diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/md/bcache/features.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md/bcache/features.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/bcache/features.c | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/features.c b/drivers/md/bcache/features.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..634922c56 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/features.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Feature set bits and string conversion. + * Inspired by ext4's features compat/incompat/ro_compat related code. + * + * Copyright 2020 Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> + * + */ +#include "bcache_ondisk.h" +#include "bcache.h" +#include "features.h" + +struct feature { + int compat; + unsigned int mask; + const char *string; +}; + +static struct feature feature_list[] = { + {BCH_FEATURE_INCOMPAT, BCH_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_LOG_LARGE_BUCKET_SIZE, + "large_bucket"}, + {0, 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define compose_feature_string(type) \ +({ \ + struct feature *f; \ + bool first = true; \ + \ + for (f = &feature_list[0]; f->compat != 0; f++) { \ + if (f->compat != BCH_FEATURE_ ## type) \ + continue; \ + if (BCH_HAS_ ## type ## _FEATURE(&c->cache->sb, f->mask)) { \ + if (first) { \ + out += snprintf(out, buf + size - out, \ + "["); \ + } else { \ + out += snprintf(out, buf + size - out, \ + " ["); \ + } \ + } else if (!first) { \ + out += snprintf(out, buf + size - out, " "); \ + } \ + \ + out += snprintf(out, buf + size - out, "%s", f->string);\ + \ + if (BCH_HAS_ ## type ## _FEATURE(&c->cache->sb, f->mask)) \ + out += snprintf(out, buf + size - out, "]"); \ + \ + first = false; \ + } \ + if (!first) \ + out += snprintf(out, buf + size - out, "\n"); \ +}) + +int bch_print_cache_set_feature_compat(struct cache_set *c, char *buf, int size) +{ + char *out = buf; + compose_feature_string(COMPAT); + return out - buf; +} + +int bch_print_cache_set_feature_ro_compat(struct cache_set *c, char *buf, int size) +{ + char *out = buf; + compose_feature_string(RO_COMPAT); + return out - buf; +} + +int bch_print_cache_set_feature_incompat(struct cache_set *c, char *buf, int size) +{ + char *out = buf; + compose_feature_string(INCOMPAT); + return out - buf; +} |
