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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/hid/hid-evision.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/hid/hid-evision.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/hid/hid-evision.c | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-evision.c b/drivers/hid/hid-evision.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3e7f43ab8 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-evision.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * HID driver for EVision devices + * For now, only ignore bogus consumer reports + * sent after the keyboard has been configured + * + * Copyright (c) 2022 Philippe Valembois + */ + +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/input.h> +#include <linux/hid.h> +#include <linux/module.h> + +#include "hid-ids.h" + +static int evision_input_mapping(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_input *hi, + struct hid_field *field, struct hid_usage *usage, + unsigned long **bit, int *max) +{ + /* mapping only applies to USB_DEVICE_ID_EVISION_ICL01 */ + if (hdev->product != USB_DEVICE_ID_EVISION_ICL01) + return 0; + + if ((usage->hid & HID_USAGE_PAGE) != HID_UP_CONSUMER) + return 0; + + /* Ignore key down event */ + if ((usage->hid & HID_USAGE) >> 8 == 0x05) + return -1; + /* Ignore key up event */ + if ((usage->hid & HID_USAGE) >> 8 == 0x06) + return -1; + + switch (usage->hid & HID_USAGE) { + /* Ignore configuration saved event */ + case 0x0401: return -1; + /* Ignore reset event */ + case 0x0402: return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +#define REP_DSC_SIZE 236 +#define USAGE_MAX_INDEX 59 + +static const __u8 *evision_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc, + unsigned int *rsize) +{ + if (hdev->product == USB_DEVICE_ID_EV_TELINK_RECEIVER && + *rsize == REP_DSC_SIZE && rdesc[USAGE_MAX_INDEX] == 0x29 && + rdesc[USAGE_MAX_INDEX + 1] == 3) { + hid_info(hdev, "fixing EVision:TeLink Receiver report descriptor\n"); + rdesc[USAGE_MAX_INDEX + 1] = 5; // change usage max from 3 to 5 + } + return rdesc; +} + +static const struct hid_device_id evision_devices[] = { + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_EVISION, USB_DEVICE_ID_EVISION_ICL01) }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_EVISION, USB_DEVICE_ID_EV_TELINK_RECEIVER) }, + { } +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hid, evision_devices); + +static struct hid_driver evision_driver = { + .name = "evision", + .id_table = evision_devices, + .input_mapping = evision_input_mapping, + .report_fixup = evision_report_fixup, +}; +module_hid_driver(evision_driver); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HID driver for EVision devices"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); |
