Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted

Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Don't destroy user event fields when removal fails

   User event fields are destroyed before the event is removed from
   visibility. But that can fail leaving the still visible event with no
   fields. Move the destroying of the fields to after the event is
   successfully removed from visibility.

 - Initialize function graph state is fork before calling
   copy_exec_state()

   For non-CLONE_VM forks, copy_exec_state() allocates a new
   task_exec_state. If that allocation fails, ftrace_graph_exit_task()
   will free the tasks ret_stack pointer. Since that pointer is still
   using the parent's ret_stack, it mistakenly frees the parent's
   pointer too.

   Call ftrace_graph_init() on the task first which will NULL out the
   new tasks's ret_stack and if the copy fails, it will not free
   anything.

 - Remove FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX

   The macro FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX was added but never used. Remove it.

 - Save ent_size in function graph printing of nested functions

   The function graph tracer needs to look at the next event to see if
   the next event is the return of the current function entry. If it is,
   it prints a single line:

	ktime_get();

   Otherwise it prints it like a nested function:

	tick_nohz_irq_exit() {
	    ktime_get();
	    kcpustat_irq_exit();
	}

   In order to look at the next event, it must save the current event so
   that it has the information to print from it. It saves the event in
   the iterator descriptor called "ent". What it doesn't save is the
   ent_size of the event which is now used to know if the function graph
   arguments are to be printed. The peek doesn't save the size so the
   size used happens to be that of the size of the last event that was
   seen.

   Save the entry event size in the iterator descriptor so that the
   correct size is used.

 - Fix several errors with freeing data in the histogram code

   The histogram code had a lot of leaked or or incorrect accounting
   when failures happen. Correct them.

 - Fix histogram regression of .percent and .graph modifiers

   Up until 6.3 histogram values could have "percent" or "graph"
   modifiers that changed how they were printed. But a change that added
   restricting histograms values from being strings, stack traces and
   other modifiers inadvertently prevented them from using the percent
   and graph modifiers, which were legal use cases for values.

   Put back the percent and graph modifiers.

 - Fix various typos in the comments

 - Set the trace_clock before initializing a histogram with clock
   argument

   The histogram API allows the user to specific which trace clock to
   use via a "clock=" string. The histogram is set up first before the
   clock is checked. If the passed in clock is not valid, it exits
   without fully fixing up the histogram leaving it on the list and a
   use-after-free can trigger.

   Update the clock argument first and if it fails then exit gracefully
   before the histogram trigger is placed on any lists.

 - Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event

   The function ftrace_set_clr_event() modifies the parse string and
   needs to put it back to what was passed in. It searches for ":mod:"
   via a strsep() but fails to put back the first ':' in the string.

   Add back the ':' in the passed in string.

 - Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file

   The options files are dynamically created and some tracers add their
   own options. When a tracer adds their own list of options, the
   trace_array holding them has an array to hold the list of options for
   each tracer. This array increases in size via a krealloc(), and the
   new entry gets a newly allocated array to hold the options of the new
   tracer being added.

   The element in each entry of the tracer's option array holds a
   pointer back to the trace_array, a pointer to the tracer it is
   associated to, a pointer to the flags of the option.

   The issue is that these arrays are freed when the trace_array is
   freed when its instance it represents is removed from the instances
   directory. There's a race that an open of one of these options files
   can happen when the instance is being removed.

   Add a new helper function to be called by the open function of the
   options file to iterate all existing trace_arrays under a lock and
   find the one that has the given option element in one of it's tracer
   arrays. If found, then update the associated trace_array's reference
   counter to keep it from being freed. If not found, have the open call
   return -ENODEV.

 - Disable interrupts when acquiring the lock in rb_wake_up_waiters()

   The function rb_wake_up_waiters() assumes it will be called in
   interrupt context and does not disable irqs when taking
   cpu_buffer->reader_lock, which can be called in hard interrupt
   context. The issue is in PREEMPT_RT, this function is called in
   thread context leaving this lock open to a deadlock.

   Take the lock with interrupts disabled.

 - Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash

   The tmp_ops used in update_ftrace_direct_mod() assigns its
   filter_hash field directly, but that field is annotated as __rcu and
   sparse complains. Assign it with rcu_assign_pointer()

 - Fix use-after-free in enable_trigger_private_data_free()

   The trace_event_call is accessed through the event_trigger_data's
   trace_event_file pointer to put the trace_event_call on freeing. The
   issue is that the trace_event_file data may have been freed already
   causing a use-after-free. Add a field to the event_trigger_data that
   points directly to the trace_event_call so that it can decrement its
   reference directly without needing to go through the
   trace_event_file.

 - Fix accounting of buffer data remote headers

   trace_buffer_desc_size() and trace_remote_alloc_buffer() undercount
   the number of pages is needed for the asked for size as it doesn't
   take into account the meta data on each page. Add a helper function
   to do the calculation properly and use that in these functions.

 - Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing

   The number of pages per remote ring buffer is capped by
   ring_buffer_desc::nr_page_va (32 bits). A buffer_size large enough to
   overflow that field would silently allocate a descriptor smaller than
   what was asked for.

 - Do not resize the subbuf order if any per_cpu buffer is disabled

   The mmapping of ring buffers disables resizing the subbuffers, but it
   is done per-cpu whereas the subbuf size change is done for all the
   per_cpu buffers under the buffer->mutex. It could change the size of
   some while the mapping is happening on others. Have the resize of the
   subbuf order check all the per_cpu buffers under the lock to see if
   any of them is disabled before starting and causing an inconsistency
   between buffers that are being mapped.

* tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: (25 commits)
  ring-buffer: Check resize_disabled before publishing the new subbuf order
  tracing/remotes: Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing
  tracing/remotes: Account for ring buffer page header in size calculation
  tracing: Don't dereference trace_event_file in deferred trigger free
  ftrace: Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash
  ring-buffer: Acquire the lock with irqsave in rb_wake_up_waiters()
  tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
  tracing: Fix ring_buffer_read_page_size() kernel-doc
  tracing: Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event()
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
  tracing: Undo the registration when enabling the histogram trigger fails
  tracing: Take the reference before publishing the named histogram trigger
  tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
  tracing: Fix typo "preceeded" in comment
  tracing: Fix typo "availabe" in comment
  tracing: Let histogram values keep the percent and graph modifiers
  tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
  tracing: Free histogram the field rejected for a bad modifier
  tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
  ...

3 files changed, 1287 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/xilinx/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/xilinx/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..730feff5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/xilinx/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ZYNQMP_AES) += zynqmp-aes-gcm.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ZYNQMP_SHA3) += zynqmp-sha.o
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-aes-gcm.c b/drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-aes-gcm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d54c268df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-aes-gcm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1026 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Xilinx ZynqMP AES Driver.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2022 Xilinx Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2022-2025 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/engine.h>
+#include <crypto/gcm.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/firmware/xlnx-zynqmp.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#define ZYNQMP_DMA_BIT_MASK	32U
+#define VERSAL_DMA_BIT_MASK		64U
+#define XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE		16U
+#define XILINX_AES_BLK_SIZE		1U
+#define ZYNQMP_AES_MIN_INPUT_BLK_SIZE	4U
+#define ZYNQMP_AES_WORD_LEN		4U
+
+#define VERSAL_AES_QWORD_LEN		16U
+#define ZYNQMP_AES_GCM_TAG_MISMATCH_ERR	0x01
+#define ZYNQMP_AES_WRONG_KEY_SRC_ERR	0x13
+#define ZYNQMP_AES_PUF_NOT_PROGRAMMED	0xE300
+#define XILINX_KEY_MAGIC		0x3EA0
+
+enum xilinx_aead_op {
+	XILINX_AES_DECRYPT = 0,
+	XILINX_AES_ENCRYPT
+};
+
+enum zynqmp_aead_keysrc {
+	ZYNQMP_AES_KUP_KEY = 0,
+	ZYNQMP_AES_DEV_KEY,
+	ZYNQMP_AES_PUF_KEY
+};
+
+struct xilinx_aead_dev {
+	struct device *dev;
+	struct crypto_engine *engine;
+	struct xilinx_aead_alg *aead_algs;
+};
+
+struct xilinx_aead_alg {
+	struct xilinx_aead_dev *aead_dev;
+	struct aead_engine_alg aead;
+	int (*aes_aead_cipher)(struct aead_request *areq);
+	u8 dma_bit_mask;
+};
+
+struct xilinx_hwkey_info {
+	u16 magic;
+	u16 type;
+} __packed;
+
+struct zynqmp_aead_hw_req {
+	u64 src;
+	u64 iv;
+	u64 key;
+	u64 dst;
+	u64 size;
+	u64 op;
+	u64 keysrc;
+};
+
+struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx {
+	struct device *dev;
+	dma_addr_t key_dma_addr;
+	u8 *key;
+	u32 keylen;
+	u32 authsize;
+	u8 keysrc;
+	struct crypto_aead *fbk_cipher;
+};
+
+struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx {
+	enum xilinx_aead_op op;
+};
+
+static struct xilinx_aead_dev *aead_dev;
+
+enum versal_aead_keysrc {
+	VERSAL_AES_BBRAM_KEY = 0,
+	VERSAL_AES_BBRAM_RED_KEY,
+	VERSAL_AES_BH_KEY,
+	VERSAL_AES_BH_RED_KEY,
+	VERSAL_AES_EFUSE_KEY,
+	VERSAL_AES_EFUSE_RED_KEY,
+	VERSAL_AES_EFUSE_USER_KEY_0,
+	VERSAL_AES_EFUSE_USER_KEY_1,
+	VERSAL_AES_EFUSE_USER_RED_KEY_0,
+	VERSAL_AES_EFUSE_USER_RED_KEY_1,
+	VERSAL_AES_KUP_KEY,
+	VERSAL_AES_PUF_KEY,
+	VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_0,
+	VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_1,
+	VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_2,
+	VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_3,
+	VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_4,
+	VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_5,
+	VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_6,
+	VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_7,
+	VERSAL_AES_EXPANDED_KEYS,
+	VERSAL_AES_ALL_KEYS,
+};
+
+enum versal_aead_op {
+	VERSAL_AES_ENCRYPT = 0,
+	VERSAL_AES_DECRYPT
+};
+
+enum versal_aes_keysize {
+	HW_AES_KEY_SIZE_128 = 0,
+	HW_AES_KEY_SIZE_256 = 2,
+};
+
+struct versal_init_ops {
+	u64 iv;
+	u32 op;
+	u32 keysrc;
+	u32 size;
+};
+
+struct versal_in_params {
+	u64 in_data_addr;
+	u32 size;
+	u32 is_last;
+};
+
+static int zynqmp_aes_aead_cipher(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx *rq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	dma_addr_t dma_addr_data, dma_addr_hw_req;
+	struct device *dev = tfm_ctx->dev;
+	struct zynqmp_aead_hw_req *hwreq;
+	unsigned int data_size;
+	unsigned int status;
+	int ret;
+	size_t dma_size;
+	void *dmabuf;
+	char *kbuf;
+
+	dma_size = req->cryptlen + XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE;
+	kbuf = kmalloc(dma_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!kbuf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	dmabuf = kmalloc(sizeof(*hwreq) + GCM_AES_IV_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!dmabuf) {
+		kfree(kbuf);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	hwreq = dmabuf;
+	data_size = req->cryptlen;
+	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(kbuf, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0);
+	memcpy(dmabuf + sizeof(struct zynqmp_aead_hw_req), req->iv, GCM_AES_IV_SIZE);
+	dma_addr_data = dma_map_single(dev, kbuf, dma_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr_data))) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto freemem;
+	}
+
+	hwreq->src = dma_addr_data;
+	hwreq->dst = dma_addr_data;
+	hwreq->keysrc = tfm_ctx->keysrc;
+	hwreq->op = rq_ctx->op;
+
+	if (hwreq->op == XILINX_AES_ENCRYPT)
+		hwreq->size = data_size;
+	else
+		hwreq->size = data_size - XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE;
+
+	if (hwreq->keysrc == ZYNQMP_AES_KUP_KEY)
+		hwreq->key = tfm_ctx->key_dma_addr;
+	else
+		hwreq->key = 0;
+
+	dma_addr_hw_req = dma_map_single(dev, dmabuf, sizeof(struct zynqmp_aead_hw_req) +
+					 GCM_AES_IV_SIZE,
+					 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr_hw_req))) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		dma_unmap_single(dev, dma_addr_data, dma_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+		goto freemem;
+	}
+	hwreq->iv = dma_addr_hw_req + sizeof(struct zynqmp_aead_hw_req);
+	dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, dma_addr_hw_req, sizeof(struct zynqmp_aead_hw_req) +
+				   GCM_AES_IV_SIZE, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	ret = zynqmp_pm_aes_engine(dma_addr_hw_req, &status);
+	dma_unmap_single(dev, dma_addr_hw_req, sizeof(struct zynqmp_aead_hw_req) + GCM_AES_IV_SIZE,
+			 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	dma_unmap_single(dev, dma_addr_data, dma_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	if (ret) {
+		dev_err(dev, "ERROR: AES PM API failed\n");
+	} else if (status) {
+		switch (status) {
+		case ZYNQMP_AES_GCM_TAG_MISMATCH_ERR:
+			ret = -EBADMSG;
+			break;
+		case ZYNQMP_AES_WRONG_KEY_SRC_ERR:
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			dev_err(dev, "ERROR: Wrong KeySrc, enable secure mode\n");
+			break;
+		case ZYNQMP_AES_PUF_NOT_PROGRAMMED:
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			dev_err(dev, "ERROR: PUF is not registered\n");
+			break;
+		default:
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (hwreq->op == XILINX_AES_ENCRYPT)
+			data_size = data_size + crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+		else
+			data_size = data_size - XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE;
+
+		sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst, sg_nents(req->dst),
+				    kbuf, data_size);
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+
+freemem:
+	memzero_explicit(kbuf, dma_size);
+	kfree(kbuf);
+	memzero_explicit(dmabuf, sizeof(struct zynqmp_aead_hw_req) + GCM_AES_IV_SIZE);
+	kfree(dmabuf);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int versal_aes_aead_cipher(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx *rq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	dma_addr_t dma_addr_data, dma_addr_hw_req, dma_addr_in;
+	u32 total_len = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
+	struct device *dev = tfm_ctx->dev;
+	struct versal_init_ops *hwreq;
+	struct versal_in_params *in;
+	u32 gcm_offset, out_len;
+	size_t dmabuf_size;
+	size_t kbuf_size;
+	void *dmabuf;
+	char *kbuf;
+	int ret;
+
+	kbuf_size = total_len + XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE;
+	kbuf = kmalloc(kbuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!kbuf)) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	dmabuf_size = sizeof(struct versal_init_ops) +
+		      sizeof(struct versal_in_params) +
+		      GCM_AES_IV_SIZE;
+	dmabuf = kmalloc(dmabuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!dmabuf)) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto buf1_free;
+	}
+
+	dma_addr_hw_req = dma_map_single(dev, dmabuf, dmabuf_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr_hw_req))) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto buf2_free;
+	}
+	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(kbuf, req->src, 0, total_len, 0);
+	dma_addr_data = dma_map_single(dev, kbuf, kbuf_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr_data))) {
+		dma_unmap_single(dev, dma_addr_hw_req, dmabuf_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto buf2_free;
+	}
+	hwreq = dmabuf;
+	in = dmabuf + sizeof(struct versal_init_ops);
+	memcpy(dmabuf + sizeof(struct versal_init_ops) +
+	       sizeof(struct versal_in_params), req->iv, GCM_AES_IV_SIZE);
+	hwreq->iv = dma_addr_hw_req + sizeof(struct versal_init_ops) +
+		    sizeof(struct versal_in_params);
+	hwreq->keysrc = tfm_ctx->keysrc;
+	dma_addr_in = dma_addr_hw_req + sizeof(struct versal_init_ops);
+	if (rq_ctx->op == XILINX_AES_ENCRYPT) {
+		hwreq->op = VERSAL_AES_ENCRYPT;
+		out_len = total_len + crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+		in->size = req->cryptlen;
+	} else {
+		hwreq->op = VERSAL_AES_DECRYPT;
+		out_len = total_len - XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE;
+		in->size = req->cryptlen - XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	if (tfm_ctx->keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_128)
+		hwreq->size = HW_AES_KEY_SIZE_128;
+	else
+		hwreq->size = HW_AES_KEY_SIZE_256;
+
+	/* Request aes key write for volatile user keys */
+	if (hwreq->keysrc >= VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_0 && hwreq->keysrc <= VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_7) {
+		ret = versal_pm_aes_key_write(hwreq->size, hwreq->keysrc,
+					      tfm_ctx->key_dma_addr);
+		if (ret)
+			goto unmap;
+	}
+
+	in->in_data_addr = dma_addr_data + req->assoclen;
+	in->is_last = 1;
+	gcm_offset = req->assoclen + in->size;
+	dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, dma_addr_hw_req, dmabuf_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	ret = versal_pm_aes_op_init(dma_addr_hw_req);
+	if (ret)
+		goto clearkey;
+
+	if (req->assoclen > 0) {
+		/* Currently GMAC is OFF by default */
+		ret = versal_pm_aes_update_aad(dma_addr_data, req->assoclen);
+		if (ret)
+			goto clearkey;
+	}
+	if (rq_ctx->op == XILINX_AES_ENCRYPT) {
+		ret = versal_pm_aes_enc_update(dma_addr_in,
+					       dma_addr_data + req->assoclen);
+		if (ret)
+			goto clearkey;
+
+		ret = versal_pm_aes_enc_final(dma_addr_data + gcm_offset);
+		if (ret)
+			goto clearkey;
+	} else {
+		ret = versal_pm_aes_dec_update(dma_addr_in,
+					       dma_addr_data + req->assoclen);
+		if (ret)
+			goto clearkey;
+
+		ret = versal_pm_aes_dec_final(dma_addr_data + gcm_offset);
+		if (ret) {
+			ret = -EBADMSG;
+			goto clearkey;
+		}
+	}
+	dma_unmap_single(dev, dma_addr_data, kbuf_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	dma_unmap_single(dev, dma_addr_hw_req, dmabuf_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst, sg_nents(req->dst),
+			    kbuf, out_len);
+	dma_addr_data = 0;
+	dma_addr_hw_req = 0;
+
+clearkey:
+	if (hwreq->keysrc >= VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_0 && hwreq->keysrc <= VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_7)
+		versal_pm_aes_key_zero(hwreq->keysrc);
+unmap:
+	if (unlikely(dma_addr_data))
+		dma_unmap_single(dev, dma_addr_data, kbuf_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	if (unlikely(dma_addr_hw_req))
+		dma_unmap_single(dev, dma_addr_hw_req, dmabuf_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+buf2_free:
+	memzero_explicit(dmabuf, dmabuf_size);
+	kfree(dmabuf);
+buf1_free:
+	memzero_explicit(kbuf, kbuf_size);
+	kfree(kbuf);
+err:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int zynqmp_fallback_check(struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx,
+				 struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx *rq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+	if (tfm_ctx->authsize != XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE && rq_ctx->op == XILINX_AES_DECRYPT)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (req->assoclen != 0 ||
+	    req->cryptlen < ZYNQMP_AES_MIN_INPUT_BLK_SIZE)
+		return 1;
+	if (tfm_ctx->keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_128 ||
+	    tfm_ctx->keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_192)
+		return 1;
+
+	if ((req->cryptlen % ZYNQMP_AES_WORD_LEN) != 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (rq_ctx->op == XILINX_AES_DECRYPT &&
+	    req->cryptlen <= XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int versal_fallback_check(struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx,
+				 struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx *rq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+	if (tfm_ctx->authsize != XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE && rq_ctx->op == XILINX_AES_DECRYPT)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (tfm_ctx->keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_192)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (req->cryptlen < ZYNQMP_AES_MIN_INPUT_BLK_SIZE ||
+	    req->cryptlen % ZYNQMP_AES_WORD_LEN ||
+	    req->assoclen % VERSAL_AES_QWORD_LEN)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (rq_ctx->op == XILINX_AES_DECRYPT &&
+	    req->cryptlen <= XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int xilinx_handle_aes_req(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *req)
+{
+	struct aead_request *areq =
+				container_of(req, struct aead_request, base);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_alg *drv_ctx;
+	int err;
+
+	drv_ctx = container_of(alg, struct xilinx_aead_alg, aead.base);
+	err = drv_ctx->aes_aead_cipher(areq);
+	local_bh_disable();
+	crypto_finalize_aead_request(engine, areq, err);
+	local_bh_enable();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int zynqmp_aes_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
+				  unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	int err;
+
+	if (keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
+		memcpy(tfm_ctx->key, key, keylen);
+		dma_sync_single_for_device(tfm_ctx->dev, tfm_ctx->key_dma_addr,
+					   AES_KEYSIZE_256,
+					   DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	}
+
+	tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
+	tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher->base.crt_flags |= (aead->base.crt_flags &
+						CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+
+	err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher, key, keylen);
+	if (err)
+		goto err;
+	tfm_ctx->keylen = keylen;
+	tfm_ctx->keysrc = ZYNQMP_AES_KUP_KEY;
+err:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int zynqmp_paes_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
+				   unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct xilinx_hwkey_info hwkey;
+	unsigned char keysrc;
+	int err = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keylen != sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(&hwkey, key, sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info));
+	if (hwkey.magic != XILINX_KEY_MAGIC)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	keysrc = hwkey.type;
+	if (keysrc == ZYNQMP_AES_DEV_KEY ||
+	    keysrc == ZYNQMP_AES_PUF_KEY) {
+		tfm_ctx->keysrc = keysrc;
+		tfm_ctx->keylen = sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info);
+		err = 0;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int versal_aes_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
+				  unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct xilinx_hwkey_info hwkey;
+	unsigned char keysrc;
+	int err;
+
+	tfm_ctx->keysrc = VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_0;
+	if (keylen == sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info)) {
+		memcpy(&hwkey, key, sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info));
+		if (hwkey.magic != XILINX_KEY_MAGIC)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		keysrc = hwkey.type;
+		if (keysrc >= VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_1 &&
+		    keysrc  <= VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_7) {
+			tfm_ctx->keysrc = keysrc;
+			tfm_ctx->keylen = sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_256 || keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_128) {
+		tfm_ctx->keylen = keylen;
+		memcpy(tfm_ctx->key, key, keylen);
+		dma_sync_single_for_device(tfm_ctx->dev, tfm_ctx->key_dma_addr,
+					   AES_KEYSIZE_256,
+					   DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	}
+
+	tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
+	tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher->base.crt_flags |= (aead->base.crt_flags &
+						CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher, key, keylen);
+	if (!err)
+		tfm_ctx->keylen = keylen;
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int versal_paes_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
+				   unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct xilinx_hwkey_info hwkey;
+	unsigned char keysrc;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (keylen != sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(&hwkey, key, sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info));
+	if (hwkey.magic != XILINX_KEY_MAGIC)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	keysrc = hwkey.type;
+
+	switch (keysrc) {
+	case VERSAL_AES_EFUSE_USER_KEY_0:
+	case VERSAL_AES_EFUSE_USER_KEY_1:
+	case VERSAL_AES_EFUSE_USER_RED_KEY_0:
+	case VERSAL_AES_EFUSE_USER_RED_KEY_1:
+	case VERSAL_AES_PUF_KEY:
+		tfm_ctx->keysrc = keysrc;
+		tfm_ctx->keylen = sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info);
+		break;
+	default:
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int xilinx_aes_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *aead,
+				       unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	tfm_ctx->authsize = authsize;
+	return tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher ? crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher, authsize) : 0;
+}
+
+static int xilinx_aes_fallback_crypt(struct aead_request *req, bool encrypt)
+{
+	struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+
+	aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher);
+	aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, NULL, NULL);
+	aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst,
+			       req->cryptlen, req->iv);
+	aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+
+	return encrypt ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) : crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int zynqmp_aes_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx *rq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_alg *drv_ctx;
+	int err;
+
+	drv_ctx = container_of(alg, struct xilinx_aead_alg, aead.base);
+	if (tfm_ctx->keysrc == ZYNQMP_AES_KUP_KEY &&
+	    tfm_ctx->keylen == sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rq_ctx->op = XILINX_AES_ENCRYPT;
+	err = zynqmp_fallback_check(tfm_ctx, req);
+	if (err && tfm_ctx->keysrc != ZYNQMP_AES_KUP_KEY)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (err)
+		return xilinx_aes_fallback_crypt(req, true);
+
+	return crypto_transfer_aead_request_to_engine(drv_ctx->aead_dev->engine, req);
+}
+
+static int versal_aes_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx *rq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_alg *drv_ctx;
+	int err;
+
+	drv_ctx = container_of(alg, struct xilinx_aead_alg, aead.base);
+	rq_ctx->op = XILINX_AES_ENCRYPT;
+	if (tfm_ctx->keysrc >= VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_0 &&
+	    tfm_ctx->keysrc <= VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_7 &&
+	    tfm_ctx->keylen == sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	err = versal_fallback_check(tfm_ctx, req);
+	if (err && (tfm_ctx->keysrc < VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_0 ||
+		    tfm_ctx->keysrc > VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_7))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (err)
+		return xilinx_aes_fallback_crypt(req, true);
+
+	return crypto_transfer_aead_request_to_engine(drv_ctx->aead_dev->engine, req);
+}
+
+static int zynqmp_aes_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx *rq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_alg *drv_ctx;
+	int err;
+
+	rq_ctx->op = XILINX_AES_DECRYPT;
+	drv_ctx = container_of(alg, struct xilinx_aead_alg, aead.base);
+	if (tfm_ctx->keysrc == ZYNQMP_AES_KUP_KEY &&
+	    tfm_ctx->keylen == sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	err = zynqmp_fallback_check(tfm_ctx, req);
+	if (err && tfm_ctx->keysrc != ZYNQMP_AES_KUP_KEY)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (err)
+		return xilinx_aes_fallback_crypt(req, false);
+
+	return crypto_transfer_aead_request_to_engine(drv_ctx->aead_dev->engine, req);
+}
+
+static int xilinx_paes_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *aead)
+{
+	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct xilinx_aead_alg *drv_alg;
+	struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
+
+	drv_alg = container_of(alg, struct xilinx_aead_alg, aead.base);
+	tfm_ctx->dev = drv_alg->aead_dev->dev;
+	tfm_ctx->keylen = 0;
+	tfm_ctx->key = NULL;
+	tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher = NULL;
+	crypto_aead_set_reqsize(aead, sizeof(struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int versal_aes_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx *rq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_alg *drv_ctx;
+	int err;
+
+	drv_ctx = container_of(alg, struct xilinx_aead_alg, aead.base);
+	rq_ctx->op = XILINX_AES_DECRYPT;
+	if (tfm_ctx->keysrc >= VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_0 &&
+	    tfm_ctx->keysrc <= VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_7 &&
+	    tfm_ctx->keylen == sizeof(struct xilinx_hwkey_info))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = versal_fallback_check(tfm_ctx, req);
+	if (err &&
+	    (tfm_ctx->keysrc < VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_0 ||
+	    tfm_ctx->keysrc > VERSAL_AES_USER_KEY_7))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (err)
+		return xilinx_aes_fallback_crypt(req, false);
+
+	return crypto_transfer_aead_request_to_engine(drv_ctx->aead_dev->engine, req);
+}
+
+static int xilinx_aes_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *aead)
+{
+	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct xilinx_aead_alg *drv_ctx;
+	struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
+
+	drv_ctx = container_of(alg, struct xilinx_aead_alg, aead.base);
+	tfm_ctx->dev = drv_ctx->aead_dev->dev;
+	tfm_ctx->keylen = 0;
+
+	tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher = crypto_alloc_aead(drv_ctx->aead.base.base.cra_name,
+						0,
+						CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher)) {
+		dev_err(tfm_ctx->dev, "failed to allocate fallback for %s\n",
+			drv_ctx->aead.base.base.cra_name);
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher);
+	}
+	tfm_ctx->key = kmalloc(AES_KEYSIZE_256, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tfm_ctx->key) {
+		crypto_free_aead(tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	tfm_ctx->key_dma_addr = dma_map_single(tfm_ctx->dev, tfm_ctx->key,
+					       AES_KEYSIZE_256,
+					       DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(tfm_ctx->dev, tfm_ctx->key_dma_addr))) {
+		kfree(tfm_ctx->key);
+		crypto_free_aead(tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher);
+		tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	crypto_aead_set_reqsize(aead,
+				max(sizeof(struct xilinx_aead_req_ctx),
+				    sizeof(struct aead_request) +
+				    crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher)));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void xilinx_paes_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *aead)
+{
+	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	memzero_explicit(tfm_ctx, sizeof(struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx));
+}
+
+static void xilinx_aes_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *aead)
+{
+	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
+	struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	dma_unmap_single(tfm_ctx->dev, tfm_ctx->key_dma_addr, AES_KEYSIZE_256, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	kfree(tfm_ctx->key);
+	if (tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher) {
+		crypto_free_aead(tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher);
+		tfm_ctx->fbk_cipher = NULL;
+	}
+	memzero_explicit(tfm_ctx, sizeof(struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx));
+}
+
+static struct xilinx_aead_alg zynqmp_aes_algs[] = {
+	{
+		.aes_aead_cipher = zynqmp_aes_aead_cipher,
+		.aead.base = {
+			.setkey		= zynqmp_aes_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize	= xilinx_aes_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt	= zynqmp_aes_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt	= zynqmp_aes_aead_decrypt,
+			.init		= xilinx_aes_aead_init,
+			.exit		= xilinx_aes_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize		= GCM_AES_IV_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize	= XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE,
+			.base = {
+				.cra_name		= "gcm(aes)",
+				.cra_driver_name	= "xilinx-zynqmp-aes-gcm",
+				.cra_priority		= 200,
+			.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD |
+				CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+				CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY |
+				CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
+				CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+			.cra_blocksize		= XILINX_AES_BLK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx),
+			.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+			}
+		},
+		.aead.op = {
+			.do_one_request = xilinx_handle_aes_req,
+		},
+		.dma_bit_mask = ZYNQMP_DMA_BIT_MASK,
+	},
+	{
+		.aes_aead_cipher = zynqmp_aes_aead_cipher,
+		.aead.base = {
+			.setkey		= zynqmp_paes_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize	= xilinx_aes_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt	= zynqmp_aes_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt	= zynqmp_aes_aead_decrypt,
+			.init		= xilinx_paes_aead_init,
+			.exit		= xilinx_paes_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize		= GCM_AES_IV_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize	= XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE,
+			.base = {
+				.cra_name		= "gcm(paes)",
+				.cra_driver_name	= "xilinx-zynqmp-paes-gcm",
+				.cra_priority		= 200,
+			.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD |
+				CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+				CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY |
+				CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
+			.cra_blocksize		= XILINX_AES_BLK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx),
+			.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+			}
+		},
+		.aead.op = {
+			.do_one_request = xilinx_handle_aes_req,
+		},
+		.dma_bit_mask = ZYNQMP_DMA_BIT_MASK,
+	},
+	{ /* sentinel */ }
+};
+
+static struct xilinx_aead_alg versal_aes_algs[] = {
+	{
+		.aes_aead_cipher = versal_aes_aead_cipher,
+		.aead.base = {
+			.setkey		= versal_aes_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize	= xilinx_aes_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt	= versal_aes_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt	= versal_aes_aead_decrypt,
+			.init		= xilinx_aes_aead_init,
+			.exit		= xilinx_aes_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize		= GCM_AES_IV_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize	= XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE,
+			.base = {
+			.cra_name		= "gcm(aes)",
+			.cra_driver_name	= "versal-aes-gcm",
+			.cra_priority		= 300,
+			.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD |
+						  CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+						  CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY |
+						  CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
+						  CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+			.cra_blocksize		= XILINX_AES_BLK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx),
+			.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+			}
+		},
+		.aead.op = {
+			.do_one_request = xilinx_handle_aes_req,
+		},
+		.dma_bit_mask = VERSAL_DMA_BIT_MASK,
+	},
+	{
+		.aes_aead_cipher = versal_aes_aead_cipher,
+		.aead.base = {
+			.setkey		= versal_paes_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize	= xilinx_aes_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt	= versal_aes_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt	= versal_aes_aead_decrypt,
+			.init		= xilinx_paes_aead_init,
+			.exit		= xilinx_paes_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize		= GCM_AES_IV_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize	= XILINX_AES_AUTH_SIZE,
+			.base = {
+			.cra_name		= "gcm(paes)",
+			.cra_driver_name	= "versal-paes-gcm",
+			.cra_priority		= 300,
+			.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD |
+						  CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+						  CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY |
+						  CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
+			.cra_blocksize		= XILINX_AES_BLK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct xilinx_aead_tfm_ctx),
+			.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+			}
+		},
+		.aead.op = {
+			.do_one_request = xilinx_handle_aes_req,
+		},
+		.dma_bit_mask = VERSAL_DMA_BIT_MASK,
+	},
+	{ /* sentinel */ }
+};
+
+static struct xlnx_feature aes_feature_map[] = {
+	{
+		.family = PM_ZYNQMP_FAMILY_CODE,
+		.feature_id = PM_SECURE_AES,
+		.data = zynqmp_aes_algs,
+	},
+	{
+		.family = PM_VERSAL_FAMILY_CODE,
+		.feature_id = XSECURE_API_AES_OP_INIT,
+		.data = versal_aes_algs,
+	},
+	{ /* sentinel */ }
+};
+
+static int xilinx_aes_aead_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	struct xilinx_aead_alg *aead_algs;
+	struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
+	int err;
+	int i;
+
+	/* Verify the hardware is present */
+	aead_algs = xlnx_get_crypto_dev_data(aes_feature_map);
+	if (IS_ERR(aead_algs)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "AES is not supported on the platform\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(aead_algs);
+	}
+
+	/* ZynqMP AES driver supports only one instance */
+	if (aead_dev)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	aead_dev = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*aead_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!aead_dev)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	aead_dev->dev = dev;
+	aead_dev->aead_algs = aead_algs;
+	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, aead_dev);
+	err = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(aead_algs[0].dma_bit_mask));
+	if (err < 0) {
+		dev_err(dev, "No usable DMA configuration\n");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	aead_dev->engine = crypto_engine_alloc_init(dev, 1);
+	if (!aead_dev->engine) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Cannot alloc AES engine\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	err = crypto_engine_start(aead_dev->engine);
+	if (err) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Cannot start AES engine\n");
+		goto err_engine_start;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; aead_dev->aead_algs[i].dma_bit_mask; i++) {
+		aead_dev->aead_algs[i].aead_dev = aead_dev;
+		err = crypto_engine_register_aead(&aead_dev->aead_algs[i].aead);
+		if (err < 0) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Failed to register AEAD alg %d.\n", i);
+			goto err_alg_register;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_alg_register:
+	while (i > 0)
+		crypto_engine_unregister_aead(&aead_dev->aead_algs[--i].aead);
+err_engine_start:
+	crypto_engine_exit(aead_dev->engine);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void xilinx_aes_aead_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	aead_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+	crypto_engine_exit(aead_dev->engine);
+	for (int i = 0; aead_dev->aead_algs[i].dma_bit_mask; i++)
+		crypto_engine_unregister_aead(&aead_dev->aead_algs[i].aead);
+
+	aead_dev = NULL;
+}
+
+static struct platform_driver xilinx_aes_driver = {
+	.probe	= xilinx_aes_aead_probe,
+	.remove = xilinx_aes_aead_remove,
+	.driver = {
+		.name		= "zynqmp-aes",
+	},
+};
+
+static struct platform_device *platform_dev;
+
+static int __init aes_driver_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = platform_driver_register(&xilinx_aes_driver);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	platform_dev = platform_device_register_simple(xilinx_aes_driver.driver.name,
+						       0, NULL, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(platform_dev)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(platform_dev);
+		platform_driver_unregister(&xilinx_aes_driver);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit aes_driver_exit(void)
+{
+	platform_device_unregister(platform_dev);
+	platform_driver_unregister(&xilinx_aes_driver);
+}
+
+module_init(aes_driver_init);
+module_exit(aes_driver_exit);
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("zynqmp aes-gcm hardware acceleration support.");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-sha.c b/drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-sha.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5813017b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-sha.c
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Xilinx ZynqMP SHA Driver.
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 Xilinx Inc.
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha3.h>
+#include <linux/cacheflush.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/firmware/xlnx-zynqmp.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+
+#define ZYNQMP_DMA_BIT_MASK		32U
+#define ZYNQMP_DMA_ALLOC_FIXED_SIZE	0x1000U
+
+enum zynqmp_sha_op {
+	ZYNQMP_SHA3_INIT = 1,
+	ZYNQMP_SHA3_UPDATE = 2,
+	ZYNQMP_SHA3_FINAL = 4,
+};
+
+struct zynqmp_sha_drv_ctx {
+	struct shash_alg sha3_384;
+	struct device *dev;
+};
+
+struct zynqmp_sha_tfm_ctx {
+	struct device *dev;
+	struct crypto_shash *fbk_tfm;
+};
+
+static dma_addr_t update_dma_addr, final_dma_addr;
+static char *ubuf, *fbuf;
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(zynqmp_sha_lock);
+
+static int zynqmp_sha_init_tfm(struct crypto_shash *hash)
+{
+	const char *fallback_driver_name = crypto_shash_alg_name(hash);
+	struct zynqmp_sha_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(hash);
+	struct shash_alg *alg = crypto_shash_alg(hash);
+	struct crypto_shash *fallback_tfm;
+	struct zynqmp_sha_drv_ctx *drv_ctx;
+
+	drv_ctx = container_of(alg, struct zynqmp_sha_drv_ctx, sha3_384);
+	tfm_ctx->dev = drv_ctx->dev;
+
+	/* Allocate a fallback and abort if it failed. */
+	fallback_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(fallback_driver_name, 0,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+	if (IS_ERR(fallback_tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(fallback_tfm);
+
+	if (crypto_shash_descsize(hash) <
+	    crypto_shash_statesize(tfm_ctx->fbk_tfm)) {
+		crypto_free_shash(fallback_tfm);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tfm_ctx->fbk_tfm = fallback_tfm;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void zynqmp_sha_exit_tfm(struct crypto_shash *hash)
+{
+	struct zynqmp_sha_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(hash);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm_ctx->fbk_tfm);
+}
+
+static int zynqmp_sha_continue(struct shash_desc *desc,
+			       struct shash_desc *fbdesc, int err)
+{
+	err = err ?: crypto_shash_export(fbdesc, shash_desc_ctx(desc));
+	shash_desc_zero(fbdesc);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int zynqmp_sha_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct zynqmp_sha_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct crypto_shash *fbtfm = tctx->fbk_tfm;
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(fbdesc, fbtfm);
+	int err;
+
+	fbdesc->tfm = fbtfm;
+	err = crypto_shash_init(fbdesc);
+	return zynqmp_sha_continue(desc, fbdesc, err);
+}
+
+static int zynqmp_sha_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int length)
+{
+	struct zynqmp_sha_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct crypto_shash *fbtfm = tctx->fbk_tfm;
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(fbdesc, fbtfm);
+	int err;
+
+	fbdesc->tfm = fbtfm;
+	err = crypto_shash_import(fbdesc, shash_desc_ctx(desc)) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_update(fbdesc, data, length);
+	return zynqmp_sha_continue(desc, fbdesc, err);
+}
+
+static int zynqmp_sha_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int length, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct zynqmp_sha_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct crypto_shash *fbtfm = tctx->fbk_tfm;
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(fbdesc, fbtfm);
+
+	fbdesc->tfm = fbtfm;
+	return crypto_shash_import(fbdesc, shash_desc_ctx(desc)) ?:
+	       crypto_shash_finup(fbdesc, data, length, out);
+}
+
+static int __zynqmp_sha_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
+			       unsigned int len, u8 *out)
+{
+	unsigned int remaining_len = len;
+	int update_size;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = zynqmp_pm_sha_hash(0, 0, ZYNQMP_SHA3_INIT);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	while (remaining_len != 0) {
+		memzero_explicit(ubuf, ZYNQMP_DMA_ALLOC_FIXED_SIZE);
+		if (remaining_len >= ZYNQMP_DMA_ALLOC_FIXED_SIZE) {
+			update_size = ZYNQMP_DMA_ALLOC_FIXED_SIZE;
+			remaining_len -= ZYNQMP_DMA_ALLOC_FIXED_SIZE;
+		} else {
+			update_size = remaining_len;
+			remaining_len = 0;
+		}
+		memcpy(ubuf, data, update_size);
+		flush_icache_range((unsigned long)ubuf, (unsigned long)ubuf + update_size);
+		ret = zynqmp_pm_sha_hash(update_dma_addr, update_size, ZYNQMP_SHA3_UPDATE);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		data += update_size;
+	}
+
+	ret = zynqmp_pm_sha_hash(final_dma_addr, SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE, ZYNQMP_SHA3_FINAL);
+	memcpy(out, fbuf, SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	memzero_explicit(fbuf, SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int zynqmp_sha_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 *out)
+{
+	scoped_guard(spinlock_bh, &zynqmp_sha_lock)
+		return __zynqmp_sha_digest(desc, data, len, out);
+}
+
+static struct zynqmp_sha_drv_ctx sha3_drv_ctx = {
+	.sha3_384 = {
+		.init = zynqmp_sha_init,
+		.update = zynqmp_sha_update,
+		.finup = zynqmp_sha_finup,
+		.digest = zynqmp_sha_digest,
+		.init_tfm = zynqmp_sha_init_tfm,
+		.exit_tfm = zynqmp_sha_exit_tfm,
+		.descsize = SHA3_384_EXPORT_SIZE,
+		.digestsize = SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.base = {
+			.cra_name = "sha3-384",
+			.cra_driver_name = "zynqmp-sha3-384",
+			.cra_priority = 300,
+			.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
+				     CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+			.cra_blocksize = SHA3_384_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct zynqmp_sha_tfm_ctx),
+			.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int zynqmp_sha_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
+	int err;
+	u32 v;
+
+	/* Verify the hardware is present */
+	err = zynqmp_pm_get_api_version(&v);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+
+	err = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(ZYNQMP_DMA_BIT_MASK));
+	if (err < 0) {
+		dev_err(dev, "No usable DMA configuration\n");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = crypto_register_shash(&sha3_drv_ctx.sha3_384);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Failed to register shash alg.\n");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	sha3_drv_ctx.dev = dev;
+	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, &sha3_drv_ctx);
+
+	ubuf = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, ZYNQMP_DMA_ALLOC_FIXED_SIZE, &update_dma_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ubuf) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_shash;
+	}
+
+	fbuf = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE, &final_dma_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!fbuf) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_mem;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_mem:
+	dma_free_coherent(sha3_drv_ctx.dev, ZYNQMP_DMA_ALLOC_FIXED_SIZE, ubuf, update_dma_addr);
+
+err_shash:
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_drv_ctx.sha3_384);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void zynqmp_sha_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	sha3_drv_ctx.dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+
+	dma_free_coherent(sha3_drv_ctx.dev, ZYNQMP_DMA_ALLOC_FIXED_SIZE, ubuf, update_dma_addr);
+	dma_free_coherent(sha3_drv_ctx.dev, SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE, fbuf, final_dma_addr);
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_drv_ctx.sha3_384);
+}
+
+static struct platform_driver zynqmp_sha_driver = {
+	.probe = zynqmp_sha_probe,
+	.remove = zynqmp_sha_remove,
+	.driver = {
+		.name = "zynqmp-sha3-384",
+	},
+};
+
+module_platform_driver(zynqmp_sha_driver);
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ZynqMP SHA3 hardware acceleration support.");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Harsha <harsha.harsha@xilinx.com>");