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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/hid/hid-evision.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/hid/hid-evision.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/hid/hid-evision.c75
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-evision.c b/drivers/hid/hid-evision.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3e7f43ab8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-evision.c
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * HID driver for EVision devices
+ * For now, only ignore bogus consumer reports
+ * sent after the keyboard has been configured
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 Philippe Valembois
+ */
+
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/input.h>
+#include <linux/hid.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include "hid-ids.h"
+
+static int evision_input_mapping(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_input *hi,
+ struct hid_field *field, struct hid_usage *usage,
+ unsigned long **bit, int *max)
+{
+ /* mapping only applies to USB_DEVICE_ID_EVISION_ICL01 */
+ if (hdev->product != USB_DEVICE_ID_EVISION_ICL01)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((usage->hid & HID_USAGE_PAGE) != HID_UP_CONSUMER)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Ignore key down event */
+ if ((usage->hid & HID_USAGE) >> 8 == 0x05)
+ return -1;
+ /* Ignore key up event */
+ if ((usage->hid & HID_USAGE) >> 8 == 0x06)
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (usage->hid & HID_USAGE) {
+ /* Ignore configuration saved event */
+ case 0x0401: return -1;
+ /* Ignore reset event */
+ case 0x0402: return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define REP_DSC_SIZE 236
+#define USAGE_MAX_INDEX 59
+
+static const __u8 *evision_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
+ unsigned int *rsize)
+{
+ if (hdev->product == USB_DEVICE_ID_EV_TELINK_RECEIVER &&
+ *rsize == REP_DSC_SIZE && rdesc[USAGE_MAX_INDEX] == 0x29 &&
+ rdesc[USAGE_MAX_INDEX + 1] == 3) {
+ hid_info(hdev, "fixing EVision:TeLink Receiver report descriptor\n");
+ rdesc[USAGE_MAX_INDEX + 1] = 5; // change usage max from 3 to 5
+ }
+ return rdesc;
+}
+
+static const struct hid_device_id evision_devices[] = {
+ { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_EVISION, USB_DEVICE_ID_EVISION_ICL01) },
+ { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_EVISION, USB_DEVICE_ID_EV_TELINK_RECEIVER) },
+ { }
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hid, evision_devices);
+
+static struct hid_driver evision_driver = {
+ .name = "evision",
+ .id_table = evision_devices,
+ .input_mapping = evision_input_mapping,
+ .report_fixup = evision_report_fixup,
+};
+module_hid_driver(evision_driver);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HID driver for EVision devices");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");