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| author | Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev> | 2026-09-22 19:14:30 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2026-09-23 12:34:30 +0000 |
| commit | 2bc6b218717b9d08f466f88209251d54bc09b207 (patch) | |
| tree | cb91c941eccb15f94cbec4e96aa3a9c8736b5d66 /drivers/crypto/caam/debugfs.c | |
| download | linux-stable-2bc6b218717b9d08f466f88209251d54bc09b207.tar.gz linux-stable-2bc6b218717b9d08f466f88209251d54bc09b207.zip | |
arm64/boot: Disable trapping of PMZR_EL0 writes to EL2grafted
__init_el2_fgt2() writes one mask to both HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2.
PMZR_EL0 is write-only, so its trap bit, nPMZR_EL0, exists only in
HDFGWTR2_EL2 and is therefore never set: a PMZR_EL0 write from the host
traps to EL2, where the nVHE hypervisor has no handler and BUG()s. The
kernel never writes PMZR_EL0, but kernel.perf_user_access=1 has the PMU
driver set PMUSERENR_EL0.UEN for a task with a user-read event, so a
write from EL0 reaches the trap and takes the host down without a panic
message.
Accumulate the HDFGWTR2_EL2 bits separately, as __init_el2_fgt() already
does for HDFGWTR_EL2, and set nPMZR_EL0 with the other FEAT_PMUv3p9
bits.
Fixes: 858c7bfcb35e1 ("arm64/boot: Enable EL2 requirements for FEAT_PMUv3p9")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/crypto/caam/debugfs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/crypto/caam/debugfs.c | 98 |
1 files changed, 98 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/debugfs.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/debugfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..718352b7a --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/debugfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0+ OR BSD-3-Clause) +/* Copyright 2019, 2023 NXP */ + +#include <linux/debugfs.h> +#include "compat.h" +#include "debugfs.h" +#include "regs.h" +#include "intern.h" + +static int caam_debugfs_u64_get(void *data, u64 *val) +{ + *val = caam64_to_cpu(*(u64 *)data); + return 0; +} + +static int caam_debugfs_u32_get(void *data, u64 *val) +{ + *val = caam32_to_cpu(*(u32 *)data); + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(caam_fops_u32_ro, caam_debugfs_u32_get, NULL, "%llu\n"); +DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(caam_fops_u64_ro, caam_debugfs_u64_get, NULL, "%llu\n"); + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API_QI +/* + * This is a counter for the number of times the congestion group (where all + * the request and response queueus are) reached congestion. Incremented + * each time the congestion callback is called with congested == true. + */ +static u64 times_congested; + +void caam_debugfs_qi_congested(void) +{ + times_congested++; +} + +void caam_debugfs_qi_init(struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv) +{ + debugfs_create_file("qi_congested", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + ×_congested, &caam_fops_u64_ro); +} +#endif + +void caam_debugfs_init(struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv, + struct caam_perfmon __force *perfmon, + struct dentry *root) +{ + /* + * FIXME: needs better naming distinction, as some amalgamation of + * "caam" and nprop->full_name. The OF name isn't distinctive, + * but does separate instances + */ + + ctrlpriv->ctl = debugfs_create_dir("ctl", root); + + debugfs_create_file("rq_dequeued", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &perfmon->req_dequeued, &caam_fops_u64_ro); + debugfs_create_file("ob_rq_encrypted", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &perfmon->ob_enc_req, &caam_fops_u64_ro); + debugfs_create_file("ib_rq_decrypted", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &perfmon->ib_dec_req, &caam_fops_u64_ro); + debugfs_create_file("ob_bytes_encrypted", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &perfmon->ob_enc_bytes, &caam_fops_u64_ro); + debugfs_create_file("ob_bytes_protected", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &perfmon->ob_prot_bytes, &caam_fops_u64_ro); + debugfs_create_file("ib_bytes_decrypted", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &perfmon->ib_dec_bytes, &caam_fops_u64_ro); + debugfs_create_file("ib_bytes_validated", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &perfmon->ib_valid_bytes, &caam_fops_u64_ro); + + /* Controller level - global status values */ + debugfs_create_file("fault_addr", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &perfmon->faultaddr, &caam_fops_u32_ro); + debugfs_create_file("fault_detail", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &perfmon->faultdetail, &caam_fops_u32_ro); + debugfs_create_file("fault_status", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &perfmon->status, &caam_fops_u32_ro); + + if (ctrlpriv->optee_en) + return; + + /* Internal covering keys (useful in non-secure mode only) */ + ctrlpriv->ctl_kek_wrap.data = (__force void *)&ctrlpriv->ctrl->kek[0]; + ctrlpriv->ctl_kek_wrap.size = KEK_KEY_SIZE * sizeof(u32); + debugfs_create_blob("kek", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &ctrlpriv->ctl_kek_wrap); + + ctrlpriv->ctl_tkek_wrap.data = (__force void *)&ctrlpriv->ctrl->tkek[0]; + ctrlpriv->ctl_tkek_wrap.size = KEK_KEY_SIZE * sizeof(u32); + debugfs_create_blob("tkek", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &ctrlpriv->ctl_tkek_wrap); + + ctrlpriv->ctl_tdsk_wrap.data = (__force void *)&ctrlpriv->ctrl->tdsk[0]; + ctrlpriv->ctl_tdsk_wrap.size = KEK_KEY_SIZE * sizeof(u32); + debugfs_create_blob("tdsk", 0444, ctrlpriv->ctl, + &ctrlpriv->ctl_tdsk_wrap); +} |
