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| author | Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> | 2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200 |
| commit | a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch) | |
| tree | 73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /drivers/md/dm-audit.h | |
| download | linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.zip | |
x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.
The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:
<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi
Which triggers this crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230
Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.
The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.
During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.
Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.
[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]
Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md/dm-audit.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/dm-audit.h | 66 |
1 files changed, 66 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-audit.h b/drivers/md/dm-audit.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2385f2b65 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/md/dm-audit.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Creating audit records for mapped devices. + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 Fraunhofer AISEC. All rights reserved. + * + * Authors: Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de> + */ + +#ifndef DM_AUDIT_H +#define DM_AUDIT_H + +#include <linux/device-mapper.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_DM_AUDIT +void dm_audit_log_bio(const char *dm_msg_prefix, const char *op, + struct bio *bio, sector_t sector, int result); + +/* + * dm_audit_log_ti() is not intended to be used directly in dm modules, + * the wrapper functions below should be called by dm modules instead. + */ +void dm_audit_log_ti(int audit_type, const char *dm_msg_prefix, const char *op, + struct dm_target *ti, int result); + +static inline void dm_audit_log_ctr(const char *dm_msg_prefix, + struct dm_target *ti, int result) +{ + dm_audit_log_ti(AUDIT_DM_CTRL, dm_msg_prefix, "ctr", ti, result); +} + +static inline void dm_audit_log_dtr(const char *dm_msg_prefix, + struct dm_target *ti, int result) +{ + dm_audit_log_ti(AUDIT_DM_CTRL, dm_msg_prefix, "dtr", ti, result); +} + +static inline void dm_audit_log_target(const char *dm_msg_prefix, const char *op, + struct dm_target *ti, int result) +{ + dm_audit_log_ti(AUDIT_DM_EVENT, dm_msg_prefix, op, ti, result); +} +#else +static inline void dm_audit_log_bio(const char *dm_msg_prefix, const char *op, + struct bio *bio, sector_t sector, + int result) +{ +} +static inline void dm_audit_log_target(const char *dm_msg_prefix, + const char *op, struct dm_target *ti, + int result) +{ +} +static inline void dm_audit_log_ctr(const char *dm_msg_prefix, + struct dm_target *ti, int result) +{ +} + +static inline void dm_audit_log_dtr(const char *dm_msg_prefix, + struct dm_target *ti, int result) +{ +} +#endif + +#endif |
