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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/dca/dca-sysfs.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/dca/dca-sysfs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/dca/dca-sysfs.c | 94 |
1 files changed, 94 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/dca/dca-sysfs.c b/drivers/dca/dca-sysfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b915c2b46 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/dca/dca-sysfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Copyright(c) 2007 - 2009 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/idr.h> +#include <linux/kdev_t.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/dca.h> +#include <linux/gfp.h> +#include <linux/export.h> + +static const struct class dca_class = { + .name = "dca", +}; +static struct idr dca_idr; +static spinlock_t dca_idr_lock; + +int dca_sysfs_add_req(struct dca_provider *dca, struct device *dev, int slot) +{ + struct device *cd; + static int req_count; + + cd = device_create(&dca_class, dca->cd, MKDEV(0, slot + 1), NULL, + "requester%d", req_count++); + return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cd); +} + +void dca_sysfs_remove_req(struct dca_provider *dca, int slot) +{ + device_destroy(&dca_class, MKDEV(0, slot + 1)); +} + +int dca_sysfs_add_provider(struct dca_provider *dca, struct device *dev) +{ + struct device *cd; + int ret; + + idr_preload(GFP_KERNEL); + spin_lock(&dca_idr_lock); + + ret = idr_alloc(&dca_idr, dca, 0, 0, GFP_NOWAIT); + if (ret >= 0) + dca->id = ret; + + spin_unlock(&dca_idr_lock); + idr_preload_end(); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + cd = device_create(&dca_class, dev, MKDEV(0, 0), NULL, "dca%d", dca->id); + if (IS_ERR(cd)) { + spin_lock(&dca_idr_lock); + idr_remove(&dca_idr, dca->id); + spin_unlock(&dca_idr_lock); + return PTR_ERR(cd); + } + dca->cd = cd; + return 0; +} + +void dca_sysfs_remove_provider(struct dca_provider *dca) +{ + device_unregister(dca->cd); + dca->cd = NULL; + spin_lock(&dca_idr_lock); + idr_remove(&dca_idr, dca->id); + spin_unlock(&dca_idr_lock); +} + +int __init dca_sysfs_init(void) +{ + int err; + + idr_init(&dca_idr); + spin_lock_init(&dca_idr_lock); + + err = class_register(&dca_class); + if (err) { + idr_destroy(&dca_idr); + return err; + } + return 0; +} + +void __exit dca_sysfs_exit(void) +{ + class_unregister(&dca_class); + idr_destroy(&dca_idr); +} + |
