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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/clk/qcom/reset.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/clk/qcom/reset.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/clk/qcom/reset.c | 59 |
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/clk/qcom/reset.c b/drivers/clk/qcom/reset.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d96c96a90 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/clk/qcom/reset.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/regmap.h> +#include <linux/reset-controller.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> + +#include "reset.h" + +static int qcom_reset(struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, unsigned long id) +{ + struct qcom_reset_controller *rst = to_qcom_reset_controller(rcdev); + + rcdev->ops->assert(rcdev, id); + fsleep(rst->reset_map[id].udelay ?: 1); /* use 1 us as default */ + + rcdev->ops->deassert(rcdev, id); + return 0; +} + +static int qcom_reset_set_assert(struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, + unsigned long id, bool assert) +{ + struct qcom_reset_controller *rst; + const struct qcom_reset_map *map; + u32 mask; + + rst = to_qcom_reset_controller(rcdev); + map = &rst->reset_map[id]; + mask = map->bitmask ? map->bitmask : BIT(map->bit); + + regmap_update_bits(rst->regmap, map->reg, mask, assert ? mask : 0); + + /* Read back the register to ensure write completion, ignore the value */ + regmap_read(rst->regmap, map->reg, &mask); + + return 0; +} + +static int qcom_reset_assert(struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, unsigned long id) +{ + return qcom_reset_set_assert(rcdev, id, true); +} + +static int qcom_reset_deassert(struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, unsigned long id) +{ + return qcom_reset_set_assert(rcdev, id, false); +} + +const struct reset_control_ops qcom_reset_ops = { + .reset = qcom_reset, + .assert = qcom_reset_assert, + .deassert = qcom_reset_deassert, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(qcom_reset_ops); |
