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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/dma/idxd/debugfs.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/dma/idxd/debugfs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/dma/idxd/debugfs.c | 138 |
1 files changed, 138 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/dma/idxd/debugfs.c b/drivers/dma/idxd/debugfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ad4245cb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/dma/idxd/debugfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2021 Intel Corporation. All rights rsvd. */ +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/pci.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> +#include <linux/io-64-nonatomic-lo-hi.h> +#include <uapi/linux/idxd.h> +#include "idxd.h" +#include "registers.h" + +static struct dentry *idxd_debugfs_dir; + +static void dump_event_entry(struct idxd_device *idxd, struct seq_file *s, + u16 index, int *count, bool processed) +{ + struct idxd_evl *evl = idxd->evl; + struct dsa_evl_entry *entry; + struct dsa_completion_record *cr; + u64 *raw; + int i; + int evl_strides = evl_ent_size(idxd) / sizeof(u64); + + entry = (struct dsa_evl_entry *)evl->log + index; + + if (!entry->e.desc_valid) + return; + + seq_printf(s, "Event Log entry %d (real index %u) processed: %u\n", + *count, index, processed); + + seq_printf(s, "desc valid %u wq idx valid %u\n" + "batch %u fault rw %u priv %u error 0x%x\n" + "wq idx %u op %#x pasid %u batch idx %u\n" + "fault addr %#llx\n", + entry->e.desc_valid, entry->e.wq_idx_valid, + entry->e.batch, entry->e.fault_rw, entry->e.priv, + entry->e.error, entry->e.wq_idx, entry->e.operation, + entry->e.pasid, entry->e.batch_idx, entry->e.fault_addr); + + cr = &entry->cr; + seq_printf(s, "status %#x result %#x fault_info %#x bytes_completed %u\n" + "fault addr %#llx inv flags %#x\n\n", + cr->status, cr->result, cr->fault_info, cr->bytes_completed, + cr->fault_addr, cr->invalid_flags); + + raw = (u64 *)entry; + + for (i = 0; i < evl_strides; i++) + seq_printf(s, "entry[%d] = %#llx\n", i, raw[i]); + + seq_puts(s, "\n"); + *count += 1; +} + +static int debugfs_evl_show(struct seq_file *s, void *d) +{ + struct idxd_device *idxd = s->private; + struct idxd_evl *evl = idxd->evl; + union evl_status_reg evl_status; + u16 h, t, evl_size, i; + int count = 0; + bool processed = true; + + if (!evl || !evl->log) + return 0; + + mutex_lock(&evl->lock); + + evl_status.bits = ioread64(idxd->reg_base + IDXD_EVLSTATUS_OFFSET); + t = evl_status.tail; + h = evl_status.head; + evl_size = evl->size; + + seq_printf(s, "Event Log head %u tail %u interrupt pending %u\n\n", + evl_status.head, evl_status.tail, evl_status.int_pending); + + i = t; + while (1) { + i = (i + 1) % evl_size; + if (i == t) + break; + + if (processed && i == h) + processed = false; + dump_event_entry(idxd, s, i, &count, processed); + } + + mutex_unlock(&evl->lock); + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(debugfs_evl); + +int idxd_device_init_debugfs(struct idxd_device *idxd) +{ + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(idxd_debugfs_dir)) + return 0; + + idxd->dbgfs_dir = debugfs_create_dir(dev_name(idxd_confdev(idxd)), idxd_debugfs_dir); + if (IS_ERR(idxd->dbgfs_dir)) + return PTR_ERR(idxd->dbgfs_dir); + + if (idxd->evl) { + idxd->dbgfs_evl_file = debugfs_create_file("event_log", 0400, + idxd->dbgfs_dir, idxd, + &debugfs_evl_fops); + if (IS_ERR(idxd->dbgfs_evl_file)) { + debugfs_remove_recursive(idxd->dbgfs_dir); + idxd->dbgfs_dir = NULL; + return PTR_ERR(idxd->dbgfs_evl_file); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +void idxd_device_remove_debugfs(struct idxd_device *idxd) +{ + debugfs_remove_recursive(idxd->dbgfs_dir); +} + +int idxd_init_debugfs(void) +{ + if (!debugfs_initialized()) + return 0; + + idxd_debugfs_dir = debugfs_create_dir(KBUILD_MODNAME, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(idxd_debugfs_dir)) + return PTR_ERR(idxd_debugfs_dir); + return 0; +} + +void idxd_remove_debugfs(void) +{ + debugfs_remove_recursive(idxd_debugfs_dir); +} |
