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| author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2026-10-01 14:52:55 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> | 2026-10-01 18:39:27 +0200 |
| commit | 33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4 (patch) | |
| tree | 543be8029ab3d8a3a63994ae23385a053ed30029 /drivers/cxl/security.c | |
| download | linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.tar.gz linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.zip | |
selftests/bpf: Test packet range of pointers sharing an idgrafted
Add tests where two packet pointers share an id and tightening one
pointer's umax from its var_off would put it less than their constant
distance from the other's umax: with an index & 0x38 capped at 50, the
base pointer keeps umax 50, so the pointer 8 bytes further on must keep
umax 58, even though its known bits allow at most 56.
These refused a valid program or accepted an out-of-bounds access before
the fix:
- check the advanced copy, load through the base: valid, was refused;
- check the base, load the byte at base + 1 through a copy advanced by
8: was accepted;
- check base + 4, load 4 bytes at base + 2 through base + 8: reads two
bytes past the checked range, was accepted;
- the same as the second with data_meta pointers checked against data:
was accepted.
These pass with and without the fix and cover nearby paths:
- subtract an unknown scalar from a checked pointer and load below it
(the range is kept across a new id);
- reach a load through two paths whose checks cover 8 and 7 bytes after
the loaded pointer; the second path must not be pruned by the first;
- spill a copy of a pointer, check the pointer, fill the copy and load
one byte past the checked range: the load is refused, and the copy
has the range of the check.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20261001145255.855630-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/cxl/security.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/cxl/security.c | 206 |
1 files changed, 206 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/security.c b/drivers/cxl/security.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ab793e857 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/cxl/security.c @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* Copyright(c) 2022 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */ +#include <linux/libnvdimm.h> +#include <linux/unaligned.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/async.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/memregion.h> +#include "cxlmem.h" +#include "cxl.h" + +static unsigned long cxl_pmem_get_security_flags(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, + enum nvdimm_passphrase_type ptype) +{ + struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm); + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd; + struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox = &cxlmd->cxlds->cxl_mbox; + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds = to_cxl_memdev_state(cxlmd->cxlds); + unsigned long security_flags = 0; + struct cxl_get_security_output { + __le32 flags; + } out; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + u32 sec_out; + int rc; + + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE, + .size_out = sizeof(out), + .payload_out = &out, + }; + + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxl_mbox, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc < 0) + return 0; + + sec_out = le32_to_cpu(out.flags); + /* cache security state */ + mds->security.state = sec_out; + + if (ptype == NVDIMM_MASTER) { + if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PASS_SET) + set_bit(NVDIMM_SECURITY_UNLOCKED, &security_flags); + else + set_bit(NVDIMM_SECURITY_DISABLED, &security_flags); + if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PLIMIT) + set_bit(NVDIMM_SECURITY_FROZEN, &security_flags); + return security_flags; + } + + if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) { + if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_FROZEN || + sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PLIMIT) + set_bit(NVDIMM_SECURITY_FROZEN, &security_flags); + + if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED) + set_bit(NVDIMM_SECURITY_LOCKED, &security_flags); + else + set_bit(NVDIMM_SECURITY_UNLOCKED, &security_flags); + } else { + set_bit(NVDIMM_SECURITY_DISABLED, &security_flags); + } + + return security_flags; +} + +static int cxl_pmem_security_change_key(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, + const struct nvdimm_key_data *old_data, + const struct nvdimm_key_data *new_data, + enum nvdimm_passphrase_type ptype) +{ + struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm); + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd; + struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox = &cxlmd->cxlds->cxl_mbox; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + struct cxl_set_pass set_pass; + + set_pass = (struct cxl_set_pass) { + .type = ptype == NVDIMM_MASTER ? CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER : + CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER, + }; + memcpy(set_pass.old_pass, old_data->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); + memcpy(set_pass.new_pass, new_data->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); + + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE, + .size_in = sizeof(set_pass), + .payload_in = &set_pass, + }; + + return cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxl_mbox, &mbox_cmd); +} + +static int __cxl_pmem_security_disable(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, + const struct nvdimm_key_data *key_data, + enum nvdimm_passphrase_type ptype) +{ + struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm); + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd; + struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox = &cxlmd->cxlds->cxl_mbox; + struct cxl_disable_pass dis_pass; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + + dis_pass = (struct cxl_disable_pass) { + .type = ptype == NVDIMM_MASTER ? CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER : + CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER, + }; + memcpy(dis_pass.pass, key_data->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); + + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, + .size_in = sizeof(dis_pass), + .payload_in = &dis_pass, + }; + + return cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxl_mbox, &mbox_cmd); +} + +static int cxl_pmem_security_disable(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, + const struct nvdimm_key_data *key_data) +{ + return __cxl_pmem_security_disable(nvdimm, key_data, NVDIMM_USER); +} + +static int cxl_pmem_security_disable_master(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, + const struct nvdimm_key_data *key_data) +{ + return __cxl_pmem_security_disable(nvdimm, key_data, NVDIMM_MASTER); +} + +static int cxl_pmem_security_freeze(struct nvdimm *nvdimm) +{ + struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm); + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd; + struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox = &cxlmd->cxlds->cxl_mbox; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY, + }; + + return cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxl_mbox, &mbox_cmd); +} + +static int cxl_pmem_security_unlock(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, + const struct nvdimm_key_data *key_data) +{ + struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm); + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd; + struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox = &cxlmd->cxlds->cxl_mbox; + u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN]; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + int rc; + + memcpy(pass, key_data->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK, + .size_in = NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN, + .payload_in = pass, + }; + + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxl_mbox, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +static int cxl_pmem_security_passphrase_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, + const struct nvdimm_key_data *key, + enum nvdimm_passphrase_type ptype) +{ + struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm); + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd; + struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox = &cxlmd->cxlds->cxl_mbox; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + struct cxl_pass_erase erase; + int rc; + + erase = (struct cxl_pass_erase) { + .type = ptype == NVDIMM_MASTER ? CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER : + CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER, + }; + memcpy(erase.pass, key->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE, + .size_in = sizeof(erase), + .payload_in = &erase, + }; + + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxl_mbox, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +static const struct nvdimm_security_ops __cxl_security_ops = { + .get_flags = cxl_pmem_get_security_flags, + .change_key = cxl_pmem_security_change_key, + .disable = cxl_pmem_security_disable, + .freeze = cxl_pmem_security_freeze, + .unlock = cxl_pmem_security_unlock, + .erase = cxl_pmem_security_passphrase_erase, + .disable_master = cxl_pmem_security_disable_master, +}; + +const struct nvdimm_security_ops *cxl_security_ops = &__cxl_security_ops; |
