Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted

Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Fix error output of boot instance creation failure

   Currently if a boot instance creation fails, instead of printing out
   the name of the instance that failed, it prints "(null)". That is
   because it prints "cur_str" that had already been processed by
   strsep(). Print the saved name instead.

   While at it, print the error code of the failure.

 - Fix use-after-free for same named historgrams

   Histograms can be named so that they can be used in multiple events.
   But if the named histogram has a variable attached, the second event
   that uses the named histogram which duplicates it and needs to free
   the original after duplication leaves the old variable in place and
   still visible. If another histogram uses than variable, it will use
   the stale one which will try to reference the freed duplicate
   histogram and crash the kernel.

   Free the duplicate variables along with the duplicated histogram
   data.

 - Check return value of kthread_run() in event self test

   The events self tests uses a kthread for testing but does not check
   if it succeeded in creating a kthread. If the kthread creation were
   to fail, the code will still try to call kthread_stop() on the error
   returned.

 - Fix race between reading trace_pipe and updating subbuffer size

   If a user is reading the trace_pipe file at the same time they update
   the ring buffer sub-buffer size, can cause the trace_pipe read to
   read stale data. Add trace_access_lock() around updating the ring
   buffer sub-buffer size.

 - Fix eventfs_inode on failure path in creation of the events directory

   In the creation of the "events" directory, if after allocating the
   eventfs_inode a failure is detected, it calls cleanup_ei() which
   calls free_ei(). The free_ei() will test if eventfs_inode being freed
   has no children. It is a bug if it does. But on the failure case of
   the creation of the "events" directory, the children lists have not
   yet been initialized and the free will trigger a warning because
   list_empty() on an uninitialized list returns false.

   Move the initialization into init_ei() where it makes more sense and
   makes sure that a created eventfs_inode has its lists initialized
   upon creation.

 - Check return value of kthread_run() in ftrace direct sample code

   The sample code that shows how to use the ftrace direct calls does
   not test the return of kthread_run() to see if it succeeds. Return a
   failure if the kthread_run() doesn't succeed.

 - Clear user events state on fork in case of alloc failure

   On fork, the child gets a pointer to the parent's user events state.
   It makes a copy of it then updates the child's pointer to it. But if
   the allocation fails, the duplication function leaves the child with
   a pointer to its parent's descriptor. When the child cleans up its
   data, it will free the parent's descriptor while the parent is still
   using it.

   In the duplication function, set the child's user_event_mm to NULL
   before testing if the allocation succeeded, and when it exits it will
   not free the parent's descriptor.

 - Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap

   simple_ring_buffer_swap_reader_page() starts with retry set to 8 and
   post-decrements it only after a failed link replacement. On the final
   attempt, a successful replacement leaves retry at zero, while a
   failed replacement leaves it at -1.

   But the check for success expects the retry value to be non-zero and
   exits with an error on zero. This is the opposite result. Fix it.

 - Fail nicely when the remote swap_reader_page() returns an error

   Currently, if the swap_reader_page() of a remote buffer fails, it
   triggers a WARN_ON_ONCE() and continues normally. Instead, have it
   exit with an error and a pr_warn() print instead of a full WARNING.

* tag 'trace-v7.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
  ring-buffer: Stop remote reader update when page swap fails
  tracing: Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap
  tracing/user_events: Clear copied tracing state before fork duplication
  samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-multi-modify
  samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-modify
  eventfs: Initialize ei->children and ei->list in init_ei()
  tracing: Fix use-after-free in trace_pipe read on sub-buffer order change
  tracing: Fix crash passing ERR_PTR to kthread_stop()
  tracing: Fix use-after-free with same-name named triggers
  tracing: Fix logged instance name on creation failure

1 files changed, 620 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-inlinecrypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-inlinecrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..66fa2f9d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-inlinecrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright 2024 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/device-mapper.h>
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+
+#define DM_MSG_PREFIX	"inlinecrypt"
+
+static const struct dm_inlinecrypt_cipher {
+	const char *name;
+	enum blk_crypto_mode_num mode_num;
+} dm_inlinecrypt_ciphers[] = {
+	{
+		.name = "aes-xts-plain64",
+		.mode_num = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS,
+	},
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct inlinecrypt_ctx - private data of an inlinecrypt target
+ * @dev: the underlying device
+ * @start: starting sector of the range of @dev which this target actually maps.
+ *	   For this purpose a "sector" is 512 bytes.
+ * @cipher_string: the name of the encryption algorithm being used
+ * @key_size: size of the encryption key in bytes
+ * @iv_offset: starting offset for IVs.  IVs are generated as if the target were
+ *	       preceded by @iv_offset 512-byte sectors.
+ * @sector_size: crypto sector size in bytes (usually 4096)
+ * @sector_bits: log2(sector_size)
+ * @key_type: type of the key -- either raw or hardware-wrapped
+ * @key: the encryption key to use
+ * @max_dun: the maximum DUN that may be used (computed from other params)
+ */
+struct inlinecrypt_ctx {
+	struct dm_dev *dev;
+	sector_t start;
+	const char *cipher_string;
+	unsigned int key_size;
+	u64 iv_offset;
+	unsigned int sector_size;
+	unsigned int sector_bits;
+	enum blk_crypto_key_type key_type;
+	struct blk_crypto_key key;
+	u64 max_dun;
+};
+
+static const struct dm_inlinecrypt_cipher *
+lookup_cipher(const char *cipher_string)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dm_inlinecrypt_ciphers); i++) {
+		if (strcmp(cipher_string, dm_inlinecrypt_ciphers[i].name) == 0)
+			return &dm_inlinecrypt_ciphers[i];
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void inlinecrypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
+{
+	struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+
+	if (ctx->dev) {
+		if (ctx->key.size)
+			blk_crypto_evict_key(ctx->dev->bdev, &ctx->key);
+		dm_put_device(ti, ctx->dev);
+	}
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx->cipher_string);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+static bool contains_whitespace(const char *str)
+{
+	while (*str)
+		if (isspace(*str++))
+			return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int set_key_user(struct key *key, char *key_bytes,
+			const unsigned int key_bytes_size)
+{
+	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+
+	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+	if (!ukp)
+		return -EKEYREVOKED;
+
+	if (key_bytes_size != ukp->datalen)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(key_bytes, ukp->data, key_bytes_size);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int inlinecrypt_get_keyring_key(const char *key_string, u8 *key_bytes,
+					const unsigned int key_bytes_size)
+{
+	char *key_desc;
+	int ret;
+	struct key_type *type;
+	struct key *key;
+	int (*set_key)(struct key *key, char *key_bytes,
+				   const unsigned int key_bytes_size);
+
+	/*
+	 * Reject key_string with whitespace. dm core currently lacks code for
+	 * proper whitespace escaping in arguments on DM_TABLE_STATUS path.
+	 */
+	if (contains_whitespace(key_string)) {
+		DMERR("whitespace chars not allowed in key string");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* look for next ':' separating key_type from key_description */
+	key_desc = strchr(key_string, ':');
+	if (!key_desc || key_desc == key_string || !strlen(key_desc + 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strncmp(key_string, "logon:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
+		type = &key_type_logon;
+		set_key = set_key_user;
+	} else {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	key = request_key(type, key_desc + 1, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+	down_read(&key->sem);
+
+	ret = set_key(key, (char *)key_bytes, key_bytes_size);
+
+	up_read(&key->sem);
+	key_put(key);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int get_key_size(char **key_string)
+{
+	char *colon, dummy;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (*key_string[0] != ':') {
+		ret = strlen(*key_string);
+
+		if (ret > 2 * BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_ANY_KEY_SIZE
+			|| ret  % 2
+			|| !ret) {
+			DMERR("Invalid keysize");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		return ret >> 1;
+	}
+
+	/* look for next ':' in key string */
+	colon = strpbrk(*key_string + 1, ":");
+	if (!colon)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (sscanf(*key_string + 1, "%u%c", &ret, &dummy) != 2 || dummy != ':')
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* remaining key string should be :<logon|user>:<key_desc> */
+	*key_string = colon;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int inlinecrypt_get_keyring_key(const char *key_string, u8 *key_bytes,
+					const unsigned int key_bytes_size)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int get_key_size(char **key_string)
+{
+	int key_hex_size = strlen(*key_string);
+
+	if (*key_string[0] == ':')
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (key_hex_size > 2 * BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_ANY_KEY_SIZE
+		|| key_hex_size  % 2
+		|| !key_hex_size) {
+		DMERR("Invalid keysize");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return key_hex_size >> 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+static int inlinecrypt_get_key(const char *key_string,
+				u8 key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_ANY_KEY_SIZE],
+				const unsigned int key_size)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (key_size > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_ANY_KEY_SIZE) {
+		DMERR("Invalid keysize");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* ':' means the key is in kernel keyring, short-circuit normal key processing */
+	if (key_string[0] == ':') {
+		/* key string should be :<logon|user>:<key_desc> */
+		ret = inlinecrypt_get_keyring_key(key_string + 1, key, key_size);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (hex2bin(key, key_string, key_size) != 0)
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int inlinecrypt_ctr_optional(struct dm_target *ti,
+				    unsigned int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+	struct dm_arg_set as;
+	static const struct dm_arg _args[] = {
+		{0, 4, "Invalid number of feature args"},
+	};
+	unsigned int opt_params;
+	const char *opt_string;
+	bool iv_large_sectors = false;
+	char dummy;
+	int err;
+
+	as.argc = argc;
+	as.argv = argv;
+
+	err = dm_read_arg_group(_args, &as, &opt_params, &ti->error);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	while (opt_params--) {
+		opt_string = dm_shift_arg(&as);
+		if (!opt_string) {
+			ti->error = "Not enough feature arguments";
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (str_has_prefix(opt_string, "keytype:")) {
+			const char *val = opt_string + strlen("keytype:");
+
+			if (!*val) {
+				ti->error = "Invalid block key type";
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+
+			if (!strcmp(val, "raw")) {
+				ctx->key_type = BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
+			} else if (!strcmp(val, "hw-wrapped")) {
+				ctx->key_type = BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_HW_WRAPPED;
+			} else {
+				ti->error = "Invalid block key type";
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		} else if (!strcmp(opt_string, "allow_discards")) {
+			ti->num_discard_bios = 1;
+		} else if (sscanf(opt_string, "sector_size:%u%c",
+				  &ctx->sector_size, &dummy) == 1) {
+			if (ctx->sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE ||
+			    ctx->sector_size > 4096 ||
+			    !is_power_of_2(ctx->sector_size)) {
+				ti->error = "Invalid sector_size";
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		} else if (!strcmp(opt_string, "iv_large_sectors")) {
+			iv_large_sectors = true;
+		} else {
+			ti->error = "Invalid feature arguments";
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* dm-inlinecrypt doesn't implement iv_large_sectors=false. */
+	if (ctx->sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE && !iv_large_sectors) {
+		ti->error = "iv_large_sectors must be specified";
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an inlinecrypt mapping:
+ * <cipher> [<key>|:<key_size>:<logon>:<key_description>] <iv_offset> <dev_path> <start>
+ *
+ * This syntax matches dm-crypt's, but the set of supported functionality has
+ * been stripped down.
+ */
+static int inlinecrypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx;
+	const struct dm_inlinecrypt_cipher *cipher;
+	u8 key_bytes[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_ANY_KEY_SIZE];
+	unsigned int dun_bytes;
+	unsigned long long tmpll;
+	char dummy;
+	int err;
+
+	if (argc < 5) {
+		ti->error = "Not enough arguments";
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx) {
+		ti->error = "Out of memory";
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	ti->private = ctx;
+
+	/* <cipher> */
+	ctx->cipher_string = kstrdup(argv[0], GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->cipher_string) {
+		ti->error = "Out of memory";
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	cipher = lookup_cipher(ctx->cipher_string);
+	if (!cipher) {
+		ti->error = "Unsupported cipher";
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* <key> */
+	err = get_key_size(&argv[1]);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		ti->error = "Cannot parse key size";
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	ctx->key_size = err;
+
+	err = inlinecrypt_get_key(argv[1], key_bytes, ctx->key_size);
+	if (err) {
+		ti->error = "Malformed key string";
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* <iv_offset> */
+	if (sscanf(argv[2], "%llu%c", &ctx->iv_offset, &dummy) != 1) {
+		ti->error = "Invalid iv_offset sector";
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* <dev_path> */
+	err = dm_get_device(ti, argv[3], dm_table_get_mode(ti->table),
+			    &ctx->dev);
+	if (err) {
+		ti->error = "Device lookup failed";
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* <start> */
+	if (sscanf(argv[4], "%llu%c", &tmpll, &dummy) != 1 ||
+	    tmpll != (sector_t)tmpll) {
+		ti->error = "Invalid start sector";
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	ctx->start = tmpll;
+
+	/* optional arguments */
+	ctx->sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+	ctx->key_type = BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
+	if (argc > 5) {
+		err = inlinecrypt_ctr_optional(ti, argc - 5, &argv[5]);
+		if (err)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+	ctx->sector_bits = ilog2(ctx->sector_size);
+	if (ti->len & ((ctx->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1)) {
+		ti->error = "Device size is not a multiple of sector_size";
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	if (ctx->iv_offset & ((ctx->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1)) {
+		ti->error = "Wrong alignment of iv_offset sector";
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	ctx->max_dun = (ctx->iv_offset + ti->len - 1) >>
+		       (ctx->sector_bits - SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	dun_bytes = DIV_ROUND_UP(fls64(ctx->max_dun), 8);
+
+	err = blk_crypto_init_key(&ctx->key, key_bytes, ctx->key_size,
+				  ctx->key_type, cipher->mode_num,
+				  dun_bytes, ctx->sector_size,
+				  BLK_CRYPTO_CFG_ALLOW_HW);
+	if (err) {
+		ti->error = "Error initializing blk-crypto key";
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	err = blk_crypto_start_using_key(ctx->dev->bdev, &ctx->key);
+	if (err) {
+		ti->error = "Error starting to use blk-crypto";
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	ti->num_flush_bios = 1;
+
+	err = 0;
+	goto out;
+
+bad:
+	inlinecrypt_dtr(ti);
+out:
+	memzero_explicit(key_bytes, sizeof(key_bytes));
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int inlinecrypt_map(struct dm_target *ti, struct bio *bio)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+	sector_t sector_in_target;
+	u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE] = {};
+
+	bio_set_dev(bio, ctx->dev->bdev);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the bio is a device-level request which doesn't target a specific
+	 * sector, there's nothing more to do.
+	 */
+	if (bio_sectors(bio) == 0)
+		return DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED;
+
+	/*
+	 * The bio should never have an encryption context already, since
+	 * dm-inlinecrypt doesn't pass through any inline encryption
+	 * capabilities to the layer above it.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_has_crypt_ctx(bio)))
+		return DM_MAPIO_KILL;
+
+	/* Map the bio's sector to the underlying device. (512-byte sectors) */
+	sector_in_target = dm_target_offset(ti, bio->bi_iter.bi_sector);
+	bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = ctx->start + sector_in_target;
+	/*
+	 * If the bio doesn't have any data (e.g. if it's a DISCARD request),
+	 * there's nothing more to do.
+	 */
+	if (!bio_has_data(bio))
+		return DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED;
+
+	/* Calculate the DUN and enforce data-unit (crypto sector) alignment. */
+	dun[0] = ctx->iv_offset + sector_in_target; /* 512-byte sectors */
+	if (dun[0] & ((ctx->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1))
+		return DM_MAPIO_KILL;
+	dun[0] >>= ctx->sector_bits - SECTOR_SHIFT; /* crypto sectors */
+
+	/*
+	 * This check isn't necessary as we should have calculated max_dun
+	 * correctly, but be safe.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dun[0] > ctx->max_dun))
+		return DM_MAPIO_KILL;
+
+	bio_crypt_set_ctx(bio, &ctx->key, dun, GFP_NOIO);
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we've added an encryption context to the bio and
+	 * blk-crypto-fallback may be needed to process it, it's necessary to
+	 * use the fallback-aware bio submission code rather than
+	 * unconditionally returning DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED.
+	 *
+	 * To get the correct accounting for a dm target in the case where
+	 * __blk_crypto_submit_bio() doesn't take ownership of the bio (returns
+	 * true), call __blk_crypto_submit_bio() directly and return
+	 * DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED in that case, rather than relying on
+	 * blk_crypto_submit_bio() which calls submit_bio() in that case.
+	 *
+	 * TODO: blk-crypto fallback write slow-path currently double-accounts
+	 * IO in vmstat, as encrypted bios are submitted via submit_bio().
+	 * This does not affect data correctness. Consider fixing this if
+	 * a cleaner accounting model for derived bios is introduced.
+	 */
+	if (__blk_crypto_submit_bio(bio))
+		return DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED;
+	return DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED;
+}
+
+static void inlinecrypt_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
+			       unsigned int status_flags, char *result,
+			       unsigned int maxlen)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+	unsigned int sz = 0;
+	int num_feature_args = 0;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case STATUSTYPE_INFO:
+	case STATUSTYPE_IMA:
+		result[0] = '\0';
+		break;
+
+	case STATUSTYPE_TABLE:
+		/*
+		 * Warning: like dm-crypt, dm-inlinecrypt includes the key in
+		 * the returned table.  Userspace is responsible for redacting
+		 * the key when needed.
+		 */
+		DMEMIT("%s %*phN %u %llu %s %llu", ctx->cipher_string,
+		       ctx->key.size, ctx->key.bytes,
+		       ctx->key_type, ctx->iv_offset,
+		       ctx->dev->name, ctx->start);
+		num_feature_args += !!ti->num_discard_bios;
+		if (ctx->sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE)
+			num_feature_args += 2;
+		if (num_feature_args != 0) {
+			DMEMIT(" %d", num_feature_args);
+			if (ti->num_discard_bios)
+				DMEMIT(" allow_discards");
+			if (ctx->sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE) {
+				DMEMIT(" sector_size:%u", ctx->sector_size);
+				DMEMIT(" iv_large_sectors");
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static int inlinecrypt_prepare_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti,
+				     struct block_device **bdev, unsigned int cmd,
+				     unsigned long arg, bool *forward)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+	const struct dm_dev *dev = ctx->dev;
+
+	*bdev = dev->bdev;
+
+	/* Only pass ioctls through if the device sizes match exactly. */
+	return ctx->start != 0 || ti->len != bdev_nr_sectors(dev->bdev);
+}
+
+static int inlinecrypt_iterate_devices(struct dm_target *ti,
+				       iterate_devices_callout_fn fn,
+				       void *data)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+
+	return fn(ti, ctx->dev, ctx->start, ti->len, data);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
+static int inlinecrypt_report_zones(struct dm_target *ti,
+				    struct dm_report_zones_args *args,
+				    unsigned int nr_zones)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+
+	return dm_report_zones(ctx->dev->bdev, ctx->start,
+			ctx->start + dm_target_offset(ti, args->next_sector),
+			args, nr_zones);
+}
+#else
+#define inlinecrypt_report_zones NULL
+#endif
+
+static void inlinecrypt_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti,
+				 struct queue_limits *limits)
+{
+	const struct inlinecrypt_ctx *ctx = ti->private;
+	const unsigned int sector_size = ctx->sector_size;
+
+	limits->logical_block_size =
+		max_t(unsigned int, limits->logical_block_size, sector_size);
+	limits->physical_block_size =
+		max_t(unsigned int, limits->physical_block_size, sector_size);
+	limits->io_min = max_t(unsigned int, limits->io_min, sector_size);
+	limits->dma_alignment = limits->logical_block_size - 1;
+}
+
+static struct target_type inlinecrypt_target = {
+	.name			= "inlinecrypt",
+	.version		= {1, 0, 0},
+	/*
+	 * Do not set DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO, since dm-inlinecrypt consumes the
+	 * crypto capability itself.
+	 */
+	.features		= DM_TARGET_ZONED_HM,
+	.module			= THIS_MODULE,
+	.ctr			= inlinecrypt_ctr,
+	.dtr			= inlinecrypt_dtr,
+	.map			= inlinecrypt_map,
+	.status			= inlinecrypt_status,
+	.prepare_ioctl		= inlinecrypt_prepare_ioctl,
+	.iterate_devices	= inlinecrypt_iterate_devices,
+	.report_zones		= inlinecrypt_report_zones,
+	.io_hints		= inlinecrypt_io_hints,
+};
+
+module_dm(inlinecrypt);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Linlin Zhang <linlin.zhang@oss.qualcomm.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION(DM_NAME " target for inline encryption");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");