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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/md/bcache/stats.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md/bcache/stats.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/bcache/stats.h | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/stats.h b/drivers/md/bcache/stats.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..21b445f8a --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/stats.h @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _BCACHE_STATS_H_ +#define _BCACHE_STATS_H_ + +struct cache_stat_collector { + atomic_t cache_hits; + atomic_t cache_misses; + atomic_t cache_bypass_hits; + atomic_t cache_bypass_misses; + atomic_t cache_miss_collisions; + atomic_t sectors_bypassed; +}; + +struct cache_stats { + struct kobject kobj; + + unsigned long cache_hits; + unsigned long cache_misses; + unsigned long cache_bypass_hits; + unsigned long cache_bypass_misses; + unsigned long cache_miss_collisions; + unsigned long sectors_bypassed; + + unsigned int rescale; +}; + +struct cache_accounting { + struct closure cl; + struct timer_list timer; + atomic_t closing; + + struct cache_stat_collector collector; + + struct cache_stats total; + struct cache_stats five_minute; + struct cache_stats hour; + struct cache_stats day; +}; + +struct cache_set; +struct cached_dev; +struct bcache_device; + +void bch_cache_accounting_init(struct cache_accounting *acc, + struct closure *parent); + +int bch_cache_accounting_add_kobjs(struct cache_accounting *acc, + struct kobject *parent); + +void bch_cache_accounting_clear(struct cache_accounting *acc); + +void bch_cache_accounting_destroy(struct cache_accounting *acc); + +void bch_mark_cache_accounting(struct cache_set *c, struct bcache_device *d, + bool hit, bool bypass); +void bch_mark_cache_miss_collision(struct cache_set *c, + struct bcache_device *d); +void bch_mark_sectors_bypassed(struct cache_set *c, + struct cached_dev *dc, + int sectors); + +#endif /* _BCACHE_STATS_H_ */ |
