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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/clocksource/timer-probe.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/clocksource/timer-probe.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/clocksource/timer-probe.c | 45 |
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/timer-probe.c b/drivers/clocksource/timer-probe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b7860bc0d --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/clocksource/timer-probe.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012, NVIDIA CORPORATION. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/of.h> +#include <linux/clocksource.h> + +extern struct of_device_id __timer_of_table[]; + +static const struct of_device_id __timer_of_table_sentinel + __used __section("__timer_of_table_end"); + +void __init timer_probe(void) +{ + struct device_node *np; + const struct of_device_id *match; + of_init_fn_1_ret init_func_ret; + unsigned timers = 0; + int ret; + + for_each_matching_node_and_match(np, __timer_of_table, &match) { + if (!of_device_is_available(np)) + continue; + + init_func_ret = match->data; + + ret = init_func_ret(np); + if (ret) { + if (ret != -EPROBE_DEFER) + pr_err("Failed to initialize '%pOF': %d\n", np, + ret); + continue; + } + + timers++; + } + + timers += acpi_probe_device_table(timer); + + if (!timers) + pr_crit("%s: no matching timers found\n", __func__); +} |
