staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 15 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/comedi/Makefile b/drivers/comedi/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..072ed83a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/comedi/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+ccflags-$(CONFIG_COMEDI_DEBUG)		:= -DDEBUG
+
+comedi-y				:= comedi_fops.o range.o drivers.o \
+					   comedi_buf.o
+comedi-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS)		+= proc.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_COMEDI_PCI_DRIVERS)	+= comedi_pci.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_COMEDI_PCMCIA_DRIVERS)	+= comedi_pcmcia.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_COMEDI_USB_DRIVERS)	+= comedi_usb.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_COMEDI)			+= comedi.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_COMEDI)			+= kcomedilib/
+obj-$(CONFIG_COMEDI)			+= drivers/