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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/firmware/imx/rm.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/firmware/imx/rm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/firmware/imx/rm.c | 90 |
1 files changed, 90 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/rm.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/rm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d492b99e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/rm.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Copyright 2020 NXP + * + * File containing client-side RPC functions for the RM service. These + * function are ported to clients that communicate to the SC. + */ + +#include <linux/firmware/imx/svc/rm.h> + +struct imx_sc_msg_rm_rsrc_owned { + struct imx_sc_rpc_msg hdr; + u16 resource; +} __packed __aligned(4); + +/* + * This function check @resource is owned by current partition or not + * + * @param[in] ipc IPC handle + * @param[in] resource resource the control is associated with + * + * @return Returns 0 for not owned and 1 for owned. + */ +bool imx_sc_rm_is_resource_owned(struct imx_sc_ipc *ipc, u16 resource) +{ + struct imx_sc_msg_rm_rsrc_owned msg; + struct imx_sc_rpc_msg *hdr = &msg.hdr; + + hdr->ver = IMX_SC_RPC_VERSION; + hdr->svc = IMX_SC_RPC_SVC_RM; + hdr->func = IMX_SC_RM_FUNC_IS_RESOURCE_OWNED; + hdr->size = 2; + + msg.resource = resource; + + /* + * SCU firmware only returns value 0 or 1 + * for resource owned check which means not owned or owned. + * So it is always successful. + */ + imx_scu_call_rpc(ipc, &msg, true); + + return hdr->func; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(imx_sc_rm_is_resource_owned); + +struct imx_sc_msg_rm_get_resource_owner { + struct imx_sc_rpc_msg hdr; + union { + struct { + u16 resource; + } req; + struct { + u8 val; + } resp; + } data; +} __packed __aligned(4); + +/* + * This function get @resource partition number + * + * @param[in] ipc IPC handle + * @param[in] resource resource the control is associated with + * @param[out] pt pointer to return the partition number + * + * @return Returns 0 for success and < 0 for errors. + */ +int imx_sc_rm_get_resource_owner(struct imx_sc_ipc *ipc, u16 resource, u8 *pt) +{ + struct imx_sc_msg_rm_get_resource_owner msg; + struct imx_sc_rpc_msg *hdr = &msg.hdr; + int ret; + + hdr->ver = IMX_SC_RPC_VERSION; + hdr->svc = IMX_SC_RPC_SVC_RM; + hdr->func = IMX_SC_RM_FUNC_GET_RESOURCE_OWNER; + hdr->size = 2; + + msg.data.req.resource = resource; + + ret = imx_scu_call_rpc(ipc, &msg, true); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (pt) + *pt = msg.data.resp.val; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(imx_sc_rm_get_resource_owner); |
