
+		max_t(unsigned int, limits->logical_block_size, sector_size);
+	limits->physical_block_size =
+		max_t(unsigned int, limits->physical_block_size, sector_size);
+	limits->io_min = max_t(unsigned int, limits->io_min, sector_size);
+	limits->dma_alignment = limits->logical_block_size - 1;
+}
+
+static struct target_type inlinecrypt_target = {
+	.name			= "inlinecrypt",
+	.version		= {1, 0, 0},
+	/*
+	 * Do not set DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO, since dm-inlinecrypt consumes the
+	 * crypto capability itself.
+	 */
+	.features		= DM_TARGET_ZONED_HM,
+	.module			= THIS_MODULE,
+	.ctr			= inlinecrypt_ctr,
+	.dtr			= inlinecrypt_dtr,
+	.map			= inlinecrypt_map,
+	.status			= inlinecrypt_status,
+	.prepare_ioctl		= inlinecrypt_prepare_ioctl,
+	.iterate_devices	= inlinecrypt_iterate_devices,
+	.report_zones		= inlinecrypt_report_zones,
+	.io_hints		= inlinecrypt_io_hints,
+};
+
+module_dm(inlinecrypt);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Linlin Zhang <linlin.zhang@oss.qualcomm.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION(DM_NAME " target for inline encryption");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");